UP SECRET

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)


1 April 1959

Copy No. C 62

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



TOP SECRET

proved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003008

TAD SEADETApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003008

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003008 1 APRIL 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC GMAIC comments on 30 March Soviet ICBM firing. 1 Khrushchev states privately that USSR intends no unilateral action on Berlin before a summit meet-2 ing. USSR warns that any future incidents such as the 27 March highaltitude flight in Berlin air corridor will make US "completely responsible" for "undesirable consequences." 3 Bloc officials urging Cairo to moderate anti-Communist campaign. (SECRET) Soviet deliveries of military equipment to UAR con-**(4)** tinue. II. ASIA-AFRICA (5) Yemeni official says Nasir's anti-Communist campaign has produced "unanimous" reaction against USSR and Qasim in Yemen. **6** III. THE WEST 7 Costa Rican President Figueres expects serious political deterioration in Cuba and expresses alarm at extent of Communist influence there. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003008

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

1 April 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee issued on 31 March the following statement concerning the most recent Soviet ICBM launching:

At about 1800 EST, 30 March 1959, the USSR launched another probable ICBM test vehicle, which failed in flight. Unlike the successful ICBM test firing on 25 March, this countdown was very smooth with no delays. There is very firm data from ELINT and COMINT that this vehicle fell far short of the Kamchatka Peninsula--perhaps half way.

This is the third known in-flight failure out of eleven test ICBM launchings.

Berlin air corridor: A Soviet communication protesting the high-altitude flight of a US C-130 aircraft between Frankfurt and Berlin on 27 March warns that any future incidents of this type could result in "undesirable consequences" for which the US would be "completely responsible." The USSR claims the altitude at which the plane was flying violated the regulations pertaining to guarantees of safety for flights in the corridors which were worked out in the course of many years of "practical experience." The Western position is that there is no ceiling in the Berlin air corridor.

USSR-Berlin: Khrushchev told West German Social Democratic leader Carlo Schmid in mid-March that nothing would happen regarding Berlin before a summit meeting,

014

SINAB

i

TOP SECRET

	This is the most specific Soviet			
	statement to date that the USSR does not intend to take unilat-			
	eral action on Berlin before high-level East-West talks. The			
	Soviet leaders will probably continue to avoid such specific			
	statements in their public pronouncements, which are designed			
	to maintain the threat of a sudden unilateral move as a means of			
	bringing increasing pressure on the West. Khrushchev also			
	told Schmid that the USSR will drop an "impregnable iron cur-			
	tain" around Berlin if the United States moves even a single			
	division toward the city.			
	Soviet-UAR relations: (The Chinese Communist ambas-			
1.0	sador in Cairo has been urging UAR officials to slacken their			
, (0	anti-Communist campaign and restore good relations with the			
M	. bloc,			
ţ	Soviet Ambassador			
	Kiselev is returning immediately to Cairo, apparently with in-			
	structions to do everything possible to persuade Nasir to halt			
	his attacks. Moscow is continuing to de-			
	liver military equipment to the UAR, despite the fears of some			
	UAR officials that economic and military aid may be disrupted.			
	(Page 1)			
	II. ASIA-AFRICA			
	Yomana Nasinis anti Cammunist samusism has anadread			
	Yemen: Nasir's anti-Communist campaign has produced			
	a "unanimous" reaction against the USSR and Qasim in Yemen,			
	according to the Yemeni deputy foreign minister. Soviet per-			
10	sonnel in Yemen have been insulted on the streets, and three			
1/2	Russian pilots were stoned by children in the capital. The			
	Yemeni official also claimed that the Imam is attempting to			
	limit the activities of both the Russians and the Communist			
	Chinese in Yemen. (CONFIDENTIAL)			
	Saudi Arabia:			
	the Saudis are readying stocks of arms, ammuni-			
1.	tion, and vehicles which have had all markings removed. In			
10				
(
	1 1 50			
	1 Apr 59 DAILY BRIEF ii			

TOP SECRET

the past such preparations have related to supply of the Omani rebels whose leaders have recently taken refuge in Saudi Arabia. These arms may be intended to support renewed dissidence in Oman. The Saudis may also be planning to support tribal enemies of the British-protected Sheik of Abu Dhabi, whose forces have occupied Saudi-claimed territory at the base of the Qatar Peninsula.

(Page 2) (Map)

III. THE WEST

Cuba: The extent of Communist influence in Cuba was impressed on former Costa Rican President Figueres during his visit there last week. Figueres now definitely regards Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro as an opponent of the leftist non-Communist Latin American revolutionary movement represented by himself and Venezuelan President Betancourt. He expects serious political deterioration in Cuba, after which "anything can happen," including Communist domination. (SECRET) (Page 3)

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):

1. The USSR will not turn over access controls to the GDR in the near future. However, the physical transfer of access controls could be accomplished with little or no advance warning.

1 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

TOP SECRET

- 2. Soviet acceptance of a foreign ministers' meeting conforms with continuing indications of Soviet emphasis on negotiations.
- 3. There are no reliable indications of a bloc intent in the near future to harass or blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the East. However, the USSR could take such actions with little or no warning.
- 4. De Gaulle's indirect reference to preserving the Oder-Neisse line, in his press conference of 25 March, may have been interpreted by the USSR as a clear indication that the West envisages this concession.
- 5. The situation in West Berlin remains basically unchanged. The general level of economic activity continues not far below pre-crisis levels, although orders for heavy industry have shown a decline.

1 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist Bloc Relations With UAR
Communist bloc diplomats are continuing efforts to smooth
over differences with UAR President Nasir and tone down the
dispute between the UAR and Iraq. Nevertheless, on 30 March

dispute between the UAR and Iraq. Nevertheless, on 30 March Nasir broke his week-long silence and again strongly criticized the USSR for its interference in Arab affairs. The Soviet press and radio have in the past been unwilling to let Nasir's public charges go unanswered.

The Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo is urging UAR officials to slacken their anti-Communist campaign and restore good relations with the bloc,

Peiping's vice foreign minister may have made similar representations during his recent visit to Cairo. Peiping has taken much the same propaganda position toward Nasir as has Moscow, although its press attacks have been less frequent and no Chinese leader has publicly criticized the UAR.)


Soviet Ambassador Kiselev is returning immediately to Cairo, reportedly with instructions to do everything possible to persuade Nasir to halt his attacks. The Soviet ambassador in Baghdad recently urged Premier Qasim not to intensify his quarrel with the UAR.

There has been no indication thus far that the USSR is deliberately delaying military or other deliveries to the UAR,

A Soviet vessel

is apparently on its way to Alexandria with some of the military equipment in question.

SECRET



Saudi Arabia Prep	aring Clandestine Arms Shipment	
\(\sigma^{\cdot}\)		
ammunition, and very removed. The con	Government is preparing stocks of a chicles from which all markings have neern to prevent the weapons being transment suggests that the materiel is dutry.)	e bee
structed the al-Kh and ammunition to	the Directorate of Ordnance in Riyadarj ordnance depot to ship unmarked the Persian Gulf port of Dammam. Tammunition, from Tabuk in northwest of the forwarded.	arms Chirt
the Saudis hav	e removed the American pilots from which are hauling the ammunition fro	the S
the Omani rebels. refuge in eastern S military operations. The Saudis may interfort against the I troops are withdraplan to support trik Abu Dhabi, whose	The Omani rebel leaders have recent audi Arabia as a result of successful against the rebels' mountain stronghed at this time to support a new Omeritish-backed Sultan of Muscat when we in April. It is also possible that to bal enemies of the British-protected Storces have occupied Saudi-claimed to bay at the base of the Qatar Peninsula	itly to Britania. Britania. Britania. Britania. Britania.
Saudi-inspired atte al-Udaid Bay may	mpt to remove the Abu Dhabi outpost be contemplated. Ownership of the K	on K Chor
of the offshore oil	ve a bearing on the legal ownership of ield now being developed under an offs the Sheik of Abu Dhabi.)	par hore
cession granted by		

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003008

III. THE WEST

Communists Making Headway in Cuba

Former Costa Rican President José Figueres was impressed with the extent of Communist influence in Cuba during his visit there last week. He and his close associate, Gonzalo Facio, returned convinced that the Communists are influential, not only in the Cuban Army and in organized labor, but also in circles close to Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

Figueres now definitely regards Castro as an opponent of the leftist non-Communist Latin American revolutionary movement represented by himself and Venezuelan President Betancourt. He expects serious political deterioration in Cuba, after which "anything can happen," including Communist domination. He strongly suspects that there is a nucleus of dedicated Communists in Cuba trying to create a "Hungary in reverse" requiring US armed intervention. This would entail considerable bloodshed and have world-wide repercussions favoring the Communists, he fears.

Figueres' observations were apparently confined to the Havana area. In Oriente Province, where the Communists appear to exert their greatest influence, a group of citizens has found it advisable to disband its anti-Communist civic committee since anti-Communists are being equated with counter-revolutionaries, who are considered close to being traitors in Cuba today. In Oriente, Communists are prominent among the teachers being recruited for the violently anti-US political-indoctrination schools which the government is establishing to teach the illiterate rural masses. The schools are expected to be extended to the rest of the island.

_ ~ 1	70r	TTET
	~~~	
	:F1	ET-

COMPUNEY Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003008

#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

<del>-CONFIDENTIAL</del>

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003008

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003008 TOP SECRET

[1] [Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003008* [ ]