30 March 1959

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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

I DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: 15 S

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2016

AUTH: 115 70 P

DATE: 15 70 P

### TOP SECRET

for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003305



#### 30 MARCH 1959

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet reaction to US high-altitude flight in Berlin air corridor.


Peiping imposes martial law to control Tibet; India to offer Dalai Lama political asylum.


#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq - Qasim predicts another "revolution" in April; may involve political and economic changes, including oil industry. Britain will withdraw troops from Habbaniya.

Tunisians and Moroccans discussing link between US military bases in North Africa and Algerian issues.

Ethiopia - Hailie Selassie will visit Moscow shortly.





#### III. THE WEST

6 Portugal - Defense minister says he may be forced to take over government from Salazar.

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

\*Berlin air corridor: The USSR used MIG fighter aircraft to "harass" a high-altitude flight on 27 March by a US turboprop aircraft (C-130) on flights to and from Berlin. The Soviet chief controller at Karlshorst refused to guarantee the safety of either flight. He protested through the Soviet representative at the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC), noting that the practice of reserving altitudes below 10,000 feet for Western aircraft and those above for the bloc had continued for 14 years; he maintained any change in this procedure would have to be worked out in advance. US Ambassador Bruce in Bonn has protested to the Soviet representative on BASC concerning the "dangerous maneuvers" and "formation flying" of the MIG aircraft which occurred during both the corridor flights and continued even after the C-130 had entered the traffic pattern at Templehof in Berlin. The crew of the C-130 reported that except for the approach to within ten feet by one MIG flying in formation, the Soviet fighters had not used aggressive or dangerous tactics

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the Tibetan rebellion indicates that Communist China will use whatever force is necessary to control the Tibetans. Premier Chou En-lai's 28 March order enjoins the Chinese armed forces in Tibet to "thoroughly stamp out" the rebellion and in effect places Tibet under martial law. The Chinese puppet—the Panchen Lama—has been named acting chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, and the local Tibetan government has been abolished. Prime Minister Nehru has agreed to extend political asylum to the Dalai Lama, who fled Lhasa on March.

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The Chinese Communists have "welcomed" Nehru's recent statement on nonintervention in Chinese affairs, but have indicated that they will consider future discussions of Tibet in India's Parliament "improper." (Page 1)

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim has predicted another 'new big revolution' for Iraq in April. His forecasts of 'revolutions' in March turned out to be the Soviet-Iraqi economic accord and Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. The next 'revolution' could involve a major change in the economic development program or in constitutional arrangements. It might also include some form of nationalization of the oil in dustry. Meanwhile, London has decided to withdraw all its forces--some 350 men--from Habanniya airfield in Iraq.

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ficials to Rabat may be an effort to align Moroccan and Tunisian views on the next step regarding Algeria and military base questions. A prominent Algerian nationalist predicts that the Tunisians, with the tacit agreement of the Algerian rebel government, will try to incorporate a North African base settlement in a package offer which would associate an independent North African federation with the French Community. Should the three parties agree to such a package deal, the United States would be subject to increasing pressure to become directly involved in the Algerian problem.

\*Ethiopia-USSR: Emperor Haile Selassie will visit the USSR "shortly" in response to an invitation extended and accepted two years ago. The move is an expression of Ethiopia's overt posture of nonalignment. The Ethiopian foreign minister has explained privately that the Emperor feels he cannot indefinitely avoid the trip, for which Moscow has repeatedly asked him to set a date.

#### III. THE WEST

Portugal: Defense Minister Moniz has told the American naval attache that he may have to advise Premier Salazar to retire. Moniz said he would take over the government. Although

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the defense minister said that he realized such conversation could be considered treasonable, he was confident of the full backing of the military high command. Moniz' ambitions could be thwarted by the activities of the former defense minister, Colonel Santos Costa, who is a candidate to succeed Salazar and who retains considerable backing among the junior officers.

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DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### The Situation in Tibet

Peiping's recent statements indicate that the Chinese Communist regime has abandoned its cautious policy in Tibet in favor of force to control the Tibetans. Although the regime has dealt sternly with outbreaks of unrest in the past, it has never attempted all-out suppression. Premier Chou En-lai's 28 March order enjoins the Chinese armed forces in Tibet to "thoroughly stamp out" the rebellion and in effect places Tibet under martial law. The decree dissolves the local government and replaces it with the Communist-sponsored Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region which was set up in April 1956 but never accepted by the Tibetans.

Peiping's policy since 1951 has been to go slow in Tibet, delaying reforms and working as much as possible through local institutions while attempting to undermine their authority and gradually replace them with Chinese Communist organizations.

The 28 March order names Peiping's puppet, the Panchen Lama, acting chairman of the preparatory committee in place of the Dalai Lama "during the time" the latter is held under ''duress'' by the rebels. The Chinese have been grooming the Panchen Lama for just such a role in the event the Dalai Lama refused to cooperate with them. The Communists, apparently anxious to keep the door open for future use of the Dalai Lama as a puppet, are claiming that his attitude continues to favor Peiping against Tibetan "reactionaries." On 29 March, Peiping Radio broadcast the text of letters allegedly exchanged between the Dalai Lama and the political commissar of Chinese armed forces in Tibet supporting this theme and attempting to document Chinese restraint in the face of rebel "provocations." It seems likely that the Communists will continue to use the Panchen Lama for the time being but will increase their efforts to destroy Lamaism in Tibet.

the	seriousness	of	the	fighting in	Lhasa	between	20	and	22	March.

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a number of buildings in Lhasa were						
damaged, including monasteries and the Dalai Lama's palace						
and summer home.) Peiping						
claims that 4,000 rebels were taken prisoner during the fight-						
ing and that rebel forces in all number "only about 20,000," in-						
cluding the Khamba tribesmen. The rebels also had built						
"battle positions" along a key highway and placed "large num-						
bers of machine guns there," according to the political com-						
missar of Chinese armed forces in Tibet.						
The Dalai Lama, who fled southward from Lhasa on 17 March,						
was expected to leave on 28 March for a Tibetan town about 20						
miles from the Indian border. Prime Minister Nehru has agreed						
to extend political asylum to him, $\mathcal{U}$						
arrangements are being made						
to meet the Dalai Lama at the frontier.						

If the Dalai Lama makes good his escape to India, Peiping is likely to press New Delhi for his return. This would sharpen Nehru's dilemma, which results from his desire to maintain good relations with Peiping in the face of growing Indian sentiment supporting a more sympathetic policy toward the Tibetans. The Chinese Communists have "welcomed" Nehru's recent statement on nonintervention in China's affairs, but have indicated that they will consider future discussions of Tibet in India's Parliament "improper."

Peiping's claim that Kalimpong in West Bengal was the "command center" of the Tibetan rebels was rejected as "entirely incorrect" by an Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman on 29 March. He said the Indian Government six months ago made it clear to Tibetans in Kalimpong that they "should not indulge in any propaganda activities against a friendly government on Indian soil"; since then, he stated, Tibetans in the city "have remained quiet."

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

#### Meeting of Tunisian and Moroccan Officials

Several top Tunisian leaders, including the foreign minister and the influential director of the political bureau of the Neo-Destour party, are visiting the Moroccan capital ostensibly to sign a series of bilateral conventions negotiated since last June. The American ambassador in Tunis, however, believes that the Tunisians will use the occasion to try to align the views of the two states on the next steps regarding both the Algerian and the foreign base questions with an eye to any meeting this spring between President de Gaulle and King Mohamed V of Morocco or Tunisia's President Bourguiba. Bourguiba has already publicly linked the future of the French base at Bizerte with settlement of the Algerian problem by mid-June, and he reportedly is disappointed that Rabat has not done the same with the American, French, and Spanish bases in Morocco.

The "minister of information" of the Algerian provisional government predicts that the Tunisians, apparently with the tacit blessing of the Algerians, will try to present a package offer to France. This would incorporate a North African base settlement, an agreement for the protection of the French minority, and the association of an independent North African federation—including an independent Algeria—with the French Community.

1	The ambassador feel there would probably be i regarding base rights. In more directly involved in	ncrease n additic	d pressu on, the U	re on the Inited Stat	United Sta	tes ecome

#### III. THE WEST

Portuguese Defense Minister Feels He May So	on Have					
To Take Over Government						
Portugal's defense minister, General Bote 26 March told the American naval attaché he fobliged "within the next 12 months or probably Premier Salazar to retire. Moniz said he had name Salazar's successor and that there was no self strong enough to hold the country together minister claimed to have complete support from high command for such action. He added, how move might not be necessary at all, since Sala	elt he would be sooner" to advise the power to o one except him The defense m the military ever, that the zar's poor health					
Moniz regards former Defense Minister Colonel Santos Costa as the only obstacle in his way. He has removed from important posts over 200 key military officers loyal to the colonel but has not succeeded in persuading Salazar to denounce Santos Costa's intrigues for a comeback. Moniz is prepared to advance the date of his own take-over if he thinks an increasing number of junior officers are transferring their loyalty to Santos Costa in the belief he is the stronger man.						
The Portuguese	consider the in-					
ternal situation grave and believe the government is "nowhere						
near the bottom; of the situation" that gave rise to the abortive						
coup attempt of 12 March re convinced the mil- itary were the prime force in this, despite repeated assertions						
of the army minister that the army is loyal to						

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#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Secretary of Commerce

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director