

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)



22 June 1959

SC No. 03287/59
Copy No. C 62

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 86
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
1 - DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 2810
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 4.14.80 REVIEWER:

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

The Daily Brief of the **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN** is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with representatives of departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable, the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk. Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including COMINT.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive **COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE** information; its security must be maintained in accordance with **COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS**.

No action is to be taken on any **COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE** which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

~~TOP SECRET~~

22 JUNE 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet - East German communiqué reiterates refusal to sanction "occupation regime" in West Berlin.

New Yugoslav oil field may make Belgrade self-sufficient in crude oil and eliminate one source of Soviet pressure.


II. ASIA-AFRICA

Tension remains high over UAR refusal to permit Israeli ships to use canal.


Indonesia--US Embassy sees political deadlock contributing to economic deterioration and growth of Communism.

Malaya--Pro-West ruling party suffers surprise defeat in state assembly election.

Japan apparently determined to carry out repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea.

**III. THE WEST**

- ⑦ Cuba--Drastic purge of air force officers follows army command shake-up. Opposition to regime apparently increasing.
- ⑧ Dominican Republic considering "defensive military action" against Cuba or any other nation aiding rebels. Haiti fears involvement.



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 June 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

31RAB

NO

USSR - East Germany: The communiqué signed on 20 June at the conclusion of the East German party-government delegation's visit to the USSR reiterated the major points made by Khrushchev in his Kremlin speech on 19 June. Expressing regret that the Western powers had thus far rejected Soviet proposals on Berlin, the communiqué warned that the USSR and East Germany "will not sanction the preservation of the occupation regime indefinitely" and are determined to take "all necessary measures for an earliest elimination of the abnormal situation in West Berlin." At the same time, however, it stated that the time limit on the Soviet-proposed "provisional status" of West Berlin is negotiable. [REDACTED]

OK

Yugoslavia: The recent completion of a series of oil wells in Croatia, which has resulted in proved reserves capable of producing a total of at least 15,000 barrels per day, will have important implications for the Yugoslav economy. The field, the largest in Western Europe, "closely resembles the great fields of California and Venezuela," [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When in operation, the 20 wells already drilled could make Yugoslavia self-sufficient in crude oil production. Yugoslavia imported approximately 60 percent of its total crude oil requirements in 1957. Since three-fourths of these imports came from the Soviet bloc, this discovery will eliminate one source of economic pressure which the Kremlin has used on Tito.

[REDACTED] (Page 1)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR-Israel: Tensions continue over UAR actions to deny the use of the Suez Canal to Israeli-owned or -chartered merchant ships. The UAR is still holding the Israeli-chartered freighter Inge Toft and its cargo. On 17 June, UAR authorities detained for 24 hours a Panamanian freighter--bound from Antwerp to Japan--on suspicion that it was carrying Israeli cargo.

Two other ships of non-Israeli registry are now reported to be loading in Haifa and may attempt to transit the canal. Israel may respond to any UAR action against these freighters by direct interference with UAR shipping between Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. The UAR Government, concerned over the possibility of such retaliation, is reported to have ordered that only ships of foreign registry be used for such voyages.

NO

Indonesia: The political deadlock in Djakarta is accelerating the deterioration of the Indonesian economy, with accompanying benefits for the Communist party,

Inflationary shortages are "beginning an ominous pinch" on urban workers and armed forces personnel, and this is increasing the following of the Communists in these influential circles. There appears to be little prospect of effective government action, even when President Sukarno returns from his foreign travels.) (Page 2)

NO

Malaya: The first major defeat to be suffered by the moderate Alliance, Malay's pro-Western ruling party, has threatening implications for future stability there. The Alliance was defeated in a state assembly election on 20 June by the narrow, racially oriented Pan-Malayan Islamic party, thus raising the possibility of a break in Malay support for the Alliance concept of multiracial cooperation. Such cooperation is essential to the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Malay and Chinese communities. Recent reports state that the Islamic party may be receiving support from Indonesian Communist sources.

OK

(Page 3)

22 June 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Japan-Korea: (Japanese determination to carry out the repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea is reflected by [REDACTED] the ambassador to Switzerland is instructed to go to Geneva to seek quick approval by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of the repatriation agreement "before there is meddlesome interference." The ambassador was also directed to request ICRC assistance for the release of some 150 Japanese fishermen held by South Korea--a more serious and urgent matter from a "domestic viewpoint" than the repatriation issue. [REDACTED]

NO

[REDACTED]
(Page 4)

III. THE WEST

Cuba: The drastic purge of air force officers carried out during the past week apparently was instigated by Raul Castro, the extremist young armed forces chief and brother of the prime minister. The affected officers, including most of Cuba's rated pilots, were known to be seriously concerned over Communist penetration of the armed forces. The purge follows an important shake-up in army commands and reports of the discharge of army officers in various parts of the country. Meanwhile, rising opposition to the regime among other groups resulted during the week in the first wave of antigovernment terrorism since the fall of Batista. [REDACTED] (Page 5)

OK

Dominican Republic: As many as 100 of the estimated 150 insurgents may have survived the initial landings on the north coast made at dawn on 20 June. The Dominican Government has evidence that the attackers came from Cuba, and it expects further landings by insurgents coming from Cuba and Venezuela. Meanwhile, Dominican troops apparently have not liquidated the small rebel force that landed by plane on 14 June in a mountainous area of the interior.

[REDACTED]
20 June that his government is seriously considering "defensive

22 June 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

military action" against Cuba and any other nation aiding the rebels. While he did not specify the nature of such action, it would probably include an attack by Cuban exiles who, with Dominican support, are preparing for action against the Castro regime in Cuba.

[REDACTED] (Page 6)

*The Haitian government has been informed by the Dominican Republic that additional forces from Cuba will land in Haiti shortly to establish a "second front" for the invasion of the Dominican Republic. Haiti, which fears opposition groups abroad may join the invaders, is urgently seeking help from the United States and the Organization of the American States. [REDACTED]

22 June 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Significant Oil Field Discovered in Yugoslavia

The Yugoslavs have recently completed exploration of an oil field in Croatia which is the largest in Western Europe,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] now has 20 wells and is capable of producing 15,000 barrels per day, which would raise Yugoslav production 166 percent. Exploitation of this field can begin after the construction of tanks and pipelines. If the field is exploited in the proper manner and the wells produce at their maximum efficient rate, Yugoslavia will be at least the second largest crude oil producer in Western Europe by 1963, according to the source.

This discovery will have sizable implications for the Yugoslav economy, as the 20 wells can make Yugoslavia self-sufficient in crude oil production and enable it to conserve--perhaps even earn--badly needed foreign exchange. In 1957 the country imported approximately 60 percent of its total crude oil requirements, with three fourths coming from the Soviet bloc; the withholding of crude oil shipments has been one of the bloc's principal means of putting economic pressure on Yugoslavia.

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia

(The inability or unwillingness of Indonesian Government and Army leaders to take effective action to break the political deadlock over constitutional reform in President Sukarno's absence is contributing to a continued and accelerated decline in Indonesia's economy. The economic decline in turn is further strengthening the Communist party of Indonesia (PKI), on which Sukarno is already dependent for his constitutional reforms.)

[redacted] the current economic crisis is beginning to cause an "ominous pinch" among urban laborers, white-collar workers, and members of the armed forces, although it has not yet affected the bulk of the population. The pinch, however, is building up PKI following among the influential groups from which the Communists must draw strength for their ultimate revolutionary goals.)

(Illustrating Djakarta's economic plight, [redacted] [redacted] prices on essential commodities have doubled in the past year while wages have remained relatively constant; major imports, handled by inexperienced army officers through government monopolies, have fallen off to the point where, because of shortages of raw materials, factories are operating at only 50 percent of capacity; and government employees are ignoring their official functions in order to take outside jobs to supplement their incomes. Labor discontent, bottled up by government prohibition of strikes, is increasing, and owners of capital are attempting to exchange their money for hard currencies and gold. In the past two weeks the rupiah has declined one third on the free market.)

(There is no assurance that President Sukarno will take effective action after his return to Djakarta on 29 June, even though he might achieve his aim of a reversion to the 1945 constitution. Previous economic crises have found Sukarno quite unconcerned, and it seems unlikely he will resolve the political conflicts wracking the country.) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ruling Party in Malaya Receives Sharp Setback in State Election

The ruling Alliance party of Malaya suffered its first major defeat on 20 June when it won only seven of 24 seats in the Trengganu state assembly election. The narrow, racially oriented Pan-Malayan Islamic party (PMIP) won a clear majority of 13 seats, and the equally narrow Negara party won four. This is the first time since Malaya achieved independence nearly two years ago that the politically predominant Malays have failed to give a large majority to the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the Malay organ and leading component of the Alliance; the development represents a serious threat to the Alliance concept of multiracial cooperation which is essential to stability in Malaya, where half the population is non-Malay. Chinese comprise about 37 percent and Indians 11 percent of the total population.

While the Alliance has swept eight previous state elections in the past month, there has been a definite increase in Malay support for the PMIP in most states. Federation officials have recently expressed considerable concern over the apparently large resources of the PMIP and reportedly have good evidence that Indonesian Communists are extending considerable financial support. The PMIP is headed by a political opportunist who apparently is willing to accept support from any source.

The victory in Trengganu can be expected to improve the PMIP's chances in the last two state elections in neighboring Kelantan and Pahang and may significantly reduce Alliance prospects of winning an overwhelming majority in the national elections in August.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~Japanese - South Korean Disputes

(Tokyo's determination to carry out the repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea is suggested [redacted] which the Japanese ambassador to Switzerland is instructed to go to Geneva and seek quick approval by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of the repatriation agreement "before there is meddlesome interference." He is also to ask for greater efforts by the ICRC to obtain the release of the 150 Japanese fishermen detained in South Korea.)

(Japan apparently considers the problem of the detention of the fishermen more serious and urgent than that of repatriation. The question of what Tokyo has done so far and what actions are contemplated to obtain their release is certain to plague Prime Minister Kishi's new cabinet at the special Diet session which opens on 22 June. Foreign Minister Fujiyama said the government would "go ahead and take every conceivable measure" to secure the release of these men.)

(Tokyo is attempting to provide greater protection to Japanese fishing vessels operating near the "Rhee line" by increasing the number of patrol craft and fitting them with armor plate. Despite growing pressure, however, Kishi is unlikely to use force to protect the boats--except as a last resort--but he could be forced to take the matter to the United Nations.)

(South Korea refuses to discuss the release of the fishermen until Japan suspends negotiations with North Korea. Seoul has broken trade relations with Japan; a complete break in diplomatic relations may follow if the agreement is consummated. Popular and official feeling is high in South Korea, and President Rhee may resort to additional action--such as seizure of Japanese shipping--as a means of rallying support for his administration.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

III. THE WEST

Cuban Air Force Purge Coincides With Rising Opposition To Regime

Major Raul Castro, brother of the prime minister and chief of the Cuban armed forces, was responsible for the drastic air force purge which resulted in the dismissal of most of the force's rated pilots, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The purge, which became public knowledge on 18 June, also resulted in the replacement of Major Pedro Diaz Lanz as air force chief.

Diaz Lanz, who was prominent among those officers seriously preoccupied with Communist penetration of the armed forces, is believed to have been particularly worried about the Communist influence in the recently established schools that have been giving six-week courses in political indoctrination to many Cuban military personnel. Diaz Lanz' half brother approached the US Embassy on 1 June for an opinion as to whether anti-Communist Cuban officers should go into exile or remain to resist Raul Castro's policies favoring the Communists.

The air force purge follows an important shake-up in army commands and reports of the discharge of army officers in several parts of the country. These moves reflect the regime's efforts to remove potential dissidents from the military.

Rising opposition to the regime among other groups led during the week to the first significant wave of antigovernment terrorism since the fall of Batista last January and to increasing evidence of government fear of an imminent counterrevolutionary effort.

The American army attaché in Cuba believes Raul Castro's frequent trips to eastern Cuba during the week may be related to fear of an attack from the Dominican Republic in retaliation for probable Cuban support of the 14 June rebel landings in that country. A knowledgeable Cuban exile in the Dominican Republic told an American Embassy officer in that country on 18 June that an armed Cuban exile force there was nearly ready to attack Cuba, but that he believes the attempt will probably fail. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Dominican Republic Considers Attack on Cuba After New Insurgent Landings

Dominican authorities claim that about 50 of the estimated 150 insurgents who landed on the north coast of the Dominican Republic at dawn on 20 June have been killed or captured.

[redacted] the landings were undetected until after the insurgents had moved inland. [redacted]

The landings were made about 75 miles from the mountainous area in the interior where a small group of rebels landed by plane from Cuba on 14 June. The latter group, with whom local civilians apparently collaborated, had inflicted "substantial losses" on the Dominican Army. [redacted]

[redacted] operations were proceeding successfully against this group, but by 20 June fighting was apparently still in progress in this area.

The Dominican Government has confirmed that the air and sea incursions were made from Cuba; it expects further landings by insurgents coming from Venezuela, as well as by two other groups from Cuba which intend to invade via Haiti.

The Dominican foreign minister told [redacted] that his government is seriously considering "defensive military action" against Cuba or any other nation aiding the rebels. Such action will become imperative, he said, if there are further landings. He indicated that his government has little confidence that an appeal to the OAS would result in effective assistance, but added that if assured that the US would take "a definite stand" in that body, the Dominican Government might consider an appeal prior to taking military action.

Dominican action against Cuba would probably include the mounting of an invasion by Cuban exiles now in the Dominican Republic. These exiles were preparing for imminent action on 20 June, [redacted]

[redacted] Batista, also in exile there, is disinclined to support such a move, however. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 Scientific Adviser to the President
 Director of the Budget
 Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
 Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
 The Counselor
 Director, International Cooperation Administration
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~