


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN




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21 MAY 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev to visit Albania on 25 May. ①

Soviet state security apparatus again pledges loyalty to Khrushchev and the party. ②

Rumania - Emigration to Israel scheduled to resume. ③

II. ASIA-AFRICA



UAR-Iraq - Harassment of Iraqi border villages renewed. [] ④

Expulsions from Kuwait arouse Iraqi military. [] ⑤

Lebanon - Cabinet changes could occur this June. ⑥

Ceylon Government will probably survive leftist resignations at least temporarily. ⑦

KMT elements fleeing Burmese forces occupy two Laotian villages. ⑧



- ⑨ Soviet Embassy in Burma refuses to allow arrest of TASS man.
- ⑩ South Korea - Rhee invokes ordinance requiring detailed reports from political parties.
- ⑪ Chiang says privately he will run for third term in 1960.

III. THE WEST

- ⑫ Suspected Communist named executive director of Cuban agrarian reform.

LATE ITEM

- ⑬ Sudanese army group plans coup.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 May 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK USSR-Albania: Khrushchev plans to pay his first visit to Albania from 25 May to 6 June. The timing of the visit to coincide with the original Soviet 27 May deadline on Berlin suggests that he wishes to play down the importance of the deadline and reassure the West that no unilateral Soviet action will be taken during East-West negotiations. While in Albania, Khrushchev may further define the bloc's attitude toward Yugoslavia. [redacted] (Page 1)

NO Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: No significant indications bearing on the possibility of hostilities. [redacted]

OK USSR-KGB: For the second time in two years, the Soviet state security apparatus (KGB) has taken a public oath of fealty to Khrushchev and the party. This pledge, an outgrowth of the recent state security conference in Moscow, was probably prompted by continuing party distrust of secret police activities. Its language also suggests that the regime has ordered the KGB to step up its counterintelligence activities. [redacted] (Page 2)

NO Rumania-Israel: Jewish emigration from Rumania to Israel will resume shortly, at least on a reduced scale. The Rumanian Foreign Ministry has asked the Israeli Legation to revalidate "some 130 Jewish emigré documents" which were issued before emigration was suspended at the end of February. A strong Arab reaction can again be expected. [redacted] (Page 3)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR-Iraq: [redacted]

[redacted] renewed harassment of Iraqi villages and outposts on the Iraqi-Syrian border, carried out by Syrian and "refugee" Iraqi tribesmen. [redacted] the arrival in the northern border area of a Syrian delegation, led by Minister of Interior Sarraj and accompanied by the deputy commander and the chief of plans of the UAR First Army. There is as yet, however, no firm evidence that significant Syrian military support has been given to these tribal elements.

[redacted] (Page 4)

Kuwait: [redacted]

recommended that Baghdad take "decisive and immediate action" to safeguard the interest of Iraqis in Kuwait. This is in reaction to Kuwait's expulsion of reputed Communists, including Jordanians, Syrians, and Palestinians as well as Iraqis. The message identified those expelled as "elements supporting the Iraqi Republic." [redacted] (Page 5)

Lebanon: A change of cabinet, and possibly new Moslem-Christian tension, may occur in mid-June, when the emergency powers of the Karami government expire. Some of the more extreme politicians favor new parliamentary elections this year, but moderates, including President Shihab, believe the elections should be postponed until next spring when they hope prospects for a peaceful campaign will be better. [redacted] (Page 6)

Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.

Iraq: The Communists pursue their course toward control of Iraq. Qasim shows no signs that he is taking resolute anti-Communist action, although he has not as yet appointed Communist party members to the cabinet nor yielded to the Communist

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DAILY BRIEF

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demands for the "legalization" of political parties. [redacted]
[redacted]

OK Ceylon: The resignation of two extreme leftist cabinet ministers and the withdrawal of some ten other leftist members of parliament from Ceylon's ruling coalition probably will not cause Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government to fall in the immediate future. However, his prospects for remaining in office until the next national elections, which must be held by 1961, do not appear very promising at this time. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 7)

OK Laos-KMT: Approximately 500 Chinese Nationalist irregular troops, fleeing from Burmese forces, have occupied two Laotian villages on the frontier. The foreign minister, probably fearing that the presence of these troops will further complicate relations with Laos' Communist neighbors, has asked the US to request Taipei to order their removal. Last March Communist China charged Laos with complicity in border incursions made by other Nationalist troops "based in Laos."

[redacted] (Page 8) (Map)

NO Burma: The refusal of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon to allow the arrest of a TASS representative to ensure his appearance for a libel trial will be generally viewed by the Burmese as a heavy-handed flouting of the law. This incident may delay Burmese acceptance of the new Soviet ambassador's credentials and could have repercussions in Southeast Asia. [redacted]
[redacted]

OK South Korea: The Rhee government has provided itself with another strong weapon for intimidating the opposition Democratic party by invoking and expanding the requirements of a long-dormant ordinance of the former US military government requiring detailed reports from all political parties. Such reports must include membership lists, details of income and expenditures, and data on party plans and activities. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 9)

OK Taiwan: Chiang Kai-shek reportedly told the Kuomintang central committee on 18 May that he intends to run for a third [redacted]

21 May 59

DAILY BRIEF

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term as president next year. He said, however, that he would not make his decision public until the National Assembly convenes possibly in December. The American Embassy in Taipei reports that Chiang presumably desires to wait until a "draft Chiang" movement has reached "ground-swell proportions" before making a public announcement. [] (Page 10)

III. THE WEST

DK Cuba: A man with a long record of Communist associations has been named executive director of the agrarian reform machinery established by cabinet decree on 17 May. Land reform is the key to the country's economic and social development, and penetration of its administration would provide the Communists with the means of building up considerable political strength in rural areas. [] (Page 11)

LATE ITEM

NO *Sudan: [] The army faction headed by Brigadier Shannan plans to stage a coup on 22 May, ousting the present Supreme Army Council in favor of a revolutionary command council on the Egyptian model. While some slight delay in undertaking this action is possible, a member of the group insists that the coup mechanism is already in motion. The principal objectives of the group, which represents radical nationalist junior officers, are reported to include a request for expanded American economic assistance, a determined effort to achieve a settlement of differences with Egypt, and the removal of sectarian and party influence from Sudanese politics. The group also claims to have obtained Ethiopian concurrence in its plans and is said to believe the Sudan is particularly well suited to lead African nationalism. [] (Page 12)

21 May 59

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev to Visit Albania

Radio Moscow announced on 20 May that Khrushchev will head a party-government delegation which will visit Albania from 25 May to 6 June. The trip, according to the announcement, had originally been scheduled for last year. No Soviet leader of Khrushchev's rank has previously visited Albania. The timing of the visit suggests a deliberate attempt by Khrushchev to play down the importance of the original 27 May Berlin deadline and to reassure the West that the USSR will take no unilateral action during high-level East-West negotiations.

Khrushchev will probably use the visit to press home new attacks on NATO. He may be joined by East German Premier Otto Grotewohl, who arrived unexpectedly in Tirana on 15 May for a vacation of indefinite length. Greece and Turkey--on NATO's southern flank--have been criticized recently by Albania and Bulgaria for having concluded bilateral military agreements with the US. Khrushchev may also further define bloc policy toward Yugoslavia, a favorite target for Albanian propaganda.

On his way home, Khrushchev may visit Bulgaria. Moscow announced in March that a "party-government" delegation would visit Bulgaria this year. Khrushchev has also said he would attend the 40th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Polish United Workers (Communist) party in Warsaw in the latter half of July, and he is already committed to tour Scandinavia from 10 to 25 August. A central committee meeting is scheduled in Moscow on 24 June.

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Soviet Secret Police Reaffirms Loyalty to Regime

In a communiqué following the recent general conference of state security workers in Moscow, the Soviet secret police (KGB) again swore complete loyalty to the Khrushchev regime and promised an all-out struggle against foreign intelligence services. The meeting, one of a series called by various organizations to discuss the work of the 21st party congress, was attended by party presidium member Aleksey Kirichenko, who is probably Khrushchev's second-in-command for party affairs. As on the 40th anniversary of the security services in December 1957, assurances were given that the days of arbitrary police power are irrevocably over and that the KGB is controlled at all levels by the party.

This second oath of fealty to the regime in two years was probably prompted by continuing party distrust of the secret police, which may have accounted for the unexplained ouster of KGB chairman Ivan Serov last December. The American Embassy in Moscow has suggested that the KGB may have been quietly trying to increase its prerogatives and to justify its continued existence on a grand scale. In recent months, Khrushchev has indicated his intention to reduce the role of the police in the Soviet Union and to transfer some of its functions to "public" organizations.

Moscow's accounts of the conference suggest that the regime has ordered the secret police to intensify its counter-intelligence efforts. Khrushchev's call at the 21st congress for a consolidation of state security organs was interpreted at the conference as a demand from the party for greater vigilance against the external enemy.

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Exodus of Jews From Rumania to Resume

[Jewish emigration from Rumania to Israel apparently is about to resume. The Rumanian Foreign Ministry in the past week has submitted "some 130 Jewish emigré documents" to the Israeli Legation in Bucharest for revalidation of the Israeli visas issued before emigration was suspended on 27 February in response to Arab protests.]

[Out of a total of 17,916 Rumanian Jews who have migrated to Israel since July 1958, 3,360 arrived in March; most of them, however, had actually left Rumania by the end of February. During the month of April there were only 25 immigrants. Registration for emigration continued during the period of actual suspension, at least for a time. Some 14,000 fully documented Jews still await permission to leave Rumania.]

[The lack of any publicity on this apparent resumption indicates an attempt by Rumania to forestall the expected strong reaction from the Arab states, which are already aroused by the mere prospect of renewed immigration into Israel. Arab protests against the previous immigration have been and continue to be directed to the Soviet Union, as well as Rumania. On the basis of an Arab League Council decision in March, Arab diplomats have urged other countries to oppose the movement of Jews into Israel. On 17 May, Jordan said it had received agreement from five Arab countries to convene an Arab League summit conference to discuss plans for halting Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe.]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraqi-Syrian Border Situation

[redacted]
[redacted] renewed harassment of Iraqi villages and outposts on the Iraqi-Syrian border by Syrian and "refugee" Iraqi tribesmen.


[redacted]
[redacted] tribes were advancing into Iraqi territory, and added that tribesmen almost certainly were "laying an ambush." A 17 May report from the Iraqi 2nd Division headquarters in Kirkuk informed Baghdad that a clash near the border involved "Syrian tribesmen supported by small Syrian army units." [redacted]
[redacted] an Iraqi reconnaissance plane, checking on tribal concentration on the Syrian side of the border, was hit by Syrian fire but returned safely. A Syrian report of the same date informed Damascus that one border incident had involved strafing by Iraqi aircraft.

[redacted] the UAR has provided tribesmen with light arms and ammunition. [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] A high-level delegation of Syrian government and military officials, including Syrian Interior Minister Sarraj and both the deputy commander and the chief of plans of the UAR First (Syrian) Army, arrived in the northern border area on 14 May, [redacted]

[redacted] The Syrian minister of agricultural reform was also in the delegation, however, and the visit may be for the purpose of discussing various questions affecting both Syrian and Iraqi tribesmen, including the UAR land-reform program and the problem of caring for the influx of Iraqi refugees.

The Syrian Government may also be concerned over reports of differences among leaders of the Iraqi tribes, some of whom have given up their opposition to the Baghdad regime and returned to Iraq. Others may be pressing the UAR to take more drastic action aimed at regaining holdings they lost at the time of the Mosul revolt. Available evidence does not indicate any significant movement into eastern Syrian by "regular" UAR military forces. [redacted]



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Kuwait's Crackdown on Communists May Bring Crisis in Relations With Iraq

Military authorities in southern Iraq have informed Baghdad that the government of Kuwait, assisted by an Egyptian police official and British authorities, has initiated a "strong campaign of terrorism against elements supporting the Iraqi Republic."

[redacted] recommended "decisive and immediate action" by our government to safeguard the interests of the Iraqis" by Kuwait. Baghdad's reaction [redacted] is not yet known. There are about 30,000 Iraqis in Kuwait's population of 210,000.

The Kuwait Government last week began a general purge of reputed Communists, including Jordanians, Syrians, and Palestinians, as well as Iraqis. The acting ruler [redacted]

[redacted] expelled "200 Iraqi Communists" in the last few days. [redacted]

[redacted] arrests and expulsions were the first steps taken to implement a decision reached in the Kuwait Supreme Council on 9 May to rid Kuwait of Communists. [redacted] suspected Communists were to be dismissed from all government departments, and later from business enterprises. Non-Kuwaiti suspects were to be expelled, and Kuwaitis were to lose their jobs and welfare benefits. The origin of the Kuwaiti Government's information on suspected Communists is uncertain. [redacted]

(In early May, prior to the anti-Communist action, the Ruler of Kuwait sought and received assurances of British military support if measures against Iraqis in Kuwait should provoke a hostile reaction from Baghdad. Kuwaiti Army officers are training with the small British garrison on Bahrein, and Kuwaiti Army headquarters has established continuous radio contact with the British command there. Kuwait has also agreed to stockpile arms, including anti-tank weapons, and ammunition for use in an emergency by British troops, who would have to be flown in.) [redacted]

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Change in Lebanese Government Likely in June

The political situation in Lebanon, which has been relatively calm during recent months, may soon become more tense. The emergency powers of the Karami government expire on 13 June, and concurrent changes in the cabinet are likely. The resulting political maneuvering may cause renewed Moslem-Christian conflicts.

Two members of the four-man cabinet--Raymond Edde and Husayn al-Uwayni--have already indicated they intend to resign by mid-June. A program of administrative reform has been undertaken by the cabinet which has imposed a considerable strain on the four ministers. The fatigue resulting from lengthy daily cabinet sessions may also have contributed to the obviously strained relations between the two Christians in the cabinet, Edde and Pierre Gemayel, leader of the extreme rightist Phalange. Gemayel is said to believe Edde is too conciliatory toward the Moslems who, he claims, repeatedly ask for concessions without taking any cognizance of Christian demands. Gemayel also resents President Shihab's "silent neutrality" amid these disputes.

An additional unsettling factor is the timing of new parliamentary elections. Gemayel agrees with Saeb Salaam, the extremist Moslem leader, in favoring elections this year. Moderate leaders, including President Shihab, however, prefer that they be postponed until next spring. They hope that prospects will be better at that time for a comparatively peaceful change from the present predominantly pro-Western assembly to one more in line with Arab neutralist sentiment and more representative of the influence of local magnates.

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
Ceylon

The resignation of two leftist cabinet ministers and the withdrawal of some 10 representatives from Ceylon's ruling coalition on 18 and 19 May probably will not cause Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government to fall in the immediate future. While the government presently commands only 45 votes in the 100-member Parliament, it probably will be able to regain a majority with the support of opposition members who do not wish to face new national elections at this time. Five independent opposition representatives reportedly have already offered Bandaranaike their support. Furthermore, the opposition does not now appear sufficiently unified to vote the government out.

Bandaranaike's prospects for remaining in power until 1961 are now seriously threatened, however, as he has failed for the first time to control and outmaneuver the rival factions in his government. Under mounting pressure from 10 moderate cabinet ministers to oust leftist ministers Philip Gunawardena and William de Silva or face a breakup of his cabinet, Bandaranaike compromised by curtailing the two ministers' powers but attempting to retain them in the cabinet. His willingness to yield to the moderate majority and to risk Gunawardena's and de Silva's resignation probably stemmed from his determination to retain office rather than from any change in his political outlook.

Bandaranaike's authority over a newly constituted government will be increasingly difficult to maintain, both because he may have to bargain for parliamentary support and because he has proved susceptible to pressure. Moreover, a government composed primarily of diverse conservative elements is likely to suffer from as much dissension as the previous coalition.

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Chinese Nationalist Irregulars Enter Laos

The entry into Laos of 500 Chinese Nationalist (KMT) troops fleeing a Burmese Army push is likely to aggravate Laos' strained relations with Communist China and North Vietnam. Laotian concern is apparent in the foreign minister's request on 19 May that the United States intervene with Taipei to order removal of the troops.

Laos is already under propaganda attack from its Communist neighbors as a result of attempts to integrate former Communist Pathet Lao battalions with the Laotian Army and the house arrest of Pathet leaders. Peiping on 20 May charged that these developments were a prelude to a military coup and the destruction of the domestic Communists and called for "immediate" re-activation of the International Control Commission (ICC) for Laos.

Last March Communist China's propaganda charged Laos with complicity in border incursions by Chinese Nationalist forces from Laos. Peiping can be expected to revive these charges to add urgency to Communist bloc requests that the ICC be reconvened. During April, Chinese Communist patrols entered Laos in search of KMT troops as well as refugees who had been crossing into Burma and Laos in large numbers.

Burmese military operations against the Chinese Nationalists probably reflect Prime Minister Ne Win's concern over indications of a Taipei-supported build-up of the irregulars for possible use in future guerrilla attacks against Chinese Communist border posts. The onset of the annual monsoon rains will soon force the curtailment of Burmese military pressure on the irregulars until next October.

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Rhee Administration Imposes New Restrictions on Political Activity

The Rhee administration has imposed additional restrictions on political activity in South Korea, probably as a further step in the campaign to assure President Rhee's re-election next year. The government information director on 19 May issued a memorandum requiring all political parties to submit reports covering their activities, membership lists, future plans, sources of funds, and details of their expenditures. Ambassador Dowling in Seoul observes that the measure will provide the administration with a strong weapon to harass the opposition Democratic party and to intimidate persons affiliated with or sympathetic to the opposition.

The order is based on American military government ordinance 55 for the regulation of political parties, which the government has not previously enforced. Requirements that ten days' advance notice be given of party meetings, that results of such meetings be reported within five days, that personal histories of party officers be turned in, and that future party plans be reported were not specified in the original ordinance. Invocation of an American-promulgated measure, as in the suppression of the large pro-opposition newspaper Kyonghyang Sinmun, could be an attempt to deflect criticism.

Acting under the terms of the new Local Autonomy Law, which provides for appointment rather than election of officials, on 13 May the government announced the most extensive change of provincial governors in the republic's history, which resulted in administration stalwarts' gaining most of these posts. The government also took steps to consolidate its control at the grass-roots level by appointing local officials. These moves will undercut the opposition Democrats at the important lower echelon of political organization and bring administration influence to bear on almost every aspect of the private citizen's daily life.

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Chiang Kai-shek States Intention to Seek Third Term

(At the Kuomintang central committee meeting held from 15 to 20 May in Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek stated that after careful consideration he had decided to run again for the Chinese Nationalist presidency, [redacted])

[redacted] Chiang definitely ruled out a constitutional amendment to permit a third six-year term and said that the central committee should decide how a third term could be legally arranged. The American Embassy in Taipei believes the constitutional hurdle could be cleared by a juridical interpretation of the constitution by some authoritative body such as the Council of Grand Justices or the National Assembly itself. Chiang stated that he would not make a public announcement of his intentions before the next National Assembly meeting, to be held in late 1959 or early 1960.)

Press reports of the central committee meeting strongly hint that Chiang will run again. One paper noted that Chiang has "left the door open for a third term" and another reported that ranking Kuomintang leaders rose one after another at the meeting to voice "unanimous conviction" that Chiang is indispensable until Nationalist China recovers the mainland. The embassy believes that Chiang desires to wait until a "draft Chiang" movement has reached ground-swell proportions before making his intentions known to the public.

[redacted] Vice President Chen Cheng, who reportedly had hoped Chiang would retire in favor of his own candidacy, asserted at a Kuomintang meeting on 11 May that some means would be devised to keep Chiang in office even if the constitution were not revised. It seems clear, therefore, that top party leaders had agreed beforehand on the position taken by Chiang at the central committee meeting.) [redacted]

[redacted]

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III. THE WEST

Communists Expected to Exploit Cuban Land Reform

Communist penetration of rural Cuba may be facilitated by the appointment of Antonio Nunez Jimenez as executive director of the Agrarian Reform Institute. The institute was established to implement the Agrarian Reform Law promulgated on 16 May. Nunez has a long record of Communist associations and may even be a member of the party. He is a widely known geographer and intellectual, and has been influential in the revolutionary army and ministry of education, both apparent Communist targets. Prime Minister Fidel Castro retains the title of president of the institute, but his numerous other duties may keep him from giving it close direction. There is a report that "Che" Guevara, a pro-Communist revolutionary military leader, may take over the program.

The Communists have already shown considerable activity in some rural areas, particularly in Oriente Province where they have staffed "revolutionary schools" designed to instill revolutionary fervor in the masses. They have also been involved in the formation of an armed civilian militia in Oriente. A dearth of trained and effective labor leaders without the stigma of cooperation with Batista has given the Communists opportunity to gain influence in many provincial labor unions ostensibly led by 26th of July revolutionaries, most of whom are young and inexperienced.

The long-awaited Agrarian Reform Law is the keystone of Castro's still vague program of rapid economic and social development. Overconcentration on sugar production and of land ownership has kept a very large portion of the rural population almost without purchasing power. Several embassy sources feel the program may be of great benefit in the long run, but the law itself is so complex that it will require skilled and disinterested technological and administrative direction to succeed.

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LATE ITEM

Sudanese Army Group Plans Coup

[The Sudanese army group headed by Brigadier Shannan plans a coup for the morning of 22 May,
 The group's plans, which have been postponed on several past occasions, are said to be fixed and the coup machinery in motion, although some slight delay still might be "unavoidable."]

[The army commanders' conference in Khartoum on 10-12 May, which failed to produce an anticipated showdown between the Shannan group and the relatively conservative senior commanders, was used to alert commands committed to the coup. Small units from the eastern, central and northern commands are reported scheduled to converge on Khartoum beginning 21 May in order to be able to forestall any attempted countercoup. The principal concern of the coup planners is probably counteraction by members of the Ansar religious sect, who have already been disturbed by the army's interventions in politics.]

[The immediate purpose of the coup leaders who reflect the radical nationalist sentiments of junior officers, is to replace the present Supreme Council, headed by General Abboud, with a "council of seven." These seven officers are to set up a revolutionary command council on the 1952 Egyptian model, with Brigadier Shannan as the front man. One of Shannan's brothers, Lt. Col. Abd al-Hafiz Shannan, is scheduled to be on this council apparently as a direct representative of the junior officers. and if the plans succeed he seems likely to exercise an influence out of proportion to his rank.]

[The objectives of the group are said to include presentation to the United States of a new list of requests for expanded economic assistance, and presentation to the UAR of a "fully developed" list of suggested solutions for UAR-Sudan differences. The group intends to keep sectarian elements out of politics; it appears particularly anxious to limit the influence of the Ansar.]

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(leaders, whose strength is based largely in the countryside where radical nationalist feeling has been weakest.)

(The group claims it will do everything possible to assist independence movements in the rest of Africa, and it is said to feel that no country of Africa is so well suited as the Sudan for leadership of the continent. The conservative Emperor of Ethiopia is said to have been fully briefed on the coup plans by Brigadier Shannan and to have concurred in them. If this has been done, it is probably mostly an effort to parry any possible Ethiopian assistance to more conservative Sudanese elements.)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Director of the Budget
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