


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14 October 1959



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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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14 OCTOBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev indicates concern that his claims of reduced tensions may lead Russians to expect rapid improvement in living conditions.


Moscow moves against "bourgeois nationalism" in Kazakhstan.

Khrushchev tells Nehru he hopes for cordial Sino-Indian relations; Nehru wary of Chinese unpredictability.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Chinese Communists refuse to issue joint communiqué with Nepal on border problems.

Pakistani and Turkish leaders seeking meeting with Shah of Iran, apparently in effort to strengthen CENTO.



III. THE WEST

⑥ Venezuelan disorders apparently no threat to President Betancourt's position.

LATE ITEM

⑦ USSR--ICBM test firing over extended range expected at Tyura Tam within next few days.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 October 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK

USSR: Khrushchev's speeches during his recent tour of Siberia reflect concern that the Soviet people may come to believe that his US visit has so reduced world-wide tensions that they can expect a rapid improvement in living conditions. Nevertheless, the moderate tone of his speeches, the omission of references to Berlin and other potentially critical situations, and his assertion that the visit produced a warmer international climate, have presumably conveyed the impression that a new phase in US-Soviet relations is under way.

(Page 1)

OK

USSR: Soviet Kazakhstan is the latest target in Moscow's campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" in the minority republics. The appointment of former KGB first deputy chairman Konstantin Lunev as Kazakh secret police chief follows closely the publication of an article in the authoritative party journal Kommunist calling for new measures to combat Kazakh nationalism. Persistent unrest in the central Asian republic is allegedly being fostered by young intellectuals who object to Russian influence over their language and culture and who glorify the ancient Moslem traditions and customs. Moscow has accused some Kazakh officials of "putting the interests of Kazakhstan in opposition to those of the Soviet Union as a whole."

In recent months, similar tendencies have led to major personnel shake-ups in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaydzhan; shake-ups have also occurred in Belorussia and Moldavia.

OK

Soviet Union - India - China:

[redacted] the USSR appreciated the "salutary steps taken by India" in withdrawing "several border outposts" which were found to be outside Indian territory and added that the USSR hoped China will follow suit and maintain peace with India. Nehru is reliably reported to feel that even if the present crisis is solved there will be no lasting accord, as "the Chinese mind is unpredictable."

[redacted] (Page 2)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Communist China - Nepal: Communist China has antagonized a Nepalese delegation which had come to Peiping to suggest talks on formal demarcation of the border between the two countries.

[redacted] Peiping reneged on an agreement made verbally by Chou En-lai and refused to become publicly committed in a joint communiqué which would agree to the traditional Nepal-Tibet boundary as a basis for negotiation. The Nepalese were planning to leave Peiping on 13 October.

Peiping's tactics toward Nepal are similar to those employed toward Burma and India, with the Chinese giving friendly assurances of readiness to negotiate border issues in general but stalling on specific details and blocking efforts for a quick settlement.

[redacted] (Page 3)

Pakistan-Turkey-Iran: Karachi and Ankara are trying to arrange a meeting in early November between the Shah of Iran, Pakistani President Ayub, and Turkish President Bayar or Prime Minister Menderes. The Pakistanis and Turks are deeply concerned over Iran, which they regard as the weak link in CENTO. They feel the necessity of strengthening the Shah's confidence and sense of solidarity by stressing their determination to cooperate in building up CENTO to resist Soviet pressures and threats. They may also wish to discuss problems relating to Afghanistan and increasing Soviet activity there.

[redacted] (Page 4)

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DAILY BRIEF

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III. THE WEST

OK
Venezuela: The broad political and labor support which quickly rallied to the Venezuelan Government after its arrests on 12 October of 40 persons for conspiratorial activity suggests that President Betancourt is not seriously threatened at this time. The arrests followed a series of bombings in Caracas beginning 9 October. The bombings came at a time when the public is uneasy over labor contract negotiations in the oil industry, uncertainty over the economic outlook, recent rumors of plotting by both civilian and military groups, and some friction among the three parties in the coalition. [redacted] (Page 5)

LATE ITEM

f10
 *USSR: The USSR is expected to conduct a test firing of an ICBM over an extended range from Tyura Tam within the next few days. Such a test is indicated by weather reporting at Klyuchi, flights by Soviet aircraft, and operations of three Sibir-class missile range instrumentation ships. At least two of these ships are now located about 1,200-1,400 miles southeast of the usual Kamchatka impact area on an approximate great circle extension of the Tyura Tam test range. This would be the first direct support to be provided by these vessels in a test-ICBM launching. [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev Cautions Soviet People Against Overoptimism Resulting From US Trip

The chief purpose of Khrushchev's five speeches during his recent tour of Siberia apparently has been to define the ideological and practical limits of current US-Soviet relations. Recent lectures and press articles by other members of the Khrushchev delegation to the US also seem to have had the same general purpose.

Khrushchev appears to be concerned lest the Soviet people get the impression that his visit has so reduced world-wide tensions that they now can expect a rapid and substantial improvement in living conditions. His injunctions about the need for hard work and his pessimistic remarks on price reductions and private ownership of automobiles make it clear that higher living standards will not be achieved easily. Similarly, his frequent reaffirmation of the superiority of "socialism" and references to "forces" at work in the US for continuing the cold war put the Soviet people on notice that the regime does not intend to make ideological compromises.

Khrushchev's speech in Krasnoyarsk, published on 11 October, is of particular interest. It is more tendentious in tone than his other recent statements and, for the first time since the US visit, omits favorable comment on President Eisenhower. Further, his reference to the "poison of bourgeois ideas" seems to preclude the possibility of a significant breakthrough on the exchange of press and radio information and may even presage a resumption of intensive Soviet jamming of the Voice of America.

However, the generally moderate tone of Khrushchev's speeches, the omission of references to Berlin and other potentially critical situations, and his admission that the visit produced a warmer international climate, have presumably conveyed the impression to the Soviet people that a new phase in US-Soviet relations is under way.

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[redacted]

Khrushchev Letter to Nehru on Sino-Indian Border Dispute

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

the USSR appreciated the "salutary steps taken by India" in withdrawing "several border outposts" which were found to be outside of Indian territory and added that the USSR hoped China would follow suit and maintain peace with India. These expressions of good will are consistent with the stand maintained both publicly and privately during the course of the current dispute by the USSR, which is trying to soft-pedal the issue as much as possible to minimize the damage to its long-standing policy of fostering Nehru's "benevolent neutralism."

[Nehru informed Mukhitdinov that India would tolerate no further border incursions, probably in the hope that the warning would persuade Soviet leaders to continue to exercise a restraining influence on the Chinese. The Chinese, for their part, have repeatedly stated their willingness to negotiate, but have as yet made no move in that direction.]

[Nehru and Prasad reportedly agreed [redacted] that even if the present crisis is resolved there will be no lasting accord on the Sino-Indian border problem, and therefore future arrangements for frontier security will have to be made. [redacted]

[redacted] Indian Army strength in the northeast frontier region, which now comprises more than two divisions, could be reinforced if necessary. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Communist China Balks on Border Communique With Nepal

A Nepalese delegation to Peiping left for Katmandu on 13 October, apparently miffed because Communist China would not sign a joint communique accepting the "traditional boundary" as a basis for negotiating the border between Nepal and Tibet. The Nepalese felt that the Chinese, by refusing to sign, had reneged on Chou En-lai's 9 October verbal agreement to accept this position for negotiating purposes.

The text of the proposed communique is not available, but Peiping previously has avoided public statements which could be construed as accepting another nation's version of ill-defined boundaries. Thus, while Chou's comments probably were intended to reassure the Nepalese, the Chinese may have felt the wording insisted on by the delegation was too definitive of the "traditional boundary" and possibly prejudicial to Peiping's present stand on the Indian border question. Chou's original offer to send a border negotiating team to Nepal probably will not be withdrawn, although initiative to get talks started appears to be back with the Nepalese.

Nepal's Prime Minister Koirala had not expected much in the way of border definition from the delegation's visit and is not likely to be too surprised by Peiping's tactics. However, he will probably continue to insist that the traditional border be used as a basis for any negotiation, and he also is likely to stall on Chou's offer of Chinese technicians to help set up a cement plant and paper mill under the provisions of Peiping's 1956 technical aid agreement with Nepal. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Pakistani and Turkish Leaders See Need to Reassure Shah Of Iran

[Karachi and Ankara are trying to arrange a meeting between the Shah of Iran, Pakistani President Ayub, and Turkish President Bayar or Prime Minister Menderes in early November. The Pakistanis and Turks consider Iran the weak link in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and feel the necessity of strengthening the Shah's confidence and sense of solidarity by stressing their determination to cooperate in building up CENTO's ability to resist Soviet pressures and threats. They probably fear that without periodic assurances the Shah may reopen negotiations with the USSR to obtain aid and bring about the cessation of hostile Soviet radio propaganda.]

[The Shah would probably be pleased with such a meeting, which would enhance his prestige both at home and abroad.]

[Both the Pakistani and Iranian governments wish to secure more military aid through CENTO and may discuss ways of coordinating their policies to this end. All three countries probably also want to discuss problems connected with Afghanistan. They have shown concern over the USSR's increasing activity in Afghanistan and apparently fear the development of a Soviet threat from that direction. Turkey is interested in expanding its military training assistance to Afghanistan, while Iran is concerned over Kabul's refusal to agree to Iranian demands regarding the division of waters of the Helmand River. Karachi is annoyed over Kabul's stepped-up attacks on its "suppression" of the tribes of Pushtoonistan.]

[Propaganda warfare between the two has reached a new intensity, and a by-product of the proposed meeting may be a sharpening of Afghanistan's sense of isolation from its two free-world neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, with whom relations are strained.]

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III. THE WEST

Venezuelan Government Moves Against Conspirators

The Venezuelan Government on 12 October arrested 40 persons--allegedly followers of former dictator Perez--for conspiratorial activity. This move followed a series of bombings in Caracas which began on 9 October. They came at a time when the government is under pressure because of unrest over the negotiations for a new contract in the oil industry, rumors of plotting by civilian and military groups, some friction among the three parties in the coalition, and uncertainty over the economic outlook. However, the broad political and labor backing, including Communist, which quickly rallied to support President Betancourt suggests that the stability of his regime is not seriously threatened at this time. Moreover, plotting in the armed forces thus far probably has not succeeded in winning substantial military or civilian backing.

On the other hand, Betancourt is threatened with labor strife--which Communists might attempt to spread--in the event the oil workers' federation does not reach a satisfactory agreement with the oil industry, on which the government and economy are largely dependent. A prolonged strike against the oil companies accompanied by violence could serve as a pretext for an attempted military take-over of the government.

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