



2 APRIL 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow and Peiping have given Latin American Communists detailed guidance on future tactics in "imperialist backyard."

II. ASIA-AFRICA


Nehru promises to raise Tibetan issue with Peiping and to ask for full Tibetan autonomy.

Nasir's top aide cautions UAR ambassador in Washington against rushing into a rapprochement with the United States.

Sudan - Dissident officer group still planning to move against its opponents in the government.

Special USIB Watch Committee report on Israeli-Syrian recalls of reserves.

Turks and Iranians discussing reorganization of Baghdad Pact military planning structure.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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2 April 1959

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*Communist bloc outlines tactics for Latin America: (Latin American delegates to the 21st Soviet party congress have returned from Moscow and a side trip to Peiping armed with new tactical plans worked out with the Soviet party as well as guidance and offers of training from the Chinese Communists.)

The delegates were told to eliminate defense of the USSR from their propaganda and to play down their subordination to Moscow, concentrating instead on the "liberation" of their own countries. They decided to schedule an anti-imperialist "People's Congress" to meet sometime before July in Latin America and, concealing its Communist origin, to attempt to exploit the popularity of Cardenas, Figueres, Betancourt, and Castro who would be asked to serve as sponsors.

(The Latin American Communists were received in Peiping by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi who expounded at some length on the benefits not only of maintaining but of increasing tension, which "benefits all Communist parties" and forces the West to scatter its strength over a vast area. As an example, the Chinese cited their tactics in the Taiwan Strait situation which had "helped by diverting imperialist forces" following US landings in Lebanon.)

(The treatment given the delegation in China provides the strongest indication to date that Peiping is bent on increasing its influence in Latin America. Peiping has decided to sponsor a 4-6 month course in "practical" tactics for Latin American Communists. The Chinese Communists stressed the need for clandestine activity carried out by underground parties parallel with existing Latin American Communist parties.)

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Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: No significant changes bearing on the possibility of hostilities.)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

India-Tibet: Prime Minister Nehru, in a _____ meeting on 31 March with the Dalai Lama's brother, who is one of the leaders of the Tibetan resistance movement in India, assured him he would take up the Tibetan question with Peiping and urge the granting of full Tibetan autonomy. Although he doubted that this approach would be successful, Nehru felt it was the only action he could now take. In reaffirming his intention to grant political asylum to the Dalai Lama, Nehru thought it best that the Dalai Lama stay near New Delhi where he could keep in touch with him.

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Sudan: (The junior officers' movement led by Brigadier Shannan is making plans to arrest its opponents on the Supreme Military Council,

Shannan had abandoned an earlier plan for a showdown within the council itself, but his group, which reportedly includes pro-Communist and pro-Egyptian elements, will probably make a bid for increased power in the near future./ (Page 5)

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Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: (Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of largescale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.)

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Iraq: (The rapid progress of the Communists toward control of Iraq is continuing.

Israel-Syria: Special Watch Committee report on Israeli-Syrian recalls of reserves. (Page 6)

Iran-Turkey: Iran's defense problems and reorganization of the military planning organization of the Baghdad Pact were the major subjects of recent talks in Tehran between Turkish and Iranian military leaders. In response to an Iranian question, the chief of the Turkish General Staff stated that the Shah would become commander in chief of the Baghdad Pact military structure in time of war. The Shah also reiterated his concern over Communist encirclement and his continuing dissatisfaction with the level of American military aid.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow and Peiping Lay Out Tactics for Latin America

(Latin American delegates to the Soviet 21st party congress have returned from Moscow and a side trip to Peiping armed with new tactical plans worked out with the Soviet party as well as guidance and offers of training from the Chinese Communists.)

Of the 20 Latin American parties, 18 were represented in Moscow and 12 during the subsequent visit to Peiping. In a series of conferences with key Soviet officials in early February and with Chinese Communist party leaders later in the month, the Latin Americans were given extensive advice on increasing their effectiveness in the "imperialist backyard.")

the Soviet officials professed concern that emphasis on Moscow's domination of the Communist movement had hampered the activities of national Communist parties, and called for the elimination from all Communist literature of reference to the "directing role" of the USSR. The Latin American delegates were told to eliminate defense of the USSR from their propaganda and to play down their subordination to Moscow, concentrating instead on the "liberation" of their own countries, thereby weakening the "common enemy." The Latin Americans decided to convene a "People's Congress," sometime prior to July. By concealing its origin, the Communists hope to attract former Mexican President Cardenas, former Costa Rican President Figueres, Venezuelan President Betancourt, and Cuban Prime Minister Castro as sponsors of the congress and to reap the advantages of their popularity. The major theme of the congress would be struggle against Latin American dictatorships and defense of the new revolutionary "democratic" regimes.)

(the attention shown the 12 Latin American delegations which visited Peiping after the Soviet congress was a strong indication of Peiping's interest in increasing its influence)

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among Communists in underdeveloped areas, particularly Latin America. Mao Tse-tung and second-ranking party leader Liu Shao-chi, among other top leaders who conferred with the Latin Americans, impressed on them the suitability of Chinese Communist revolutionary tactics in the underdeveloped conditions of Latin America. The Chinese argued that events in Cuba had proven that the "imperialists are paper tigers." They asserted that a "policy of tension" benefits Communist parties, which can force "imperialists to spread their forces thin over a vast area." As an example, they cited their tactics in the Taiwan Strait situation which had "helped by diverting imperialist forces." following US landings in Lebanon.)

(The Chinese advised formation of clandestine parties in each Latin American country to function parallel to the established Communist parties, arguing that they themselves had used similar methods, "especially in Shanghai," to great advantage.)

(The Chinese offered to set up in Peiping, at Chinese expense, a four- to six-month course for Latin American leadership cadres. The course, to begin in August, would stress the "practical experience" of the Chinese revolution, rather than general Communist theory "which could be learned in any country.")



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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nehru's Position in Tibet

While officially maintaining his policy of noninterference in the Tibetan situation, Prime Minister Nehru apparently has given secret assurances to resistance leaders in India that he will provide what diplomatic support he can, as well as asylum for the Dalai Lama and his staff. The Indian leader on 31 March publicly expressed his sympathy to a large delegation of Tibetans from the Indian frontier town of Kalimpong, but pointed out that India was not in a position to intervene and counseled patience,

(In a meeting later with the Dalai Lama's brother, a leader of the Indian-based resistance movement, Nehru promised he would take up the Tibetan question with Peiping and urge that Tibet be granted full autonomy. Nehru's own doubt that this approach would be successful suggests that his offer of support represents more a gesture to the rebels than an indication of firm intention to pressure Peiping.

(In the event Nehru does approach the Chinese on behalf of the Tibetans, they probably will inform him that Tibet is considered "autonomous" and that Indian representations are regarded as "interference." <u>People's Daily on 31 March stated</u>, "No foreign country should interfere in the Tibet rebellion, which is an internal affair of China."

(Peiping's repetition of charges that Kalimpong is a "commanding center of the rebellion" provoked a new uproar in the Indian Parliament on 1 April. In view of the fact that Nehru had categorically denied this allegation on 30 March, the deputy external affairs minister accused the Chinese of challenging Nehru's "integrity and honesty.")

(The Dalai Lama's party was last reported to have been expected at the Indian frontier in Assam on 31 March. In reaffirming that the Indian Government would "definitely" grant asylum to the Dalai Lama and his staff, Nehru told the Lama's brother it would be best that he be brought to the New Delhi area, where Nehru could keep in touch with him. The prime minister said his government was already making arrangements for the Dalai Lama's stay in India and he would personally discuss his future with him.)

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UAR Attitude on Rapprochement With US

Despite the expressed desire of some UAR officials for a demonstration of American support of Nasir's anti-Communist campaign, the regime apparently hopes to avoid the impression of a rapprochement with the United States which would lend credibility to Communist charges that Nasir is now subservient to the "imperialists."

Cairo wishes to be "cautious and reserved" in dealing with Washington. apparently referring to Kamal's reports to Cairo on his talks with US State Department officials,

Cairo is obviously anxious to continue at least the appearance of neutrality. Both Baghdad and Moscow have claimed repeatedly that Western interests are behind Nasir's attacks on the USSR and Arab Communists. Cairo officials are also fearful of a cessation of Soviet economic and military aid as retaliation to Nasir's continued attacks on the USSR's interference in Arab affairs. They probably hope for American assurances of support in the event of Soviet sanctions, but at this time they apparently wish to keep moves to improve relations with the United States as unobtrusive as possible.)



CENTDAL INTELLIGENCE RIJLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03180498

Instability in the Sudan

Despite Premier Abboud's repeated assurances to the people that the Sudan's military government is stable and united, jockeying for power continues at the highest army levels, and the leaders of the suspended political parties are maneuvering to improve their positions. The junior officers' movement, led by Brigadier Abd al-Rahim Shannan, has been holding nightly meetings since 24 March,

and is plan-

ning an attempt to seize power by arresting most of the senior members of the Supreme Military Council. Brigadier Muhyi al-Din Abdullah, who participated with Shannan in leading the early March coup, is now being excluded from the group's secret plans, apparently because he opposes further drastic action.)

(The senior council members are acutely aware of the threat posed by Shannan's group, which reportedly contains pro-Communist and pro-Egyptian elements as well as other dissident officers; they are therefore attempting to build up a counter-movement within the army. They also have to contend with political and religious leaders who want a number of military members of the cabinet replaced by civilians.)

(The governmental changes since early March and the death on 24 March of Ansar leader Sayyid al-Rahman al-Mahdi have resulted in a sharp decrease in the power and influence of the Ansar sect and its Umma party, the strongest pro-Western elements in the country. The demands of leaders of the neutralist National Unionist party (NUP) that they be included in the Abboud government have so far been refused, but the senior officers in the government may resort to an !'alliance'' with NUP political leaders against the junior officers' movement.)

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Israeli-Syrian Recalls of Reserves

(The USIB Watch Committee issued the following report after a special meeting held at 1730, 1 April 1959:)

An Israeli mobilization, announced at 1900 GMT on (1 April, recalling "all" reserves to report for reserve duty was followed prior to 2100 GMT by a UAR order to personnel of the First (Syrian) Army to return from leave and to all reservists detailed to certain numbered formations to report to their units by the morning of 2 April. A later Israeli order ordered reserves of three units (probably brigades) to report by 1700, 2 April. By 2100, a spokesman of the Israeli Defense Forces described the call-up as a recall of certain reservists of only three reserve units for ordinary training and the Israeli finance minister, speaking for the prime minister in the Knesset, declared that the order was only a routine call for training and that no importance was to be attached to it. The Israeli Embassy in Washington has also characterized this action as "not unusual," observing that "the days of Suez are over."

(No preliminary mobilization measures, such as requisitioning of motor vehicles or rail rolling stock, have been observed or reported in Israel. The strength and deployment of Israeli military forces are believed to be normal. Recent incidents along Israel's borders have been minor and have not been treated as serious by the Israeli press, and the only specific source of tension between Israel and the UAR recently publicized has been the Egyptian seizure of cargoes of Israelichartered ships. Israel is known, however, to be concerned over a rapprochement between Nasir and the US and possible UAR action against Qasim.)

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(The Syrian recall order appears to be a direct reaction, about 2 hours later, to the Israeli order. Possible explanations for the Israeli recall of reservists, based on limited evidence, include:)

/-as the most likely, a mobilization exercise testing the "codeword" open radio call-up, with the codewords indicating the unit and its location to the reservists involved. The Israeli fiscal year begins 1 April and funds may have just become available for such an exercise.

--a demonstration of readiness for action as a pressure tactic.

--a true reaction to information unknown to us of real or suspected impending changes in situations along its borders.

--as the least likely, an intention to recall reservists, under the guise of a training exercise, for possible military action.)

(Whatever the purpose of the Israeli mobilization, this action and the Syrian mobilization in apparent reaction can raise Israeli-UAR tensions. In the face of the Syrian call-up, Israel may now retain its recalled forces on ready status.)

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Iranian-Turkish Military Talks Strengthen Ties

During recent discussions in Tehran between Iranian and Turkish military leaders, the chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Rustu Erdelhun, stated in response to an Iranian question that in time of war the Shah would "of course" become the commander in chief of Baghdad Pact forces. Any such decision, however, would require the approval of Britain and Pakistan.

The Shah, pleased with the outcome of the talks and impressed with Erdelhun's presentation, has ordered the chief of the Iranian General Staff to coordinate closely with Turkey on defense problems and on Baghdad Pact military organization. The Turks and Iranians also agreed that, to assure concerted action in an emergency, the Baghdad Pact Military Planning Organization should have a proper staff structure headed by an American officer. These issues probably will be raised formally during the July meeting of the Baghdad Pact Military Committee.

The Shah emphasized to Erdelhun his fear that Iran would be encircled by hostile powers now that Iraq is working with the Communists. Erdelhun, who is a highly competent officer and strong advocate of close Turkish-American military cooperation, attempted to calm the Shah by stressing that Turkey and Pakistan stand on Iran's flanks and that US power will deter aggression by the USSR.

In respect to the Shah's continuing dissatisfaction with the level of American military aid, General Erdelhun stressed that both Turkey and Iran must increase the literacy and technical competence of their service personnel before they can make effective use of modern weapons.

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