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14 February 1959


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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14 FEBRUARY 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR apparently believes that British views on Berlin and Germany can be exploited to weaken Western unity.

Macmillan may be governed by domestic political considerations in proposals to USSR.



MIG-19s noted in East China.

Chinese Communist ambassador in Cambodia privately expresses confidence in Sihanouk.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq - Last two members of NDP in cabinet submit resignations.

Nasir intends to halt his campaign against Communist influence in Iraq.



- ⑦ Algerian rebel government's relations with Nasir have deteriorated; it may turn to Iraq for more weapons.
- ⑧ Cameroun terrorists will reportedly engage in violence prior to UN consideration of Cameroun independence on 20 February.
- ⑨ Burma - Ne Win resigns as premier; apparently forcing showdown to return him for indefinite tenure.
- ⑩ South Korea - Rhee taking counter-measures in effort to block Japan's decision to repatriate Koreans to North Korea.

LATE ITEM

- ⑪ Cuba - Fidel Castro takes over as prime minister.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 February 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

no

*USSR: [A Soviet official in Bonn recently gave the impression to an American correspondent that the USSR considers Britain to be the "weakest link" in the Western front and may hope to use Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to drive a "hard bargain." A Soviet Embassy officer in Paris has expressed doubt that Britain would participate in any Western military action to keep land access to Berlin open.] (SECRET NOFORN) (Page 1)

no

*UK-USSR: [The American Embassy in London reports indications that Prime Minister Macmillan has "election fever" and may be tempted to make proposals to the USSR primarily motivated by domestic political considerations. A large number of top-level officials will accompany the prime minister, and more than 100 newsmen are seeking visas.] (Page 3)

no

Communist China: [FARMER (MIG-19) jet fighters in at least one flight reference over East China. Some of these planes were noted in China in late October 1958 when aircraft from the Soviet Union landed in Manchuria. The presence of these supersonic fighters in East China will improve Chinese Communist air defense capabilities in the Taiwan Strait area.] (Page 5) (Map)

no

Communist China - Cambodia: Ambassador Wang Yu-ping recently expressed confidence to his staff that Sihanouk's position would become more stable in 1959 and that Sino-Cambodian relations would continue to improve to Peiping's advantage. Ambassador Wang was one of the first to tip off Sihanouk regarding the plot against his regime supported by South Vietnam and Thailand.] (Page 6)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq: The last two members of the National Democratic party (NDP) in the Iraqi cabinet have submitted their resignations, [redacted] Prime Minister Qasim now will be left to rely only on the support of his personal following among the military and on the Communists.

no [redacted] The leader of the NDP, Kamil Chadirchi, has been Qasim's principal political adviser. He was reported recently to be hoping to make the NDP more potent than the Communists, who he felt were taking the lead away from him. [redacted]

UAR: [Nasir intends to end, at least for the time being, his campaign against Communist influence in Iraq, according to an emissary from Nasir to Ambassador Hare. The emissary said this action is to be taken because Nasir believes he cannot continue to attack the Communists while the British and French governments remain hostile to him. Nasir may hope that the US will bring some pressure to bear on London and Paris in order to create a unified backing for him in the event of a further worsening of his relations with Moscow. A more important consideration for Nasir, however, probably is that his tactics toward Iraq have not succeeded.] [redacted] (Page 7)

Algeria: Relations between the Algerian rebel government and President Nasir's regime seem to have deteriorated seriously and the Algerians now may turn to Iraq as the principal source of weapons to continue the rebellion. [redacted]

no [redacted] the removal of the rebel government from Cairo to Tunis and offers arguments to refute the anti-UAR charges which Cairo expects the Algerian rebel premier will make during his forthcoming tour of the Middle East and Asia. [redacted] (Page 8)

Cameroun: Leftist terrorists have reportedly been instructed by their Cairo-based headquarters to engage in violence to embarrass the moderate pro-French native government shortly before the UN General Assembly meets on 20

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DAILY BRIEF

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February to consider Camerounian independence. If settlement of the issue is postponed, the pro-Western government may be unable to combat growing disorders and may fall from power. [redacted] (Page 9) (Map)

no *Burma: [General Ne Win, through his statements explaining his resignation as prime minister on 13 February, is apparently forcing a showdown in Parliament on the question of whether to make the constitutional changes necessary to permit his return to the premiership indefinitely or to call for elections in April. Ne Win may expect significant opposition to his request for such a constitutional amendment, particularly from former Prime Minister U Nu. However, he is probably counting on the threat of extra-legal action by the army to influence Parliament to return him to office on his terms.] [redacted]

not released

no Japan - South Korea: In an effort to block implementation of Japan's decision to repatriate Koreans wishing to go to North Korea, the Rhee government has suspended further talks with Japan and begun demonstrations. It apparently intends also to cut off trade and step up seizures of Japanese fishing vessels. Despite an alert of South Korean armed forces, no military action is likely except for possible clashes between South Korean Coast Guard vessels and Japanese patrol craft. [redacted] (Page 11)

LATE ITEM

no *Cuba: The resignation of Prime Minister Miro Cardona and his cabinet on 13 February and the assumption of the top cabinet post by Fidel Castro on 16 February will probably sharpen the latent conflict between Castro's "26 of July movement" and other groups that opposed former dictator Batista.

This is possibly Castro's first move toward the presidency; he was made eligible for the post by a recent constitutional revision lowering the age requirement. Another revision, conferring citizenship rights on foreigners who fought with the

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DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

rebels, also makes the controversial leftist Argentine, "Che" Guevara, eligible for any high government post.

Castro's former position as chief of the armed forces now will probably fall to his younger brother, Raul, whose past actions have demonstrated his irresponsibility.

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DAILY BRIEF

iv

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Views of Macmillan's Visit to Moscow

{The Soviet leaders apparently believe that British views on Berlin and Germany and the likelihood of British elections this year can be exploited to weaken Western unity. The first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn implied to an American correspondent on 11 February that the USSR considers Britain the "weakest link" in the Western front and may drive a "hard bargain" during Prime Minister Macmillan's visit. He hinted that the USSR might suggest withdrawing its Berlin demands in exchange for cancellation of plans for West German nuclear rearmament.}

{Moscow probably feels that Macmillan's desire for a "peacemaker" role, together with the pressure of British public opinion for a lessening of East-West tensions, makes him particularly vulnerable on the German issue. The counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris has expressed doubts that Britain would participate in any Western military action to maintain land access to Berlin.}

{The Soviet leaders, reminded of the benefits former Prime Minister Eden derived in his 1955 election campaign from having advocated a summit meeting, may seek to obtain at least a tacit endorsement from Macmillan of the desirability of another heads-of-government conference and favorable reference to European security measures such as a nonaggression pact or a reduction of foreign forces in Germany. Soviet propaganda is stressing the British people's concern over trends in West Germany and their desire for a policy "independent of that imposed by the Adenauer-Dulles partnership."}

{In discussing the Berlin problem with Macmillan, Khrushchev probably will repeat the line he took with the Norwegian ambassador on 9 February, when he warned that Soviet troops would immediately react to any violation of the East German frontier by Western forces. He remarked on the significance of Secretary Dulles' reference to the formula that the East Germans might act as "agents" of the USSR and said this formulation, while unfortunate, was a move in the right direction. Khrushchev again denied that his Berlin proposal was intended as}

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[an ultimatum, but said the turnover of Soviet functions to the
East Germans could occur sooner or later than 27 May.]

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Macmillan's Visit to the Soviet Union

{The British Foreign Office is preparing a list of questions to be used as "guideposts" for Prime Minister Macmillan's discussions during his week- to ten-day visit to Moscow beginning on 21 February. According to a Foreign Office official, London hopes to ascertain how confident Khrushchev is that the USSR is sufficiently strong to prevent any modification of the European situation. Britain would also like to determine whether the USSR is so apprehensive of a "German-US alliance in NATO" as to consider war to prevent its further development. The importance London attaches to the forthcoming trip is indicated by the large number of top-level officials who will accompany Macmillan.}

{The US Embassy feels that Macmillan now has entered the period of "election fever" and may have to be held back "by the coattails" from pushing proposals aimed at impressing the British electorate. The embassy also feels that if British elections were scheduled to follow an East-West conference, the British Government would be under pressure to produce results and "agreements."}


{Macmillan may be considering a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. In a possible trial balloon, Reuters on 11 February said that London diplomatic quarters expect Khrushchev to propose a bilateral pact during Macmillan's visit. According to these diplomats, Soviet leaders believe Macmillan's denial of an intention to negotiate would not rule this out.}

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[REDACTED]

MIG-19s Noted in East China

{ Indications that FARMER (MIG-19) jet fighters are operating in East China were received on 11 February when a control tower at Chingyang warned another aircraft, "One MIG-19 left Liencheng. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

{ A number of MIG-19s moved into Manchuria from the Soviet Union in late October 1958, and there are indications that a second flight may have taken place in January 1959. These aircraft have not been observed [REDACTED] although Chinese Communist radar in East China has recently tracked aircraft at altitudes beyond the capabilities of MIG-17s. }

{ The presence of these supersonic aircraft in the Taiwan Strait area would improve Chinese Communist air intercept capabilities, particularly during conditions of good visibility. Some of them have been modified to give them limited all-weather capability. }

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Peiping Optimistic About Policy Toward Cambodia

{ An optimistic estimate of Peiping's efforts to bring Cambodia into a closer relationship with Communist China was made by Communist China's ambassador and his deputy in Phnom Penh at party meetings on 30 January and 2 February in the embassy. }

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the work of Peiping's economic mission was appraised as having "yielded some results," and Ambassador Wang Yu-ping stated that Sino-Cambodian relations would continue to improve to Peiping's "advantage." Wang expressed confidence that the Cambodian political situation would become more stable in 1959. He advised that Sino-Cambodian relations be made a "model" of compliance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence between "large and small countries." He also advised embassy officials to learn to speak French or Cambodian within a year or two in order to "expand activities" at the grass-roots level. }

{ Peiping's objectives in Cambodia are facilitated by Sihanouk's premise that the best way to maintain Cambodia's independence is to "remain friends with Chou En-lai," as well as by his constant feuding with anti-Communist South Vietnam and Thailand. These attitudes and Cambodia's weak security capabilities render largely ineffective Sihanouk's declared opposition to the spread of Communism within Cambodia. }

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

[REDACTED]

Nasir Says He Plans to Drop Campaign Against Iraqi Communists

{ Nasir, through Cairo newspaperman Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, informed Ambassador Hare on 11 February that the UAR campaign against the Iraqi Communists will be gradually abandoned for "tactical reasons." Haykal added that suppression of Egyptian and Syrian Communists would continue, however, as would the UAR's "basic hostility" toward those in Iraq. }

{ Nasir's reason for dropping the campaign, according to Haykal, is his feeling that he cannot continue while the French and British still show no indication of changing their opposition to the UAR. He complained specifically of press and clandestine radio attacks against him and alleged British delay in completing financial negotiations with the UAR. Haykal stated that Nasir's complaint did not include the United States, whose position throughout the Iraqi-UAR dispute was "unprecedented in its wisdom." }

{ Various considerations, besides that put forth by Haykal, probably entered into the decision. Nasir has had virtually no success in shaping events in Iraq according to his desire, and he has run considerable risk of seriously damaging his relations with the Communist bloc, which backs Iraqi Premier Qasim. Nasir is unlikely to stop all clandestine opposition to Baghdad, however, and would probably still attempt to aid any internal movement in Iraq which appeared to him capable of displacing the present regime. The approach to Ambassador Hare may have been partly designed to elicit some assurance of American support. }

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Algerian Rebel Relations With Nasir Deteriorating


Relations between the Algerian rebel government and the regime of UAR President Nasir seem to have deteriorated. Although resenting the controls which Egyptian authorities imposed on them, the rebels heretofore have counted on Cairo for much of their external support.

[redacted] confirms earlier reports that the Algerian rebels were moving their provisional government to Tunis. [redacted] posts were being created in Baghdad, Libya, and Morocco, while two ministers would "formally" remain in Cairo.

(Rebel ministers in Tunis implied that this shift is designed to engender confidence in the West that they were moving away from contacts with Nasir and Middle Eastern Arab radicals with whom they have "little in common.") This move suggests either that Cairo is reducing its support or that the rebels are assured of more generous support elsewhere. Iraqi Premier Qasim's declaration to news correspondents on 11 February that Iraq--already a major financial contributor to the Algerian rebellion--will step up its arms shipments to the Algerians may indicate that Iraq has supplanted the UAR as the principal source of weapons for the rebellion.

The UAR expects Algerian rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas to make anti-UAR charges during his current tour of the Middle East and Asia. Cairo said that Abbas would accuse "us of shortcomings in aiding the Algerian revolution materially and with arms, and making an agreement with France at the expense of the cause, while alleging that we had ignored them (the rebels), that the President had not met them since February 1958, and that we had not fulfilled our obligations on the Algerian budget."

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Violence May Erupt in Cameroun About 20 February

The Cairo headquarters of the Union of the Cameroon Population (UPC)--an Egyptian-sponsored leftist-nationalist group responsible for several years of guerrilla warfare in western Cameroun--has urged the terrorists to use violence shortly before 20 February to discredit the moderate, native Cameroun Government. On 20 February, the UN General Assembly will discuss termination of the French trusteeship over Cameroun--promised independence by France on 1 January 1960--and the related problem of the British Cameroons.

The UPC, which was favorably received at the recent All-African Peoples' Conference at Accra, plans to send a strong delegation to the UN meeting. Several nations apparently have been influenced by UPC propoganda that the pro-French Ahidjo government of Cameroun is unrepresentative and that new legislative elections should be held before independence. [redacted] Opposition to Premier Ahidjo is indicated [redacted] [redacted] which suggests that Accra should insist on new elections. [redacted] the African group generally supports that position. [redacted]

If the UN General Assembly fails to give the necessary two-thirds support to a resolution opposing new elections, the issue will be postponed until the regular fall meeting of the General Assembly, and Cameroun probably cannot achieve independence in January. In such event, the Ahidjo government would be under sharp nationalist attack and might not be able to remain in office.

At present, there does not appear to be any other pro-Western politician who could maintain the present fragile coalition between a conservative Moslem north and the more evolved tribal south. Furthermore, if new elections should be ordered by the General Assembly, the UPC sympathizers and antigovernment elements might increase their political influence sufficiently to make stable government impossible in Cameroun. [redacted]



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Japanese - South Korean Crisis

South Korea has responded to Japan's decision to permit the voluntary repatriation of Korean residents in Japan who desire to go to North Korea by breaking off negotiations to normalize relations with Japan, by commencing nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations, and by announcing an intention to step up seizures of Japanese fishing boats and to cut off trade.

The South Korean Coast Guard and the Air Force allegedly have been alerted to intercept "any ships" carrying repatriates. These orders are unlikely to result in military action. Actual sailing of repatriation vessels is several months away, and the most serious incidents likely at the present time are clashes between South Korean and Japanese patrol vessels.

The Japanese have intimated they might arm their patrol vessels, which heretofore have been defenseless, (but Tokyo is planning to request International Red Cross or possibly North Korean transportation for the repatriates.)

The Kishi Government's decision to act unilaterally on the repatriation issue probably stems from a desire to keep it from developing into a major domestic political problem. (Other factors such as the problem of internal security, the expense of maintaining many destitute Koreans, pressure on the labor market, and Japan's vulnerability to charges of violation of "human rights" also entered into the decision.) In any event, Japan sees little chance of normalizing relations with South Korea.

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The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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