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7 April 1959

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



EXEMPTION NO. 21
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7 APRIL 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Foreign Ministry officials show obvious pleasure over agreement on foreign ministers' conference.


Soviet submarines test new equipment on their longest cruises thus far.

East German workers reported increasingly refractory.

Mao Tse-tung tells visiting Japanese he will retire as chairman of Chinese Communist Government.

Communist China may be providing MIG-17s to Indonesia.

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
II. ASIA-AFRICA

Himalayan border states fear Tibetan developments may threaten their security.

British Ambassador believes Iraq may be preparing to sequester affiliate of Iraq Petroleum Company.

III. THE WEST

- ⑧ France hints further unilateral action toward NATO if US sells arms to Morocco.
- ⑨ Spanish Communists seek to exploit labor discontent over inflation by call for joint strike action.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 April 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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NO

*USSR: (High Soviet Foreign Ministry officials showed obvious pleasure and relief to Ambassador Thompson that a foreign ministers' conference has been arranged, and adopted an "almost pleading" attitude in stressing the importance of a summit meeting. Thompson believes these attitudes reflect both Khrushchev's pressure on Foreign Ministry officials to arrange a summit meeting and their realization of the dangers of the situation brought about by Khrushchev's Berlin move. Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin remarked to Thompson on 3 April that Khrushchev knew what Secretary Dulles wanted but now is uncertain what American policy objectives are.)

NO

USSR submarines: At least two Soviet long-range submarines, one from the Northern and one from the Pacific Fleet, have concluded four-month round-trip voyages to the vicinity of Cape Horn, the most lengthy and distant voyages ever made by Soviet submarines. Each was supported by a surface tanker. It appears that these submarines were conducting concurrent tests of submerged reception of VLF/LF broadcasts, unconventional transmitters used in communicating with authorities ashore, and a low-frequency long-range navigation system. (Page 1) (Map)

OK

*East Germany: (East German workers are becoming increasingly "testy and assertive," according to an estimate by former party leader Karl Schirdewan. The workers are refusing to cooperate in forced programs involving "voluntary" work and increased production norms.) (Page 2)

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OK
Communist China: (Mao Tse-tung confirmed to a Japanese Socialist party delegation recently at Wuhan that he will not run for another term as chairman of the government. Mao said concurrent government and party responsibilities were "too great" and that he was "becoming old." It is likely that some respected figure such as Chu Te, who is not one of the real powers in the party, will be chosen to succeed Mao in this largely ceremonial position at the National People's Congress, which opens on 17 April.) [redacted] (Page 3)

Communist China - Indonesia: [redacted]

NO
 [redacted] "the MIG-17s originating from the Chinese People's Republic" suggests that Peiping is supplying Indonesia with jet fighters. Communist China already has transferred 12 TU-2 light bombers and some LA-11 piston fighters to the Indonesian Air Force. The planes apparently are being provided under a Chinese-Indonesian arms deal which may be part of a larger agreement between Indonesia and various Sino-Soviet bloc states including Czechoslovakia and Poland. [redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK
India-Tibet: The governments of the Himalayan border states of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, like New Delhi, are actively concerned over the possibility of border incidents as a result of increased Chinese military activity in Tibet and flight of refugees across the border. Public agitation in India against Peiping's action in Tibet continues strong. The Indian Communist party has come under heavy attack by Nehru, as well as by all other political parties for its defense of Peiping's position. [redacted]
 [redacted] (Page 4) (Map)

NO
Iraq: (The British ambassador in Baghdad has advised London that the arrest and prolonged interrogation of the senior Iraqi officer in charge of Mosul Petroleum Company operations may have been engineered to provide a basis for sequestering the company.) [redacted]

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(The ambassador believes that Baghdad will attempt to demonstrate a link between the Mosul uprising and the Mosul Petroleum Company--an Iraq Petroleum Company affiliate with relatively insignificant production. Thus far more than one third of the 157 Iraqi nationals holding senior posts in IPC have been arrested)

III. THE WEST

No
France-NATO: (French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, informed of the US decision in principle to furnish arms to Morocco, stated De Gaulle's personal reaction would be unfavorable and incline him to take "further unilateral action in other fields relating to NATO." De Gaulle previously linked his withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO wartime control to the issue of Allied support for France's North African policy. This suggests he might be equally prepared to use the Moroccan arms question as the pretext for transferring NATO-committed ground units back to "national" control in line with his concept of NATO as a loose coalition.) (Page 6)

No
Spain: Continuing economic deterioration in Spain makes labor disturbances appear probable in April or early May. (The outlawed Spanish Communist party is trying to capitalize on workers' discontent by urging moderate opposition groups to join in a nonviolent strike. These groups have thus far been unwilling to join the Communists in public demonstrations against the regime, but might feel obliged by growing worker restiveness over inflationary pressures to undertake some limited form of cooperation.) (Page 7)

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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):

1. The USSR will not turn over access controls to the GDR in the near future. However, the physical transfer of access controls could be accomplished with little or no advance warning.
2. There are no reliable indications of a Bloc intent in the near future to blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the Bloc. However, the Soviets could take such actions with little or no warning. The Soviet diplomatic protest and other Soviet reactions to the C-130 flights indicate that, in the event of further US flights above 10,000 feet, the Soviets would lay primary stress on propaganda exploitation and would not indentifiably attack such flights. However, fighter harassment (as in the present case) seems likely, and a staged "accident" cannot be excluded.
3. Indications of Soviet responses to possible Western actions in the event of turnover or harassment/blockade remain consistent with the judgments stated in SNIE 100-2-59.
4. Indications of Soviet diplomatic intentions remain consistent with the judgments stated in SNIE 100-2-59 and SNIE 100-2/1-59. There are as yet no useful indications of specific Soviet tactics at Geneva.
5. There were no major intelligence indications of Western allied diplomatic intentions, apart from information obtained through official contacts with US representatives.

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6. The situation in West Berlin remains basically unchanged. Data received in the past two weeks reflect some upturn in the current economic situation, but the future order situation for heavy industry remains uncertain. [redacted]

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
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Submarines Conclude Record Voyages

At least two Soviet long-range submarines, one from the Northern and one from the Pacific Fleet, have returned to their home ports after absences of over four months, concluding the longest and most distant voyages ever made by Soviet submarines.

The Northern Fleet submarine was possibly the only unit in a submarine detachment, termed "GOLF" by Western intelligence, which departed Murmansk on 20 November and moved slowly to the vicinity of the southern tip of South America before changing course to the east and eventually northward. The detachment was accompanied and logistically supported by the tanker Vilyuysk, which left Murmansk on 22 November and returned on 29 March.

A Pacific Fleet submarine, Number 32, departed Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula on 27 November and followed a great-circle course to the vicinity of Cape Horn before beginning its return voyage. During most of its cruise, this Z-class unit was accompanied and logistically supported by the tanker Pevek, which left Petropavlovsk on 11 December and returned on 22 March.

Analysis of all available intelligence indicates that these submarines probably were conducting concurrent tests of the following: (1) submerged reception of low-frequency and very-low-frequency broadcasts; (2) unconventional transmitters for communicating with authorities ashore; and (3) a low-frequency long-range navigation system. It is likely that they have also been recording gravimetric readings for use in developing a system for submerged navigation.

The recently concluded activity constitutes a further extension of the range of Soviet submarine operations, which are expected to continue with greater intensity at increasingly longer distances from Soviet bases. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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East German Regime Facing Difficulties With Workers

(The East German workers' refusal to cooperate in the regime's programs involving "voluntary" work during free time and their increasingly "testy and assertive" behavior are becoming a very serious problem for the Socialist Unity (Communist) party (SED), according to former party leader Karl Schirdewan. This situation will make it impossible to fulfill Ulbricht's boast that the East German standard of living will equal that of the Federal Republic by 1961, and will mean a further loss of face for the SED. Schirdewan, who lost his party position following a split with First Secretary Ulbricht early in 1958, reached these conclusions following a recent survey of party members employed as workers and administrators in major East German industrial centers. This survey was made at Schirdewan's request by friendly party members.)

(One pro-Ulbricht functionary summed up the situation, "If we don't attain our goal the masses will laugh at us. If we do reach it we'll have lost the workers." He recognized that if the workers were exploited to the extent necessary to achieve the goal, they would be completely alienated from the regime.)

(Disagreement over the pace of socialization in East Germany, especially intensified drives for greater industrial production and faster collectivization of agriculture, was the major factor in Schirdewan's split with Ulbricht. Schirdewan obviously sees the present situation in East Germany as a vindication of his views.)








Mao Tse-tung Comments on His Current Role

(Mao Tse-tung recently informed members of the Japanese Socialist party delegation in Wuhan that it was necessary for him to relinquish his post as chairman of the regime because his concurrent government and party responsibilities were "too great" and he was "becoming old." Mao had told the new Burmese ambassador in Wuhan on 12 March that he was not well enough to go to Peiping to receive the ambassador's credentials. The Burmese diplomat thought Mao looked tired and was not "in a very fit state" physically.)

(Mao's successor as chairman of the government is scheduled to be named at the National People's Congress opening on 17 April. He will probably be a senior party leader with much prestige but little real power. Vice Chairman Chu Te's candidacy for the job was reportedly being discussed in municipal street committees as early as last January.)

(In reply to a question by the leader of the Japanese delegation, Mao stressed the practical rather than the ideological implications of the communes. He said they were intended, in part, to facilitate rural mechanization and water conservancy. He remarked that "it is impossible to say" when Communism will be attained in China. He hoped that it could be attained in the 20th century, but admitted the country is "poor" and that Communism depends on "many, many things," from mechanization to raising the cultural level of the populace. Mao's remarks indicate that the Chinese Communists are being more cautious in statements concerning the arrival of "Communism" than they were last year. However, his previously reported desire to write on the subject of Marxist-Leninist doctrine--which he repeated to the Japanese--stems from a view of himself as the bloc's leading theorist, and will probably continue to be a source of irritation to the Soviet leaders.) 

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Himalayan Border States Share Indian Concern Over Tibetan Developments

India's concern over the possible consequences of Peiping's military action in Tibet is being increasingly reflected in the small independent and semi-independent states which share the Himalayan frontier. The royal governments of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan fear that the Chinese Army's intensified effort to wipe out remaining rebel concentrations along the frontier will result in an influx of refugees and possibly lead to clashes with their border troops.

Independent Nepal appears to be relying on India for guidance. [redacted]

[redacted] Like New Delhi, Katmandu's closed-door policy on Tibetan refugees has been modified so that asylum probably will be granted in most cases. Nepali army and police units along the Tibetan border have been reinforced. The isolated mountain kingdom of Bhutan--a protectorate of India--appears to be taking similar action.)

The crown prince of Sikkim, a state more closely controlled by New Delhi, has taken a strong line against Chinese repression in Tibet, likening it to the revolt in Hungary. The prince, a prominent Buddhist leader closely related to the Dalai Lama's family, on 6 April expressed his conviction that Prime Minister Nehru would "persuade" Peiping to recognize Tibetan autonomy.

The Dalai Lama, now resting at the remote lamasery of Tawang in India's North-East Frontier Agency, apparently will leave on 7 April to begin a five-day trek across the mountains to Bomdila, headquarters of the Kameng frontier division. From Bomdila, where central government officials will greet him and

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discuss problems of asylum, he presumably could be transported by road or flown to a center on the Assam plains. The Indian Government, determined to keep the Dalai Lama isolated from contacts with the press and foreign officials, probably will succeed in persuading him to make only noncontroversial statements while in India.

(Nehru [redacted] has shown his irritation with Peiping since the Tibetan crisis began by refusing to see the Chinese ambassador. Foreign Office officials have sharply rejected the ambassador's complaints about the Indian consul general's activities in Lhasa.) Peiping's public comment on the Dalai Lama, who the Chinese still claim is held "under duress," reflects its embarrassment and its intention to avoid a dispute over his presence in India as long as he makes no public statements. [redacted]

[redacted]

III. THE WEST

Possible French Reaction in NATO to US Decision
On Moroccan Arms

(French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville stated on 5 April that De Gaulle's reaction to the American decision in principle to furnish arms to Morocco would be "extremely bad," since it would be regarded as making a farce of tripartite Western policy consultations. Referring to De Gaulle's recent withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO wartime control, the foreign minister said the US decision on arms for Morocco would encourage De Gaulle to take further unilateral French action in other fields affecting NATO.)

(De Gaulle may use the Moroccan arms question as the pretext for further moves to weaken the "integration" aspects of NATO in line with his concept of the alliance as a loose coalition. He will probably maintain his opposition to integration of the French Air Force with the NATO air-defense complex, and might go so far as to transfer NATO-committed ground units--most of them already in Algeria--back to "national" control.)

(De Gaulle's current views on NATO were made public in his 25 March press conference. In a 4 April address marking NATO's tenth anniversary Premier Debré repeated De Gaulle's demands for a greater voice for France in deciding free world strategy and said NATO must develop cooperation in other than purely military matters.)




Possibility of Strikes in Spain This Spring

(The illegal Spanish Communist party (PCE) reportedly is trying hard to persuade the moderate opposition groups to support a nonviolent general strike this month or early in May.

[redacted] these groups are reluctant to back obviously Communist-inspired demonstrations but they are not completely unwilling to collaborate with the PCE.)

(A repetition of the spring strikes of the past three years is possible. Workers continue to feel the pinch of inflationary pressures even though the cost of living has tended to level off in 1959. The US Embassy estimated in February that living costs in the Madrid area had risen 45.2 percent since November 1956. The government's program to rationalize the Spanish economy to qualify for aid from the International Monetary Fund and to enable Spain to compete in a free European market may require layoffs of surplus workers to lower production costs and may give rise to serious strikes.)

(The moderate opposition groups have heretofore rejected Communist overtures for joint demonstrations against the regime. Should worker restlessness be such as to compel attention by the opposition, the moderate groups might feel obliged to collaborate in some degree with the PCE in order to forestall the Communists--the best organized of all the clandestine parties--from making a bid to capture the workers' allegiance.)



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Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

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Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Army

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

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