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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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25 NOVEMBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Activity at Tyura Tam indicates space launching may be imminent. [redacted] ①


Peiping admits drought has caused serious crop losses. ②

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Ghana irritated by Western opposition to Afro-Asian UN resolution against French atom tests; government urged to reappraise policy toward bloc. [redacted] ③


Cairo orders press campaign against Bourguiba; UAR seeks identification as champion of Algerian rebels. [redacted] ④

Factional rivalries may split South Korea's only opposition party. ⑤



III. THE WEST

⑥ Cuba--Communists gained several objectives in recent labor congress.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 November 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: (Activity at the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range indicates that a significant operation, such as the launching of a lunar vehicle or a possible attempt to recover a vehicle from space, may occur in the near future. Extensive preparations, including unusual aircraft activity, have been noted during the past three weeks. The next optimum lunar launching date is 26 November 1959.)

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Communist China: Peiping now acknowledges that last summer's drought in at least one key central China rice-growing province resulted in an almost total loss of crops from 25 percent of the land and sharp reductions on another 15 percent. The regime has been taking the line that the effects of the drought, while serious, had been overcome through a combination of the "superior organization of communes" and the party's fight against "rightist-inclined tendencies." This year's crop will almost certainly be no better than last year's, and Peiping is taking measures to restrict consumption and improve distribution in a major effort to avoid the shortages which developed late last winter.

ND

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Ghana: Ghana appears to be highly irritated over Western opposition to the recent Afro-Asian UN resolution urging France not to conduct nuclear tests in the Sahara. Newspapers controlled by the Nkrumah government--which has spearheaded

ND

the campaign in tropical Africa against the tests--have vehemently denounced the position taken by the US and Britain.

(Ghana's representative at the UN urged Accra on 16 November to make official representations to the US and Britain, and also to consider "reappraisal of our foreign policy toward the Western countries and the Soviet Union.")

inform

UAR-Tunisia: Cairo ordered its embassy in Beirut on 22 November to begin a campaign of attacks in the UAR-subsidized press in Lebanon against Tunisian President Bourguiba. The press will charge that Bourguiba has hamstrung Algerian rebel efforts and contrast this with the UAR's alleged all-out support. The UAR probably hopes the campaign will not only embarrass Bourguiba, but--more importantly--bolster Cairo's prestige vis-a-vis Baghdad as the leading supporter of the rebels.

NO

Watch Committee Conclusions: (Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Although situations in Laos and Iraq appear relatively quiet at the present, there are many elements of continuing danger in both countries.)

NO

South Korea: Rivalries in the South Korean Democratic party may result in confusion and possible violence at the party's national nominating convention on 26 and 27 November. This could split and critically weaken the only organized political opposition to the Rhee administration. The outcome of the contest for the Democratic presidential nomination between Vice President Chang Myon and titular party head Cho Pyong-ok is uncertain.

NO

the Rhee administration has ordered the national police to hinder the attendance of Cho's supporters at the convention, apparently in an effort to aggravate factionalism.

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III. THE WEST

NO
Cuba: The final results of the congress of the Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC), which ended on 23 November, included gains for the Communists. The congress rejected the "unity" slate for the top positions on the CTC executive committee which included Communists and was strongly endorsed by Fidel Castro. However, the "non-Communist" slate elected includes some who are Communist-oriented. An important Communist objective was achieved when the CTC voted to withdraw from the anti-Communist Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers. The CTC congress also passed several strongly anti-US resolutions.

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Future of South Korean Opposition Party Threatened

The future of South Korea's opposition Democratic party may hinge on the outcome of the struggle between party leaders Cho Pyong-ok and Vice President Chang Myon for control of the party at the Democratic national convention on 26 and 27 November, at which the party's 1960 presidential and vice-presidential candidates will be selected. Should either faction be able to steam-roller the convention, a split in the party might develop and undermine the only significant organized opposition to the Rhee administration. [REDACTED]

Neither faction appears confident of its strength among the delegates. In an apparent effort to intensify party factionalism, the national police have been ordered by the Rhee administration to "hinder" the attendance of Cho's supporters at the convention. Similar police tactics were used against Chang's supporters last month, when a party split may have been averted only by postponement of the convention, originally scheduled for 15 October. This police interference, if continued at the convention itself, will increase the possibility of an outbreak of violence. [REDACTED]

The American Embassy in Seoul has noted that the moderate elements in the party have had little success in promoting a compromise which would separate the presidential candidacy from the post of party leader and divide other leadership positions between the rival factions. A close vote for the presidential nomination would make a compromise more likely. Even should the split be avoided at the convention, however, the party will probably continue to be plagued by factionalism.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
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Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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