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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 June 1959

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#### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - Tibet: (Peiping ordered New China News Agency correspondents in Lhasa to stop sending material on the Dalai Lama

This instruction, together with Peiping's failure to comment on two recent public statements by the Dalai Lama, suggests that the Chinese Communists now intend to avoid any publicity for the Dalai Lama which might detract from their effort to build up the Panchen Lama. Any demands for Tibetan "independence" by the Dalai Lama at his scheduled 20 June press conference could result, however, in Communist propaganda linking him with the "small group of reactionaries who oppose reform" in Tibet.

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR:

the UAR has recently deployed and alerted various elements of its military forces. These measures, if not part of routine exercises, probably are precautionary and would reflect Cairo's apprehension over its dispute with Israel regarding Suez Canal shipping and possibly also Syrian-Jordanian border tension. Some UAR dispositions may possibly be designed as well to support dissident Iraqi tribal elements. (Page 1)

Iraq: The Iraqi Communist Party, which has lately received some setbacks, has entered into a new dispute with Prime Minister Qasim. The party newspaper has objected

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i

TOP SECRET

	to Qasim's announcement that amnesty will be granted on 16  June, a religious holiday, to Iraqis banished to remote areas of the country, who the Communists allege are feudal or re- actionary elements. (Meanwhile, there are unconfirmed re- ports of a major split within the party's central committee on the question of how to deal with the Qasim regime)
L	unconfirmed
	that Qasim was moving to thwart a plot by
	Communists, supported by some military elements, to assassinate him. (Page 2)
	Yemen: Unrest, probably related to the uncertain Yemeni succession problem, has again developed into violence in Yemen.
	"the situation is very serious" in Taiz, Yemen's southern capital, where fighting involving soldiers and civilians was in progress. Government forces quelled an earlier army uprising in Sana, the northern capital, on 18 May.
	(In Rome, it is improbable that the Imam will ever be able to rule effectively again. Physicians have characterized his treatment for drug ad- diction as "endless and probably hopeless." Crown Prince Badr apparently hopes to keep the Imam in Italy so that he can con- solidate his position as the Imam's designated successor in Yemen.
) <del>/</del>	Guinea: (President Sekou Touré of Guinea may be planning the ''liberation'' of neighboring Portuguese Guinea through a campaign of propaganda and civil disobedience. He apparently is organizing a network of sympathizers there among tribesmen related to those in the Republic of Guinea. Although Touré has reportedly stated that Guinea would offer armed aid in case of an insurrection in the Portuguese territory, such a development appears unlikely in the near future.)
	(Page 4)

15 June 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

India: The three-day-old civil disobedience campaign by opposition parties against the Communist government in Kerala State has resulted in widespread disturbances. Five persons have been killed and many injured in several clashes between police and opposition demonstrators. Increased violence is likely as a result of the intensive agitation planned by Catholic and upper-caste Hindu groups against Communist education policies. Communist offers to compromise probably will not be considered by opposition leaders, who hope that a serious breakdown of law and order may force New Delhi to suspend parliamentary government and invoke direct rule.

(Page 5)

#### III. THE WEST

France-Yugoslavia: The quick protest of the French government over the joint Yugoslav-Algerian statement of 12 June, proposing French-Algerian negotiations to end the Algerian war, reflects Premier Debré's desire to stress his firm position without being obliged to follow through on his threat to break diplomatic relations with states formally recognizing the rebels' Provisional Algerian Government. While the statement reflected no basic change in the Yugoslav position toward the rebel government, Paris nevertheless regarded it as an "inadmissible intrusion in French affairs." (Page 6)

France: Premier Debre's decision to draft key workers will probably prevent a serious transportation stoppage in the 8-hour strike all French railroad unions have called for 16 June. The Communist-led General Labor Confederation will take full advantage of the government's action, however, to play up the first large-scale strike collaboration it has been able to achieve with the non-Communist unions since 1953. The government hopes to delay wage hikes until 1960, but, if labor restiveness becomes more serious, it may feel obliged to make some concessions earlier. (Page 7)

15 June 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

Guatemala: A new period of political tension appears in prospect. Maneuvering has begun for the election on 5 July to fill the important office of mayor of the capital, Guatemala City. At the same time, Communists are increasingly active and are planning to instigate student-labor demonstrations on 25 June. There is also a continuing possibility of a coup effort against President Ydigoras by rightists who want to prevent further gains by the Communists and other leftists.

(Page 8)

iv

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

No Back-up material

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

# Deployment and Alert of UAR Military Forces

A deployment and alerting of elements of the UAR's mil-
itary forces has occurred recently.
all military leave outside of the country was pro-
hibited on 8 June, and the most senior personnel in training
groups in the Soviet Union have been recalled to Cairo.
(Several squadrons of the UAR's MIG-15s and MIG-17s ap-
pear to have been moved from the Cairo area, possibly to the
Sinai neninsula or Syria, and all tanks and three artillery reg-
iments have been missing from camps in the Suez Canal zone,
although there was no change in infantry strength there. How-
ever. 51 tanks have been observed along the Sinai coast of the
Culf of Suez, and earlier reports indicated there was a concen-
tration of troops and armor, including tanks, in the Sinai penin-
sula. Roughly one half of the UAR Navy, including three Russian-
made W-class submarines and two destroyers, were absent from
Alexandria harbor as of 11 June,
This deployment of planes, tanks and naval ships could be
associated with routine maneuvers. However, the UAR's cons-
persal of its heavy equipment may also be precautionary
measures taken as a result of current tensions involving the
UAR with Israel over Suez Canal shipping, and with Jordan be-
cause of Cairo's recent closure of Syria's Jordanian border.
Some of the activity may also be related to UAR support of dis-
sident Iraqi tribal elements along the Syrian-Iraqi border.

#### Current Position of the Iraqi Communist Party

The Iraqi Communist party has entered into a new public dispute with Prime Minister Qasim--this time on the issue of his decision to grant amnesty on the occasion of a 16 June religious feast to a large number of Iraqis who had been "exiled" to various parts of the country. The party newspaper has complained that those banished included "feudalists and reactionaries who had participated in imperialist plots." A UAR message from Baghdad said about 2,000 people had been released.

Quarreling with the government's statement that stability and security prevail in Iraq, the Communist organ said that during the past two weeks there have been a series of violent assaults by "reactionary groups" against trade unions, peasant organizations and "other democratic bodies." It added that activities of the Popular Resistance Forces have been curtailed and that officials had been transferred to special units in governmental departments to "watch progressive movements."

Beginning with Qasim's rejection in May of Communist demands for governmental sanction of party activities and for appointment to the cabinet of acknowledged Communist party representatives, the Iraqi Communists have suffered a series of setbacks. These have included a governmental proclamation emphasizing that judicial procedures even in security matters are the province of the courts, a directive cautioning the press and radio to be prepared to substantiate charges published against individuals, and moves by the army command to assert tighter control over the Popular Resistance Forces. Leaders of the socialist National Democratic Party (NDP) have shown an increasing willingness to make decisions independent of the Communists, and Finance Minister Hadid, an NDP stalwart, has been elected chairman of the Communistfront Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The Communist-packed Iraqi delegation to promote fraternal relations with other Arab countries had its departure date twice postponed and so far has been circumspect in its public statements in other countries. Most important of all, there are indications of some gradual resurgence of anti-Communist groups throughout Iraq.

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There are, at the same time, persistent reports of a major split within the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist party itself. One wing allegedly favors continuing of pressure tactics of all types to force the party's inclusion in the government; the other counsels caution and continued ostensible support of the Qasim regime until the hard core of the party has had time to improve the organization and discipline of its mass of recent adherents.
A street demonstration staged by the Communists in Baghdad on 12 June in favor of a "National Union Front" of political parties—defying Qasim's wishes for a suspension of party activity—came off without incident. However, press reports now indicate clashes have occurred in the countryside between Communists and NDP members who are vying for leadership of Iraq's peasantry.
unconfirmed report that Qasim has discovered a Communist plot, to assassinate him, which involved army tank corps officers. As a result the ammunition of the tank regiments and armored units stationed in Baghdad reportedly was withdrawn and several officers are to be transferred. Cairo newspapers are now printing reports of the alleged plot.

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## Guinea May Intervene in Portuguese Territory Guinea President Sekou Touré plans to "liberate" neighboring Portuguese Guinea by a campaign of propaganda and agitation. Toure's plan, which has apparently been approved by the powerful political bureau of Guinea's single party, envisages the development of a network of sympathizers in Portuguese Guinea, the use of civil disobedience, and finally insurrection. Touré would employ African tribesmen related to those in Guinea--presumably his own Moslem Mandingo tribesmen, who make up about 65,000 of the half-million population of the Portuguese territory. The Mandingo are considered intelligent. very aggressive, and well supplied with firearms.) Sekou Touré reportedly stated his willingness to furnish insurrectionists clandestinely with arms) (Lisbon will not readily abandon Portuguese Guinea because it would fear the effect on other overseas provinces in India and Africa. Portuguese officials have shown growing apprehension over the effect of the Africans' emancipation movement on Portugal's African holdings. Last October after French Guinea became independent the American consul general in Dakar reported that the Portuguese were "literally trembling" at the possible threat this posed to Portuguese Guinea. Lisbon has recently opened three new army installations in Portuguese Guinea although its armed strength there is only about 1,200

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rity authorities in mid-May suggested to the government the establishment of prison facilities in the Azores to house natives from the overseas African provinces who engage in subversive

African enlisted men led by Portuguese officers.

activities,

Portuguese secu-

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# Agitation Against Communist Government in India's Kerala State

The widespread agitation against the Communist regime in Kerala State, which the local Congress party and other opposition groups opened with a general strike on 12 June, has resulted in continuing disturbances. Five persons were killed and 30 injured on 13 June when Communist-directed police opened fire on a large crowd in northern Kerala. Many opposition volunteers have been arrested following "nonviolent" demonstrations in the capital city of Trivandrum and other centers throughout the state.

Further violence is likely when the intensive agitation planned by the Catholic and Hindu Nair communities against Communist education policies begins on 15 June. These groups have long planned an all-out effort to challenge the Communist government and apparently have been amassing weapons in anticipation of clashes with Communist security forces.)

Both government and opposition leaders had hoped to place the responsibility for whatever violence occurred on the other. A group of top Kerala and all-India Communist party leaders reportedly agreed at a meeting in Bombay on 7 June to avoid police firing during the first stages of the agitation, and resort to "intensive repression" only when it is clear such action is essential to prevent serious disorders.) Opposition strategists now are likely to exploit the police shooting on 13 June to incite further "direct action" against the Communists.

Communist Chief Minister Namboodiripad has offered to compromise with the opposition parties, and he invited Prime Minister Nehru to visit Kerala following Nehru's recent statement that he would go there if it would help resolve the situation peacefully. Anti-Communist leaders in Kerala are unlikely to accept the compromise offer, since they hope that a serious breakdown of law and order will either force the Communists to resign or cause New Delhi to suspend parliamentary government in the state and institute direct rule. If the Communist position deteriorates drastically, party leaders may also conclude that direct President's Rule--with the onus for intervention on New Delhi--is the best way out of an unfavorable situation.

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#### III. THE WEST

### French-Yugoslav Relations Strained Over Algeria

The quick protest Paris made to the joint communiqué issued in Belgrade on 12 June by representatives of Yugoslavia and of the Algerian rebels' provisional government (PAG) indicates that France intends to press strongly its official policy of discouraging other countries from recognizing the rebels. Paris seems to be acting on the basis that the Yugoslav-Algerian statement, which followed a visit to Belgrade by Ferhat Abbas, premier of the PAG, did not imply diplomatic recognition. The Paris press notes that the expression "representatives" for the Yugoslav signatories, may mean the Yugoslav Government need not be directly involved.

Without formal acknowledgment of recognition by Belgrade, Premier Debré may have decided to use this incident to reemphasize the strong public position he and President de Gaulle have taken that relations will be cut with any nation which recognizes the rebels.

Belgrade has consistently taken a sympathetic attitude toward the rebel government, but so far has refrained from formal recognition. The French government warned Belgrade in April that such a move could automatically result in a severance of relations. In recent months, however, the Yugoslavs have given haven to wounded Algerian rebels and have attempted to interject themselves as intermediaries between the Algerian rebels and the De Gaulle government.

Aside from the Algerian issue, relations between Paris and Belgrade have been good, and both sides have concrete reasons, mainly in trade and economic aid, for avoiding a break. Belgrade, however, made a strong official protest on 13 June concerning the detention for three hours the same day of a top Yugoslav trade union official, Misa Pavicevic, on his arrival at Paris airport to attend a French trade union congress.

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#### French Labor Unrest Increasing

Premier Debré has the authority and the means of enforcing his decision to force key transport workers to remain on their jobs during the 8-hour strike period proclaimed by all the major railroad unions for 16 June. He insists that wage increases now will ruin the economic stability that France is achieving as a result of broad reforms instituted at the beginning of the year.

Labor leaders are increasingly inclined to force his hand. Their bargaining power had been weakened in 1958 by fear of a recession as well as by the general desire to avoid complicating De Gaulle's task. The effect of reduced earnings and reduced purchasing power became apparent in March, however, when widespread local demonstrations and short work stoppages occurred during a "week of action" sponsored by the Christian Workers' Confederation.

As the government's statements on improved financial conditions became more and more optimistic, labor restiveness increased. Workers in the nationalized transport services have been particularly irked because an agreement to bring their wages up to the levels of private industry has been held up for over a year. On 6 May, a 24-hour rail strike brought Parisian suburban traffic to a virtual standstill, and on 1 June a Paris subway strike halted rush-hour traffic.

The Communist-led General Labor Confederation (CGT) has avoided taking the initiative in these demonstrations, but it has joined agitation started by other labor groups. It can now cite a number of instances of unity of action and it will be increasingly difficult for the non-Communist labor leaders to justify their efforts to avoid formal collaboration, particularly if the government holds firm. Increased CGT pressure can be expected, particularly since the French Communist party has been reduced to a handful of deputies in the National Assembly, and has no other legal means of pressing its influence.

There are some signs of private management's willingness to adopt a more flexible wage policy, and the government has indicated that adjustments may be possible by the end of 1959. It seems likely, however, that some concessions beyond the minor family allowances just announced, will be necessary by fall.

#### New Period of Political Tension Developing in Guatemala

A new period of political tension appears to be developing in Guatemala. June and July have traditionally been months of political violence there, and this year the situation is complicated by the political maneuvering for the important mayoralty election in the capital on 5 July. In addition, Communists are preparing to instigate student-labor demonstrations on 25 June, the third anniversary of bloody student riots. They could get out of hand, particularly if accompanied by counterdemonstrations by rightists.

The capricious President Ydigoras, though a skillful political manipulator, appears to be losing political strength. The economic situation is deteriorating and he may again attempt to distract attention from his domestic difficulties, by some move similar to his provocative attack on Mexican fishing boats last December, although this action and earlier threats against neighboring British Honduras only fleetingly served this purpose. Ydigoras' apparent personal grudges against the United States and his failure to obtain additional economic assistance might lead him to attempt to exploit the latent anti-American feeling among many diverse groups in Guatemala.

Ydigoras' efforts to control Communism have been half-hearted, and the Communists have refrained from attacking him in the realization that a successor regime might be less favorable to their present interests. His efforts to curry favor with the increasingly strong non-Communist leftist groups reflect a growing conviction among many Guatemalans that the leftists will inevitably succeed to power in Guatemala. Extreme rightists, alarmed at these trends and thoroughly disillusioned with Ydigoras, may in the coming months, be sufficiently encouraged by Ydigoras' declining strength to implement their long-standing desire to effect a coup.

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The Secretary of the Treasury

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

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