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11 April 1959


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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11 APRIL 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Ambassador Thompson comments on Soviet policy as foreign ministers' conference approaches.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

British concerned over reports that Iraq preparing to take military action against Kuwait about 15 April.

More military supplies sent from Egypt to Syria, probably for guerrilla operations against Iraq. [redacted]

UAR furnishing additional military equipment to Libya. [redacted]

Pakistani Air Force shoots down Indian aircraft over Pakistani territory.

III. THE WEST

US Embassy in Bonn comments on Adenauer's decision to relinquish chancellorship.

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

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⑦ Czech ship seized this week by French Navy was carrying arms to Indonesia and Morocco. [redacted]

⑧ Uruguay considers breaking diplomatic relations with USSR.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 April 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: In assessing Soviet policy as the foreign ministers' conference approaches, Ambassador Thompson concludes that Moscow's principal objective is to gain Western acceptance of the Eastern European status quo, to be symbolized by some sort of recognition of East Germany.

OK As for Adenauer's decision to assume the presidency, Thompson suggests that Soviet leaders will see this as providing opportunities for exploitation of those West German political forces willing to "dicker" with Moscow and the East German regime. [redacted] (Page 1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq-Kuwait: [redacted]

MD [redacted] owing to the importance of Kuwait they are obliged to "take seriously" reports, admittedly of the "rumor variety" that Iraq intends to take over Kuwait by military action about 15 April. [redacted] the British military position in the area is "woefully weak," and that unless there were sufficient advance warning to enable British forces to be flown to the area, they would be unable to counter such an Iraqi move. [redacted]

[redacted] While the bulk of Iraq's forces are in the north and central portions of the country, and there has been no indication of a deployment preparatory to a move against Kuwait, the Iraqi forces near Basra probably could undertake this operation alone. Additional Iraqi forces presumably would be moved into the area, however, in anticipation of a British countermove. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 3) (Map)

MO UAR-Iraq: An additional UAR shipment of 1,750 rifles, 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and a quantity of explosives was scheduled to be sent from Egypt to Syria on 9 April, [redacted]

[redacted] These munitions, like a shipment of 3,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition last week, are probably destined for use in guerrilla operations against Iraq. Iraqi security forces were instructed on 7 April to strengthen protection of the northern Iraq oil pipelines against saboteurs who allegedly had infiltrated from Syria. [redacted] (Page 5)

MO UAR-Libya: The trend toward closer relations between the two countries has continued with a UAR agreement in late March to furnish additional military equipment, including three Sherman tanks and a few mortars and anti-aircraft guns, [redacted] Egyptian military instructors are to go to Libya to train Libyan personnel in the use of these arms. [redacted]

At the end of February, the UAR presented Libya with two training planes and a small quantity of light arms. (CON-

MO Pakistan-India: The Pakistani Air Force on 10 April shot down an Indian Canberra jet bomber near Rawalpindi in northern West Pakistan. Karachi states the aircraft was intercepted well inside Pakistani territory and ignored several warnings to land. The two-man Indian crew reportedly escaped with injuries. The action is likely to produce sharp political repercussions, including mutual recrimination and heated press comment. The incident probably will retard current efforts to negotiate a settlement of the canal waters dispute. [redacted] (Page 6)

III. THE WEST

MO West Germany: American officials in Bonn feel it is an open question how great Adenauer's influence will be after he leaves the chancellorship, despite statements by Christian

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DAILY BRIEF

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Democratic party (CDU) leaders that he will continue to dominate policy from the presidency. CDU Deputy Chairman Krone has ruled out any attempts to change the constitution in a "De Gaulle-like fashion." The embassy also believes that external developments may have influenced Adenauer's final decision. The Foreign Ministry has announced that Adenauer will meet the French premier in Bonn on 6 May, and hinted that he may visit London and the United States. [redacted] (Page 7)

Bloc-France-Morocco: [✓]The Czech freighter Lidice seized by the French off Casablanca on 7 April and taken to Oran was carrying Czech military aircraft equipment for Indonesia as part of its cargo, [redacted]

no [redacted] The seizure stemmed from the French belief that the arms cargo was for the Algerian rebels. The vessel, [redacted] [redacted] also carried some military materiel purchased by Rabat for its own military defense forces. The French seizure has further strained French-Moroccan relations. [redacted]

ok Uruguay: The governing executive council is considering breaking diplomatic relations with the USSR. Leaders supporting a break point to Argentina and Mexico's recent ouster of Soviet diplomats accused of promoting Communist agitation, and they cite similar activities in Uruguay. The death on 8 April of majority party chief Herrera, who feared a break would prejudice Uruguay's increasingly important trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc, will probably lessen opposition to such a move. [redacted] (Page 9)

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Ambassador Thompson's Views on Soviet Position in Negotiations

[Ambassador Thompson believes the USSR's principal objective in forthcoming negotiations will be to achieve a result which will amount to Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, to be symbolized by some sort of recognition of East Germany. He suggests the USSR, in trying to accomplish this, will seek to inflict as much damage as possible on Western prestige and unity.]

[In Thompson's view, the USSR precipitated the Berlin crisis in order to overcome Western resistance to top-level conferences and to exert pressure on a very vulnerable Western position. He suggests that if the Soviet leaders succeed in obtaining Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe and East Germany, they may agree to a new Berlin arrangement which will provide the West with an "improved title" for remaining in West Berlin and with better defined access rights.]

[The ambassador warns that failure to reach agreement on Berlin will lead, at a minimum, to more active Soviet probing and pressures on Allied and, eventually, West German access to Berlin. While Thompson does not believe Khrushchev is under any compelling domestic pressure to produce a victory, he emphasizes that the Soviet premier is in "deadly earnest" in "aiming a fatal blow at Western pretensions to challenging the existing boundaries of the Soviet empire." At the same time, the ambassador continues to believe there will be a strong Soviet desire to avoid letting matters get out of hand.]

[As for Soviet tactics at the foreign ministers' conference, Thompson suggests that the Soviet representative, after stating Moscow's established positions on a German peace treaty and Berlin, may put forward "fall-back" positions on individual articles of the Soviet draft treaty, the specifics of the free-city plan, and the temporary or provisional exclusion of Czechoslovakia and Poland from the conference. Moscow's essential]


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"sticking point," however, will be over agreement to any Western proposals which do not give substantial de facto recognition to East Germany.]

Thompson feels the Soviet leaders believe Adenauer's decision to seek the presidency has injected new elements of fluidity into the situation which will provide opportunities for Soviet exploitation of West German groups which may be willing to abandon the West's long-standing policy on reunification and "dicker" with the USSR and East Germany.]

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IRAQ
 Basra area - 15th Inf Brigade & transport company (3000)
 7th Field Artillery Regt (600),
 Nasiriya - 14th Inf Brigade (3000)



90411

[REDACTED]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Plans For Iraqi Military Occupation of Kuwait Rumored

[British Foreign Office officials are "taking seriously" rumors that Iraq intends to occupy Kuwait by military action in mid-April, according to the American ambassador to Saudi Arabia who is consulting with British officials in London.]

[REDACTED]

[The British reportedly feel that the Iraqis might consider that any move to nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company should be accompanied by seizure of Kuwait, the largest Middle Eastern producer, in order to gain a strong bargaining position with consumer nations.]

[British officials state that their military position in the area is very weak with only one infantry battalion and an armored car company (about 800-900 men) based on Bahrein. Three more infantry battalions and an armored car battalion are based at Aden, and an infantry brigade is located in Kenya. Facilities for rapid movement of troops from these points to Kuwait by air are very limited at present.]

[Britain has a military defense treaty with Kuwait, but no British troops are stationed there. Members of Kuwait's ruling Subah family have shown increasing awareness of their total dependence on British military protection, as a result of developments in Iraq and recent manifestations of Kuwaiti nationalist hostility to Subah rule. The British military adviser's relations with the Kuwaitis have improved markedly in recent weeks, and he has been given the additional title of "liaison officer with British forces."]

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[The principal element of Kuwait's armed forces is the Frontier Force of 900-1,000 men organized into six infantry companies, one armored car company, one field artillery battery, an armored personnel company, and a support company. The 1,500-man security force and the 1,000-man police force are equipped only with rifles.]

[There has been no indication of a deployment of Iraqi forces preparatory to a move against Kuwait. Iraqi forces in the Basra area consist of an infantry brigade and a field artillery battalion. These forces are capable of occupying Kuwait. Another infantry brigade is stationed at Nasiriya, about 100 miles northeast of Basra, while the 2nd Division headquarters is farther north at Diwaniya. The main Iraqi troop concentration of three divisions, including most of the armor, is in central Iraq, while the 1st Division is in the north. The northern forces have been increasingly occupied with growing tension on the Syrian-Iraqi border. All divisional security units and most Iraqi tank units were alerted on 4 April, presumably because of indications that UAR-supported tribesmen will step up their forays into Iraqi territory, and persistent rumors of impending internal disturbances.]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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UAR-Iraqi Tensions

The UAR is making further propaganda efforts to promote an internal uprising in Iraq, and is sending large additional quantities of arms to equip the Shammar tribesmen on the Syrian side of the Iraqi border. On 9 April the UAR's "Voice of Free Iraq" broadcast slogans for "a great revolution" which "will be unleashed tomorrow" by "our struggling peoples and our valiant army... against the hated Communists and the despised sole leader." This follows a barrage of unfounded UAR claims that major uprisings and army mutinies were already taking place. While it is doubtful that the UAR now has the capability to induce revolution inside Iraq, there is some possibility of disturbances in connection with a rally of the Communist-front Peace Partisans, scheduled for 14 April in Baghdad.

More intensive raids into Iraq by Shammar tribesmen are to be expected. [redacted] since 2 April, 1,750 rifles, 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and a quantity of explosives have been dispatched from Egypt for use by the Shammar and that additional shipments may be forthcoming.

The Iraqi Government, believing that Syrian saboteurs have already infiltrated, on 7 April ordered a series of new police and army patrolling activities to protect the oil pipelines in northern Iraq.

On 9 April, the Iraqi press headlined the creation of five new economic ministries and the abolition of the Ministry of Development. The new ministers have not yet been identified. Reports of this impending change indicated, however, that its purpose is to increase the proportion of Communist ministers in the cabinet. The assignment to the post of Iraqi ambassador in Iran of Minister of Guidance Husayn Jamil, who was actually displaced from control of his ministry several weeks ago, leaves governmental supervision of press and radio completely in pro-Communist hands. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Possible Repercussions of Indo-Pakistani Airplane Incident

The shooting down of an Indian Canberra jet bomber over West Pakistan on 10 April will almost certainly renew the mutual mistrust and suspicion which both Karachi and New Delhi have shown a desire in recent months to diminish. The major immediate result of the incident may be to make more difficult the settlement of the Indo-Pakistani canal waters dispute, which is under negotiation with the assistance of the World Bank.

The press in Pakistan seems likely to play up the "aggressive" attitude shown by Indian military forces in flying over Pakistan, while the Indian press will note Pakistan's "aggressive" attitude in shooting down an unarmed plane. Political leaders may also try to capitalize on the issue to secure tactical advantages or maintain a propaganda position.

If the Pakistani Air Force used American-supplied jet fighters to shoot down the Canberra, New Delhi's long-standing claim that American military aid to Pakistan might well be used against India will be strengthened. Similarly, Pakistan may also claim that the incident shows its continued need for strong armed forces with up-to-date equipment. Both governments, however, may try to prevent the incident from interfering seriously with over-all relations.

The incident is also likely temporarily to draw the attention of the Indian public and government away from Communist China's suppression of the Tibetan revolt. Without it, feeling might have been maintained at a higher pitch as the Dalai Lama makes his way toward New Delhi.

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III. THE WEST

Adenauer's Future Influence on Policy Seen as Uncertain

American Embassy officials in Bonn feel that it is still an open question how great Adenauer's influence on policy will be after he leaves the chancellorship. Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Deputy Chairman Heinrich Krone informed American officials that the whole point of Adenauer's move was to exert long-range political influence and remain a ruling force in West German politics. He said, however, there was no question of altering the constitution in a "De Gaulle-like fashion."

Krone also flatly denied that foreign policy questions were involved in Adenauer's decision and declared the chancellor's policies would be continued "as far as humanly possible." He explained that "for some time" Adenauer's close associates had been "urging" him to reconsider his decision against moving into the presidency, and after discussing the matter for a week with them he decided to accept on 6 April, the day before the CDU committee meeting.

American officials, however, feel that Adenauer was influenced by recent foreign policy developments. They cite as possible motives his impression that the trend of Western policy was against certain of his basic positions following Macmillan's trip to Moscow and the increasing German press attacks on him as the only obstacle to East-West negotiations. Secretary Dulles' illness and Adenauer's assessment of Bonn's differences with other NATO countries on a phased unification plan are mentioned as other possible contributing factors.

A Bonn Foreign Ministry official credited Khrushchev's threat to Berlin as having secured Adenauer's "abdication." He believes that Adenauer's influence will not be brought to bear in a possible summit conference, and mentioned that

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Important German political circles were advocating a "new flexibility" in Bonn foreign policy.

Most press speculation on a new chancellor agrees that Economics Minister Erhard would be the party's choice, although Adenauer is reported by the press to favor Finance Minister Etzel.

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Uruguay Considers Breaking Relations With USSR

Uruguay's governing executive council is considering breaking diplomatic relations with the USSR, [redacted]
[redacted] Councilor Nardone had introduced the proposal and had accused the country's Communists of fomenting a strike to gain a political advantage. Another councilor, he said, called attention to the recent expulsions of Soviet diplomats from Argentina and Mexico and suggested that the council reconsider the question of Uruguay's own relations with the USSR.

Some officials of the National party, which came to power on 1 March, have expressed concern over the extent of Communist influence in Uruguay and over the large staffs in the five bloc diplomatic missions in Montevideo. The Communists thrived under the lengthy incumbency of the last ruling party.

The view previously voiced by some National party members of the council that Uruguay's serious financial problems make bloc trade necessary for the short run may have lost some support with the death on 8 April of the ruling party chief, Dr. Herrera, who reportedly feared a break would prejudice the increasingly important Sino-Soviet bloc trade.
[redacted]

[redacted]

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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