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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 April 1959

SIRAB

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran-USSR: Iranian Foreign Minister Hekmat

	is greatly concerned over renewed	
OK site	is greatly concerned over renewed propaganda attacks by the USSR and is preparing a very strong note of protest. He is again considering the advisability of raising the issue in the UN and indicated he may also protest the numerous recent overflights by Soviet aircraft. (Page 2) Tibet-India: (The Dalai Lama expressed)	
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laura mayor	raising the issue in the UN and indicated he may also protest	
cla sentence	the numerous recent overflights by Soviet aircraft.	
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17, 73		
0]	Tibet-India: (The Dalai Lama	expressed
	his determination to set up a "Free Tibetan" gove	rnment and
	work for Tibetan independence. His desire to sta	te these goals
	publicly has already created some difficulties wit	h New Delhi.
	Since Nehru has indicated his opposition to politic	al activities
	by the Dalai Lama while in India, the Dalai Lama	has said he
	by the Dalai Lama white in India, the Dalai Lama	o Doining pres
~ 10	may feel impelled to seek asylum elsewhere. The Peiping pres	
O^{1-}	on 23 April adopted a tougher line toward India w	nen 11 accuseu
	"Indian officials" of releasing the Dalai Lama's st	atement on
	18 April, thus abetting "vicious attacks on China."	11)
	(Page 3)	

III. THE WEST

Finland-USSR: Evidently under pressure from President Kekkonen, the commander in chief of the Finnish Defense Forces will make a "friendship visit" to Moscow in early May in response to an invitation from the Soviet defense minister. The visit is in line with Kekkonen's belief that Finland must make special efforts to assuage Moscow's doubts concerning Finland's neutrality. The USSR may want Finland to use part of a commodity credit offered in May 1958 for arms purchases. Until now, the Finnish military leadership has consistently opposed such purchases.)

France: (In a move designed to emphasize De Gaulle's desire for a US-UK-French division of the world into areas of defense responsibility, France is establishing two new "major" military commands—one including the Western Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Sahara; the other embracing the French Community area in Africa. The precise relationships which De Gaulle envisages between the new commands and NATO are unclear. The first presumably would include the French Mediterranean fleet, and might involve a formal declaration of with drawal of part of the French ground forces now in Algeria from their NATO commitment. The second apparently would involve only non-NATO forces in west and tropical Africa.)

NO

24 Apr 59

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR and Nepal to Exchange Resident Diplomatic Missions

TASS announced on 23 April that the USSR has reached agreement with Nepal to exchange resident diplomatic missions. Heretofore diplomatic contact has been maintained through the Soviet and Nepali embassies in New Delhi and by occasional trips to Katmandu by Soviet Ambassador Ponomarenko--accredited to Nepal as well as India--and other Soviet diplomats from New Delhi.

(Ponomarenko informed the Indian Government on 20 April that such a move was pending and that the USSR had responded to "Nepali overtures"—an apparent effort to minimize New Delhi's reaction.) The USSR is breaking a "gentlemen's agreement" to postpone opening of a diplomatic mission in Nepal. The Indian Government, which regards Nepal as being within its sphere of influence, will not look with favor on this move. Should the United States accept the long-standing Nepali invitation to open an embassy in Katmandu, Communist China—which now has permission to open a consulate in Katmandu—can be expected to press for establishment of an embassy.

A 20-man Soviet economic delegation has been in Nepal since mid-February negotiating on economic aid projects; Nepal has reportedly agreed to accept a Soviet credit of about \$7,500,000 to construct a sugar mill, a hydroelectric plant, and communications projects, but an agreement has not yet been signed. Ponomarenko is to visit Katmandu over the week end of 25-26 April, at which time he may seek to sign a formal agreement covering the aid.)

Ponomarenko is being replaced as ambassador to India by I. A. Benediktov, who served in the post for five months in 1953. It is not known whether Benediktov will also be accredited to Katmandu or whether a resident ambassador will be appointed to head the new diplomatic mission there.

SECRET

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran Preparing Strong Protest to USSR

Foreign Minister Hekmat Iran is preparing a "very strong" note, which it expects to deliver to the Soviet Union in the near future, protesting "savage" propaganda attacks against the Shah and an estimated 100 unauthorized flights in recent months over the Iranian Azerbaijan area. Hekmat is also considering placing these problems before the UN.
Iran's campaign to improve relations with the USSR apparently has made no headway, despite efforts by the new ambassador to Moscow, Abdol Hosein Masud-Ansari, to obtain the cessation of propaganda attacks and to create an atmosphere in which outstanding problems could be discussed.) Although Hekmat claims that Soviet propaganda against Iran temporarily ceased on 17 April, American monitors have noted no such interruption.
while Moscow's campaign had not stopped entirely, for several days Soviet propaganda had not attacked the Shah personally, which is probably Hekmat's principal concern in the matter. The Iranian Government denies that Soviet propaganda is having any effect on the Iranian public, but Tehran's recent
overtures to Moscow are indicative of continuing concern over its possible effectiveness.
Masud-Ansari remains optimistic and has informed Tehran that, in his opinion, the USSR is looking for a way to improve relations and would do so if Iran ceased its counterpropaganda. Available information suggests, however, that Moscow is unlikely to curtail its propaganda attacks which thus far have been the primary means used by the USSR to exert pressure against the Shah's regime.
TOP SECRET

Dalai Lama Apparently Determined to Work for Tibetan Independence

The Dalai Lama all Tibetans now are convinced that attempts to obtain autonomy are useless, and that he is determined to work for independence despite Prime Minister Nehru's advice that autonomy remain the goal of the Tibetans. The Lama also expressed his determination to establish a "Free Tibetan" government at Lhuntse Dzong in Tibet, near the Indian and Bhutanese borders, and seek international recognition for it. He added that if New Delhi objected to such action he and his cabinet would seek asylum outside India. Since Chinese Communist forces apparently are now in control of Lhuntse Dzong, the Dalai Lama may decide to set up a government-in-exile)

His desire to state his goals publicly has already created some difficulties with the Indian Government, which opposed such a strong statement. Nehru has said that the Dalai Lama will be free to carry on his spiritual activities but that India cannot permit its territory to be used for political activities against Communist China. Nehru is likely to make strenuous attempts to persuade the Dalai Lama to moderate his goals at their 24 April meeting at Mussoorie, but might eventually request him to seek asylum elsewhere if he persists in his present plan

Peiping has dropped its reticence about attacking India directly. People's Daily on 23 April accused Indian Foreign Ministry officials of abetting "vicious attacks on China" by releasing the Dalai Lama's 18 April statement, in which he denied he was abducted from Tibet. This and similar charges made by speakers representing Communist China's puppet parties indicate that Peiping intends to maintain pressure on Nehru to curtail the Dalai Lama's activities and statements. The Chinese Communists, however, have thus far avoided a formal diplomatic protest on this issue.

SECRET

III. THE WEST

Finnish Commander in Chief to Visit Moscow

General K. A. Heiskanen, commander in chief of the Finnish Defense Forces, accompanied by four major generals, will make a "friendship visit" to Moscow in early May at the invitation of Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky. Although a group of Finnish officers attended the 1956 May Day celebration in Moscow, General Heiskanen has resolutely opposed making a visit himself. The US Embassy concludes that he has yielded to pressure from President Kekkonen.

During Kekkonen's state visit to the USSR in May 1958, Premier Khrushchev emphasized the desirability of visits by Finnish officers as an indication of good will and peaceful intentions. Kekkonen has since indicated that he feels that the USSR is taking a hard attitude toward Finland and that the Finnish Government must be prepared to follow a flexible policy and to make certain "tactical concessions."

The Heiskanen visit may involve the purchase of Soviet military equipment under the long-term credit in rubles of \$100,000,000 to \$125,000,000 offered Finland during Kekkonen's state visit in May 1958. During that visit Soviet officials pressed the Finns to purchase jet aircraft tanks, radar and communication equipment, and naval vessels. Kekkonen felt that Finland should purchase a limited number of MIG fighters to balance the acquisition of British jets and agreed to negotiate at a later date with the USSR. The Finnish armed services have consistently opposed such purchases.

SECRET

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