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11 AUGUST 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Peiping, sensitive to probable criticism over Tibet, discourages Indian sponsor-ship of representation issue at UN this fall.

Chinese Communists still meeting armed resistance in Tibet.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Peiping propaganda accuses US of direct intervention in Laos.

Pakistan--Military regime issues decree designed to muzzle political opposition.

Independent African nations adopt moderate resolutions but face increasingly strained relations with France over Algeria.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

<u>Communist China - UN:</u> Peiping has indicated to New Delhi its reluctance to have the Chinese representation issue raised this year in the UN, according to two Indian journalists. Aware of the damage its reputation already has suffered from its truculence during the past year, Peiping is concerned that a debate on representation would bring up the subject of Tibet. Despite the expression of Chinese concern,

New Delhi still plans to present the issue to the General Assembly.7 (Page 1)

Tibet: Peiping is apparently still meeting Tibetan armed resistance.

a "battle" in eastern Tibet and "intense" fighting in Tibetan-populated Tsinghai Province. Localized resistance against Peiping's efforts to consolidate control of Tibet is expected to continue for some time.]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Laos: Communist bloc propaganda continues its strong attack on the United States as the power behind the scenes in Laos. On 9 August Peiping claimed that the "United States has committed direct intervention militarily in Laos...and is threatening the peace in Indochina." This is the most direct Communist accusation to date of actual US "intervention."

The Laotian premier is not prepared at this time to request a UN observer and is flatly opposed to the British suggestion for a "mediator." The Laotian military commander in northern Laos

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meanwhile, says Communist partisan forces have faded into the heavily forested mountains and are conducting light skirmishes against government troops. (Page 3)

Pakistan: The Pakistani military regime, in its most authoritarian measure to date, on 7 August promulgated an order barring from public office for the next seven years persons found guilty of any act "which contributes to political instability." The regime apparently intends to ban from politics anyone considered capable of developing opposition to the regime in advance of the local-level elections planned for October. This step illustrates the Ayub government's intent to retain firm control while establishing a facade of constitutional democracy. (Page 5)

African conference: The nine independent African states meeting at Monrovia from 4 to 8 August adopted comparatively moderate resolutions on Algeria and other issues of common concern, but the anticipated increase in their involvement with Algeria may strain relations with France. Guinea announced its readiness to consider an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Algerian provisional government. This put heavy pressure on Liberia, which has reportedly agreed to recognize the rebel government in the near future despite earlier warnings that Paris might break off diplomatic relations. (Page 6)

III. THE WEST

Cyprus: (Greek-Turkish negotiations over implementation of last February's Cyprus settlement appear to be reaching a critical stage. The dispute involves conflicting interpretations of the executive powers which the accord gave to the Turkish Cypriot vice president. The matter probably will have to be referred back to the signatories of the agreement, the Greek and)

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Turkish premiers, for solution. Failure to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, however, could endanger the entire Cyprus settlement (Page 7)

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Argentina: The Peronista call for a 24-hour general strike on 11 August is ostensibly in support of the striking Tucuman sugar workers. The Peronista labor leaders may, however, wish to test the discipline of their own unions and, probably with the aid of the Communist-led unions, the vulnerability of the government to wage demands. If this strike is effective, it may hasten threatened strike calls against the railroads, power plants, and metallurgical industries. It could also provide cover for terrorist tactics, such as the frequent bombings of recent weeks.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Peiping Reluctant to Raise UN Representation Issue This Year

(Peiping has indicated to New Delhi reluctance to have the matter of representation in the UN raised when the General Assembly reconvenes 15 September, according to two Indian journalists. Chou En-lai also is reported to have told a Hong Kong Communist editor recently that he should not emphasize India's action in placing the matter before the UN, as Peiping "is not now overly anxious to join."

(The Chinese Communists apparently fear that a debate on admission to the UN would raise embarrassing questions with regard to their conduct in Tibet. They probably also realize that friendship with Communist China has lost much of its attractiveness to neutral nations during a year of truculence highlighted by the Taiwan Strait crisis, and by disputes with Burma, Pakistan, the UAR, and India itself. While Peiping probably would get pro forma support on representation from the Afro-Asian neutrals, defense of its actions in Tibet would be unlikely, leaving Communist China guilty in the eyes of the non-Communist world.)

Despite their expressions of concern, the Chinese apparently have made no formal request that India withdraw its sponsorship of the item, and a high Indian official told one of the journalists that New Delhi still plans to present the issue. New Delhi probably feels it must maintain its long-standing position on the question before the UN. In the past, Indian officials have expressed the view that China's presence in the UN would place it under greater international restraint.

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Unrest in Tibet Continues

new evidence of continuing Tibetan armed resistance. Communist authorities in eastern Tibet were refusing permission for dependents to come to Changtu, the major administrative center of the area, because of a "battle." reported "intense" fighting in the Yushu region of Tsinghai Province, a Tibetan "autonomous" area of western China.)

Peiping's propaganda in recent weeks has attempted to give the impression that military pacification has been completed. some

rebel groups remained active following the suppression of the main Tibetan resistance in March and April. The Chinese Communists have strengthened their forces in the area and now may have more than 100,000 troops in Tibet.]

(Localized resistance against Peiping's efforts to consolidate its control of Tibet is expected to continue for some time.)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Laos

The Laotian military commander in Sam Neua Province says Communist partisan forces have faded into the heavily forested mountains and are conducting light skirmishes against government troops.

the Laotian Army commander in Sam Neua charges that North Vietnam had recruited members of Laotian minority groups to serve as partisans in the current upheaval, and that North Vietnamese units in late July had crossed four miles into Laos in order to launch these guerrillas

Laotian Premier Phoui Sananikone meanwhile has reacted negatively to Britain's efforts to associate the USSR, in its capacity as cochairman of the 1954 Geneva conference, in UN mediation in the Laotian situation. Phoui believes that the Laotian Army should be able to handle the military and subversive threat in its current dimensions. He reserved the right, however, to request the secretary general of the UN to nominate an observer should subsequent developments, such as the threat of heavy Communist infiltration, necessitate such action.]

[About 15 July, 75 to 100 North Vietnamese troops were observed being airlifted in groups of twelve from Hanoi's Gia Lam airfield in two AN-2 single-engine transport aircraft, On 25 July and again on 4 August

the same source observed between 30 and 50 North Vietnamese troops boarding an IL-14 transport. The 4 August flight was scheduled for Dien Bien Phu, according to the airfield flight information board. The transport of small numbers of troops between Hanoi and Dien Bien Phu, where the 316th Division is/

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located, would not necessarily be unusual, although it is possible that this activity may be connected with the situation in Laos.

North Vietnam, with no more than 20 aircraft, most of which are small liaison and training types, does not have a major airlift capability. The initiation of IL-14 passenger service between Hanoi and Dien Bien Phu was indicated in a 2 June North Vietnamese plain-text message.

The Communist bloc continues to attack the US as the power behind the scenes in Laos. On 9 August, Peiping claimed that the "United States has committed direct intervention militarily in Laos...and is threatening the peace in Indochina." This marks the first direct Communist accusation of actual US "intervention." Other commentaries have spoken of "interference." While Communist China did not threaten counteraction, Hanoi propaganda has warned that North Vietnam "cannot sit idly by" in the event of for-. eign military intervention in Laos.

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Pakistani Military Regime Moves Against Politicians

The Pakistani military regime on 7 August promulgated an "Elective Bodies Disqualification Order" under which any persons not acceptable to the regime can be barred from public office for the next seven years. This step was taken apparently in anticipation of local elections scheduled for October. Although President Ayub's regime plans to establish a facade of constitutional democracy, it intends to retain firm control of the government for the indefinite future.

The order is the most authoritarian measure taken by the regime to date. Special tribunals can bar from office any person found guilty of such broadly defined offenses as "contributing to political instability" and "any other abuse of whatever kind of power or position." Accused persons may not have legal counsel when appearing before the tribunals, and no appeal is to be permitted. The order is to apply to religious and business figures as well as to politicians.

The authoritarian character of Ayub's action is almost certain to arouse strong resentment among the politically conscious segments of the population. The general public would probably welcome action against the more notorious politicians ousted by the order. However, if the regime applies the order to popular figures and to broad sections of local leadership, the public would be likely to resent such measures as obvious dictatorial moves by the regime to perpetuate itself in power.

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African Conference at Monrovia Takes Moderate Position

The conference of nine independent African states and the Algerian provisional government, held at Monrovia from 4 to 8 August, adopted comparatively moderate resolutions. The principal subject of discussion was the Algerian situation. The conference also listened to appeals for a review of the racial and political problems in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to a nationalist attack on British policies in Uganda, to a plea for support of Cameroun nationalist extremists, and to a demand for international discussion of the UN trust territory of Ruanda Urundi, which is administered by Belgium.

In a unanimous resolution, the representatives asked France to recognize the right of the Algerian people to self-determination leading to independence, to end hostilities and withdraw its troops from Algeria, and to enter into negotiations with the provisional government of Algeria. The conference recommended that each government prepare for the forthcoming debate in the UN, continue diplomatic action in favor of the Algerian nationalists, and give material aid to the rebels.

Any strengthening of ties between African states and the Algerian rebels will adversely affect relations between France and those governments. Nevertheless, the Guinea delegation announced that Conakry would consider an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Algerian provisional government, and Monrovia, ignoring a French threat to break diplomatic relations with nations recognizing the Algerian rebel government, reportedly will make a public announcement of recognition in several weeks.

Thus Ethiopia appears to be the only African state at the conference not intending to recognize the Algerian rebels, although it will probably support the Asian-African bloc in the UN debate this autumn.

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III. THE WEST

Dispute Over Constitution Threatens Cyprus Settlement

A serious dispute, which could threaten the Cyprus settlement of last February, has arisen among the negotiators preparing the constitution for the new Republic of Cyprus. The Constitutional Commission--composed of representatives of Greece, Turkey, and the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and aided by a Swiss legal adviser--has been working for several weeks on a constitution in line with the basic structure of government agreed to by the Greek and Turkish premiers last winter.

Article Five of the Greek-Turkish agreement is subject to differing interpretations on the extent of executive power--particularly the right of veto--granted to the Turkish Cypriot vice president. The Turks are claiming that Article Five implies "joint" or equal authority between the Greek Cypriot president and the vice president. Greek Cypriot representatives on the commission, backed by Makarios, reject the contention that the two men have equal powers and state that the vice-presidential powers are strictly limited by succeeding articles of the original agreement.]

The issue, described by the American consul general as "grave," will apparently be referred back to Athens and Ankara-possibly to the premiers themselves. Resolution of this issue will be difficult, however, in light of the adamant demand of the Greek Cypriots that the primacy of the president be recognized. Greek Cypriot leaders have indicated that their firmness on the question stems in part from fear that EOKA leader Grivas may otherwise use any retreat by them on the question as evidence of a "sellout" to the Turks. By this admission, they give support to expressed Turkish Cypriot fears that Grivas' recent criticism of Makarios will tend to make the moderate Greek Cypriots more intransigent and a final settlement more difficult.

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