24 January 1959

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


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Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023337



### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 January 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-UAR:
Soviet leaders have complained
exploitation of Nasir's anti-Communist moves has elevated
the matter from an "internal" to an "international" issue. The
Kremlin is said to feel that while the USSR still respects the UAR's right of independent action, the fact that the attacks ap-
peared in the UAR-controlled press and radio has given the
anti-Communist charges an official character, and thus will ultimately create a critical situation for the Soviet position in
other Afro-Asian countries. Soviet position in
Ambassador Kissilev has hinted that Soviet assistance for the Aswan High Dam project might be affected by the UAR anti-
Communist campaign. (Page 1)
USSR - Communist China: Another transfer of MIG-19s from the Soviet Union to China may be under way. This would be the second group of these high-performance day fighters suspected to have been transferred to China; indications of a first delivery were received in October 1958, but reflections of this have not been noted since.  (Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR: Sarraj appears to be falling into disfavor with the

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Nasir regime and may be relieved of any real power in his present position as Syrian minister of interior. Cairo has apparently had him under surveillance for some time, and he is

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ments in its foreign policy. The Shah is also concerned over

a possible Western rapprochement with the UAR.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Cyprus: Progress toward a Cyprus settlement apparently resulted from the recent meeting between the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers in Paris. Agreement was reached on establishment of a republic of Cyprus with guarantees against future changes in the island's political status. According to the Greek foreign minister, the Turks no longer demand that their troops be present on Cyprus. Remaining problems include the composition and authority of mixed courts and the percentage of Turkish Cypriot representation in the future Cyprus parliament. (Page 5)

\*Laos: Premier Phoui's efforts to pack his new cabinet with ineffectual conservative politicians and members of his family are splitting the ranks of the power group in Laos. The army and young reformist elements refuse to join such a cabinet, and if Phoui miscalculates his strength and remains adamant, there is a prospect that the army would seize power and call on the Crown Prince to appoint a government.

(Page 6)

Thailand: Friction is apparently growing between Marshal Sarit and his two principal deputies, Generals Thanom and Prapat. This raises the possibility of an estrangement which might upset the precarious stability of the ruling military group.

#### III. THE WEST

France-Algeria: Contacts between the French Government and the Algerian rebels continue, and Egyptian President Nasir has indicated that he personally would be willing to help mediate the dispute. Some sort of understanding with the rebels is increasingly urgent for De Gaulle. Nasir is unlikely to risk his prestige in any mediation effort unless he has some assurance that it will be successful. (Page 8)

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\*Cuba-Venezuela: Plans to oust Trujillo may be discussed during Fidel Castro's visit to Venezuela. Castro and Venezuelan President-elect Betancourt share a bitter hatred for Trujillo. Top Castro leaders believe that all possible aid short of armed intervention should be given Dominican revolutionaries, and the Venezuelan Government apparently endorses this policy.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### Soviet Leaders Criticize Nasir's Anti-Communist Moves

Boylet Leaders Criticize Masir 5 Inter Commission
Soviet leaders have complained
Western press exploitation of the UAR
campaign against local Communists has raised the matter from
an "internal affair" to an "international" issue,
. The Kremlin is also said
to be concerned over the extreme character of some attacks by the Cairo press and radio, since UAR governmental control of these organs gives such statements an "official status." While the USSR still respects Cairo's right of independent action in moving against local Communists, the Kremlin reportedly feels that UAR charges of Communist opposition to Arab independence and unity can damage the USSR's relations with other Afro-Asian countries.
Soviet Ambassador Kissilev in Cairo has been angered by the way the UAR's crackdown on Communists has been treated in the press of Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait as well as the UAR,  Kissilev is also reported to have told Nasir aide Ali Sabry that the presence of an anti-Communist editor as one of two UAR newsmen attending the signing of the Aswan Dam agreement is a "bad omen" for the agreement.
Despite indications that Moscow is increasingly displeased with recent signs of improvement in Cairo's relations with the West and with Nasir's anti-Communist moves, the UAR Presiden has stated that the USSR has not broached the latter problem "officially." Soviet leaders still apparently hope to avoid any open clash with Cairo on the issue. The Soviet press and radio continue to avoid independent criticism, although on 19 January Moscow abandoned its hitherto brief factual reporting by repeating to Arab listeners an attack attributed by the Paris Communist newspaper L'Humanité to the Moroccan Communist party calling Nasir's crackdown on Communists a "blow to democracy" which will hinder the Arab struggle against "imperialism." At least one East European journal—the Polish Government paper Zycie Warszawy—has recently indulged in direct but mild criticism of Nasir, while the Indonesian and Algerian Communist parties have attacked his anti-Communist moves in strong language.

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#### USSR May Be Transferring More MIG-19s to China

A transfer of more FARMER (MIG-19s) from the Soviet Union to China may be under way. At least 12 MIG-19s accompanied by ten transports flew from the Krasnoyarsk area in the central USSR to the Far East on 16 January. On 20 January one of these transports was observed departing an unknown base en route to Shenyang, Manchuria. This transport made references in communications to the "malenkie" (small ones), suggesting that it was still being accompanied by fighter aircraft. This would be the second group of these high-performance day fighters to be delivered to China; the first delivery was suspected on 25 October 1958 when a minimum of 11 MIG-19s and possibly a regiment flew into Tsitshihar, Manchuria. No firm reflection of these has been noticed since that date, however.

The MIG-19 is a single-place twin-engine day interceptor with a maximum speed of 680 knots and a maximum ceiling of 62,000 feet. It is generally superior to the MIG-15s and MIG-17s now employed by the Chinese Communist Air Force and should improve its daylight intercept capability.

Other modern Soviet aircraft have recently flown to Com-
munist China. On 6 January two BADGER (TU-16) jet medium
bombers, a type never observed landing in China before, flew
to Harbin. The final disposition of these bombers is unknown.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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of strength he may have developed during his domination of Syrian internal security forces.	
any real responsibility and removed from control of any source of strength he may have developed during his domination of	S
ficials fallen from favor, Sarraj would probably be relieved of	
rupt, overt break with Sarraj. As in the case of other high of-	
Nasir is reported considering the possibility that Sarraj has been 'framed,' and in any event is unlikely to make an ab-	
ical difficulties which may reflect upon Sarraj's loyalty and ability.	
economic conditions in Syria, but is also checking into polit-	
and the UAR interior minister, was ostensibly sent to review	
The committee, consisting of two UAR vice presidents	
"his Communist officers."	
a special investigating committee from Cairo that he dismiss	
Sarraj was resisting demands made by	╛
through Sarraj's security net.	7
former Syrian Chief of Staff Afif Bizri, long suspected of leftist tendencies, who appears to have slipped or been helped	
The regime is also concerned over the whereabouts of	
arross and merosy given min a chance to escaped	
law. Sarraj is alleged to have warned Bakdash about planned arrests and thereby given him a chance to escape.	
Communist army officers, and has a Communist sister-in-	
Communist Khalid Bakdash, has tolerated the presence of	
charges that the Syrian minister is sympathetic toward top	
The UAR minister of interior, probably personally hostile to Sarraj, is said to have "enthusiastically" supported	
munists.	
Cairo is reported to have had him under surveillance for several months and appears to consider him too easy on the Com-	
be in danger of losing his position as Syria's strong man.	
"bungled" the recent roundup of Syrian Communists and may	
Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, minister of interior for the Syrian region of the UAR, is reportedly considered by Cairo to have	
[Al. 1 al. Warming Common maining of interview for the Common	
Syrian Interior Minister Sarraj May Be Demoted	

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## Iran and UAR Considering Top-level Exchange Visits

approved the idea of having Prime Minister Eqbal visit Cairo and that he would then welcome a visit from President Nasir. This overture probably means that Foreign Minister Hekmat's exploratory moves to strengthen relations have been well received in Cairo.  The Shah probably is concerned over the outcome in the struggle between Nasir and Communist forces for control of Iraq, and propaganda pressures against Iran's negotiation of a defense treaty with the US. He may anticipate a political rapprochement between the US and the UAR and want to make his accommodation with Nasir in advance.	The Shah of Iran
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want to make his accommodation with Nasir in advance.	
	want to make his accommodation with Nasir in advance.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Progress in Cyprus Negotiations	
Conversations between Greek F and Turkish Foreign Minister Zorla to 20 January, apparently resolved lems which had developed in the couturkish exchanges on a Cyprus sett Ankara no longer insists of a Turkish military base on the islar viously stalled progress toward agrof an international police force on further negotiations. Other problem the composition and extent of author the percentage of Turkish Cypriot recyprus parliament.	several of the major prob- arse of recent Greek- clement. on the establishment of ad, an issue which pre- eement. The possibility Cyprus has been raised for as still remaining include city of mixed courts and
on the establishment of a rindependence would be guaranteed by Turkey. The new republic would have its sovereignty. It would not be pering to which both Greece and Turkey British would retain their military resolution of the Cyprus problem we general settlement of all outstandin and Ankarasuch as the status of respected to raise serious objections to by Greece and Turkey as long as to retain their bases.	republic of Cyprus whose by the UK, Greece, and we certain limitations on rmitted to join any group- y did not belong, and the bases on the island. Final ould be accompanied by a g issues between Athens minorities. London is not s to any settlement agreed
On Cyprus, meanwhile, the consecurity operations combined with tainees have tended to improve the of the EOKA truce, in effect since	new releases of political de- chances for a continuation

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Conflict Develor	os Within	Laotian	Power	Group

Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone's efforts to include his relatives and a heavy proportion of discredited politicians in the new cabinet are creating friction with the army and young reformers on the Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI), who backed his successful demand that the assembly grant him full powers. The army officers and reformists now refuse to participate in his proposed cabinet since it would carry over the image of previous ineffectual governments and diminish the prospect for radical reforms opened by Phoui's assembly victory.

The army and CDNI are aware that a serious crisis could develop, and they have made it clear that they are ready to negotiate with Phoui on an acceptable slate. Some jockeying for position is almost inevitable, especially in a situation where long-entrenched politicians are being displaced by reform groups only recently emerged on the political scene. However, if Phoui miscalculates his strength and remains adamant, there is a real prospect that the army would seize power, and call upon the Crown Prince to appoint a government.

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## Friction Reported Among Thai Military Leaders

Friction between Thai Premier Marshal Sarit and his principal deputies, Generals Thanom and Prapat, appears to be growing. There is some danger that an estrangement may ensue which might upset the precarious stability within the ruling military group. It is also reported that dissatisfaction is increasing throughout Sarit's Revolutionary party—which includes both military and civilian elements—over his performance as Thailand's dictator. Sarit is said again to be ignoring the party's advice on matters of state, and his continued delay in forming an interim government is meeting with criticism.

Thanom and Prapat, who seem to have submerged their past differences, would prefer to avoid trouble since they expect that Sarit's declining health will soon force him to give up power. They may, however, feel forced to move against Sarit in self-defense. Recently he is reported to have drawn up orders for the arrest of Thanom and Prapat, only to tear them up a few minutes later. He has apparently been piqued because they questioned certain of his official decisions. Some weeks ago, on the basis of rumors, he actually detained for a short time Air Marshal Dawee, a popular figure in the military group.

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#### III. THE WEST

### Nasir Willing to Mediate Between France and Algerian Rebels

Egyptian President Nasir now has indicated he believes he can bring about peace between France and the Algerian rebels, and has stated that he personally would be willing to help mediate,
Nasir may have been influenced by his recent talks with Italian Premier Fanfani who, despite public denials that he was acting as an intermediary, nevertheless carried Nasir's views on Algeria to De Gaulle on 14 January. Nasir reportedly said that "if he did anything" he would require French assurances of an intention to free Algeria after
Nasir told Fanfani he had no objection to a solution which would give Algeria membership in the French Community, a suggestion said to have been advanced in recent French soundings of rebel leaders.
According to Fanfani, De Gaulle indicated great interest in Nasir's observations but, although more flexible than several months ago, appeared "troubled and uncertain" about the future of Algeria. The French President is probably weighing the domestic repercussions of mediation by Nasir-particularly the reactions of some army elements and diehard rightists in France as well as Algeria. Nevertheless, some sort of early settlement of the Algerian question is made increasingly urgent by French political, economic, and military considerations.
De Gaulle may also hope that Moslems more representative of the masses than the deputies elected to the National Assembly last November will emerge from the March municipal elections in Algeria. The American consul general in Algiers notes the necessity of a cease-fire for the municipal elections, pointing out that it was difficult to find 100 Moslem candidates for 46 assembly seats in November and that there are some 15,000 positions to be filled in March.

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Cuba and	Venezuela	Likely	to	Support	Revolt	in	Domini	can
Republic								

Cuba and Venezuela are likely to become bases for revolutionary operations against Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. Fidel Castro and other leaders of his 26 of July Movement are agreed that every possible aid short of armed intervention should be given Dominican revolutionaries. Even before Cuban dictator Batista's flight to the Dominican Republic on 1 January, Castro had vowed that Trujillo would be "next." There are indications that a Castro-backed expedition of Haitian exiles is being prepared to oust the weak Duvalier regime in Haiti as a first step in getting within easy striking distance of the Dominican Republic.

Enrique Jimenez, a Dominican revolutionary who fought with Castro in Cuba, is also on close terms with high Venezuelan officials, and he is believed to have accompanied Castro on his 23 January trip to Venezuela—a trip made by Castro primarily to help celebrate the first anniversary of the overthrow of the Venezuelan dictator and to thank Venezuelans for their considerable assistance to his cause during the fight against Batista.

Trujillo and Venezuelan President-elect Betancourt, who is scheduled to be inaugurated on 13 February, have long been bitter antagonists.

Trujillo has been aiding Venezuelan opposition elements in exile plotting against the Venezuelan junta.

Confronted by growing public pressure to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry recently indicated that maintenance of relations would provide an opportunity for the Venezuelan Government to collaborate with groups seeking to overthrow Trujillo.

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Truillo	annears a	Trujillo appears aware of the threat to his 28-year-old							
regime and has been taking unusual internal security measures									

#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Special Adviser to the President

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

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