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22 July 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN




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22 JULY 1959

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Ambassador Thompson comments on Khrushchev's designation of Koslov as his eventual successor.

Two additional Soviet destroyers reach Indonesian waters, apparently for transfer to Indonesian Navy.

[Redacted]

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Yemen--Tension rising at prospect of Imam's return.

[Redacted]

Burma--Military regime making credible record; faces internal disagreement on best means of staying in power.

Afghanistan--Soviet technicians to assist in bridge construction in sensitive area near Pakistani frontier.


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
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**III. THE WEST**

**IV.**

④ Conclusions of special USIB committee on Berlin situation.



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[Redacted]

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 July 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

\*USSR: [Commenting on Khrushchev's statement that he and Mikoyan had agreed on Kozlov to succeed them, Ambassador Thompson believes that Kozlov might take over in the event of Khrushchev's disappearance from the scene, but that he would not be capable of maintaining power, and that he has probably been selected to be front man while the power struggle is decided behind the scenes. Suggesting that Mikoyan would prefer a relatively weak character as nominal leader since this would increase his own influence, the ambassador, despite Khrushchev's disparagement of Kirichenko, considers him almost the only presidium member who appears to have the ability and drive to win out in a power struggle. In Thompson's view the party presidium is strikingly weak, with a large number of older men who have little influence in their own right and younger members most of whom appear to have little personal following and who owe their positions to Khrushchev.]

NO

[Redacted]

USSR-Indonesia: Two additional Soviet Skoryy-class destroyers, apparently transferred to the Indonesian Navy under an arms agreement with Poland, have arrived in Indonesian waters. Two destroyers and eight subchasers had previously been supplied and two submarines remain to be delivered to Indonesia under its agreement with Poland. Djakarta's arms purchases since mid-1958 total approximately \$300,000,000, of which about \$175,000,000 has been procured from the Sino-Soviet bloc, mainly from Poland and Czechoslovakia. Negotiations are in progress for additional arms from Communist China.

NO

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Yemen: [redacted]

[redacted] new trouble may occur

soon. [redacted]

No

"the people and tribes are in a mood to take action" and that "the authorities are in a state of confusion fearing the Imam's return." The UAR military mission, which in addition to its training functions has supported Crown Prince Badr, appears concerned about its own role in the situation. The Imam reportedly hopes to leave Rome by air today. [redacted]

Burma: The army-controlled administration in Burma, now nine months old, has made a vigorous approach to economic and political reforms and has taken an increasingly open pro-Western stand. Dissidence by the Shan ethnic minority [redacted] and disagreement among army leaders on how best to perpetuate army control, when and if Prime Minister Ne Win steps down, are the principal domestic political issues now facing the regime. [redacted] (Page 1)

OK

Afghanistan-USSR: Afghanistan and the USSR on 18 July announced a new agreement under which Soviet technicians will assist in the construction of three motor-road bridges in the eastern province of Ningrahar, near the Pakistani frontier. This activity would place Soviet personnel in sensitive tribal territory where disorders occurred last December in protest against government road-building operations. [redacted] (Page 3) (Map)

OK

## III. THE WEST

### IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with all SNIEs relevant to the Berlin situation.

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DAILY BRIEF

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1. The USSR continues to maintain its hard position at Geneva by linking an all-German commission with a specified time limit to an agreement for an interim solution on Berlin, apparently in anticipation of gaining further Western concessions. Furthermore, Gromyko has refused to clarify the Soviet position on the duration of Western rights in relation to an interim Berlin agreement.
2. So long as the Soviet leaders estimate that the prospects for negotiation with the West over Berlin are favorable to them they will not conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR or turn over access controls to the East Germans. The USSR will continue to use threats of such actions as a form of pressure on the West. The actual physical transfer of controls could be accomplished with little or no warning.
3. While there are no reliable indications of a bloc intent to deny Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin in the immediate future, such actions could be taken with little or no warning.
4. There has been no significant change in West Berlin's favorable economic situation.
5. There have been no significant changes in Soviet capabilities to respond to possible Western actions in the event of turnover, harassment, or blockade.
6. There were no major intelligence indications of Western allied diplomatic intentions, apart from information obtained through official contacts with US representatives. [REDACTED]

22 July 59

DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Army-controlled Regime in Burma Continuing Vigorous Reform Efforts

General Ne Win's army-controlled government is continuing its vigorous efforts to reform and revitalize Burma's political and economic life. Inept political appointees of the former government are being weeded out, and officials are being scrutinized for indications of corruption. The Ne Win regime also seems to be moving toward a reorganization of the labor movement which would neutralize labor as a political instrument.

Ne Win and the army are maintaining their campaign of attrition against the Communist insurgents and their above-ground counterparts in the National United Front (NUF). The NUF has been especially hard hit by the detention of a substantial number of its national and local leaders.

The strongly anti-Communist bias of the Ne Win government is also increasingly apparent in the execution of Burma's ostensibly neutral foreign policy. Burma seems to be slowly liquidating its once substantial economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Perhaps the best measure of the degree to which Ne Win has reoriented Burma's foreign policy is the recent agreement to accept American grant aid, a step which the former government refused to take after Burma unilaterally terminated an American technical-assistance program in 1953.

Dissidence among Burma's 1,000,000 Shans, who occupy a large area bordering on Communist China, is increasingly becoming the government's major internal preoccupation. While the Shan rebels probably still number considerably less than 1,000, Rangoon fears the movement may gain momentum unless suppressed in the near future. Of prime concern is the possibility that the Shans and the Chinese Nationalist irregulars may join forces.

The question of how best to perpetuate army influence in the government when and if Ne Win steps down is apparently still

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[unresolved. Ne Win personally leans toward holding elections late this year or early next year in the expectation that the Ba Swe - Kyaw Nyein faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League will win. Certain of his most trusted lieutenants are believed to favor postponement of the elections at least long enough to permit a select group of army officers, already deeply involved in governmental affairs, to prepare themselves to contest the elections as a "third force" seeking the parliamentary balance of power. Ne Win made clear to Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion during his recent visit to Israel that the one thing he would not permit would be former Premier U Nu's return to power.]

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### Afghan-Soviet Bridge Construction Agreement Announced

Afghanistan and the USSR on 18 July announced a new agreement under which Soviet technicians are to assist in the construction of three motor-road bridges in the eastern province of Ningrahar, near the Pakistani frontier. This activity would place Soviet personnel in the region opposite the Pakistani states of Chitral and Dir, which are subject to only limited and indirect control by Karachi, and near the sensitive Mohmand tribal area which lies astride the Afghan-Pakistani border.

The projected bridges apparently are part of an Afghan Government program for road development in this region. This program is probably partly intended to facilitate the development of mineral and forest resources in the province. The restive local tribes have opposed this construction because such road development facilitates the extension of central government control in their territory. An Afghan district official was murdered in this area last December by Mohmands, one of the Pushtu tribes, and Kabul sent troops which suppressed the agitation and arrested a number of Mohmand leaders. Afghan Prime Minister Daud was reported to suspect that Pakistan had a hand in this incident. He may intend the new agreement as a show of confidence in his ability to control the local tribes.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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 Scientific Adviser to the President  
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 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
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 Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
 The Director, The Joint Staff  
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 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
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