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31 January 1959


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


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

SIRAB

31 January 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

	Modified Soviet submarines: The Guided Missile Intel-
	ligence Committee has made a preliminary assessment of the evidence concerning the modification of at least three
	Soviet Z-class submarines. Although there may be other
\mathcal{M}^{0}	reasons for this modification, GMIC believes that it is a dis-
7/	tinct possibility that these submarines have been equipped to
	fire ballistic missiles having a range of 100 to 200 nautical miles. (Page 1)
	(Fage 1)
	Communist China - UAR: The UAR informed its em-
	bassy in Peiping to "extend thanks" but that
	the artillery offered to a UAR military mission
$\sim 10^{10}$	by Communist China was "not suit-
	able," and that no contract was to be concluded. (Page 2)
	(Page 2)
	North Vietnam:
	Chinese Communist policy in
	the Taiwan Strait is "to fire at times and cease fire at times"
α Δ	and ''not to liberate Quemoy and Matsu immediately.'' Peiping's policy is to ''win over world
$\sqrt{\mathcal{O}}$	opinion" and create discord between the US and the Chinese
1 .	Nationalists. (Page 3)
	Yugoslavia-USSR: Belgrade apparently no longer feels
	that Khrushchev might act to moderate the bloc-Yugoslav dis-
h	pute. In response to his statements about Yugoslavia at the
K	party congress, the Yugoslavs have launched the most severe
() '	personal attacks against Khrushchev since the dispute was renewed last spring. (Page 4)
•	Te wed tast spring. (Lage 1)

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USSR-Geneva talks: The chief Soviet delegate at the nuclear test-cessation talks in Geneva told the American and British delegates that he does not wish nor intend to break off the negotiations. The number-two man on the Soviet delegation said the USSR also had new data on underground explosions but "could not discuss it until the treaty is signed." Another Soviet delegate admitted that "military authorities" in the USSR did not want to stop tests and would be happy if no treaty were concluded.

W

II. ASIA-AFRICA

*Taiwan Strait situation: The Chinese Nationalists have informed American officials on Taiwan that orders have been issued for the interception of Chinese Communist shipping in the Taiwan Strait from just north of Matsu to just south of Chinmen. Such action was common prior to last fall but was discontinued shortly after the beginning of the offshore island crisis. If the Nationalists carry out their intentions, the Chinese Communists would probably retaliate by shelling Chinmen heavily and engaging any Nationalist naval craft operating inside the 12-mile limit. (Page 5)

ok

Iran-USSR:

treaty negotiations with the USSR, will offer to agree not to sign a pending bilateral defense agreement with the US and not to permit Iran to be used as a base against the Soviet Union. In exchange, the Shah will ask for a Soviet guarantee not to attack Iran and to cease hostile propaganda. He says he intends to wait one week before making a final decision on concluding the projected nonaggression pact. The Shah indicated that Iran will remain in the Baghdad Pact and has refused Soviet economic aid. Court Minister Ala says the Shah will be glad to see the American ambassador at any time. (Page 6)

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Libya: A Libyan military mission led ister is reported to have been meeting with	by the defense min- the Soviet military
attaché in Cairo and the Egyptian army chi-	
the acquisition of arms from the USSR. Ac	
reports, the purpose of the Libyan mission	
was to request from Cairo heavy equipmen	
and armored cars, which the Libyan Gover	nment had unsuccess-
fully sought from the British?	
<u>Cambodia:</u> External and internal plott	
Sihanouk regime may soon be coordinated.	
commander in northwestern Cambodia, is	
proached Thai authorities for the first time requested their support for his efforts.	and to have digently
Daily anti-Sihanouk broadcasts from a mob	ile station on the
Thai-Cambodian border are scheduled to b	
Inai Campodian por der are benedated to b	ogm nom woon
(Page 7)	
Japan-Korea: Foreign Minister Fujiy ment on 30 January that the Japanese Gove Korean residents in Japan to depart for No desire, probably will be used by Syngman to break off negotiations for normalization Japanese move probably stemmed from improgress in the negotiations.	rnment will permit rth Korea, if they Rhee as an excuse of relations. The
III. THE WEST	
*Paraguay: Opposition elements, inclu Paraguay's ruling Colorado party, have ste ting and, tempt to remove President Stroessner with Stroessner is known to be aware of at least against his administration and has taken sp	pped up their plot- plan an at- in the next few days. some of the plots ecial security
ures, particularly since the Castro victory	in Cuba.
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Possible Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines

At least three Soviet Z-class submarines in the Northern Fleet and perhaps one or more in the Far East have been modified and are markedly different from others in this class. This modification, which may date back to 1956, involves an extensive alteration of the conning tower fairwater. The fairwater has been enlarged and two circular covers or domes are on top of the after portion of this structure.

the three Northern Fleet units identified as modified Z-class boats operate in a somewhat different manner from other submarines of that fleet. One of these units is now on patrol in the northeast Atlantic.

The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee has made a preliminary assessment of the evidence concerning these submarines. Although there may be other reasons for this modification, GMIC believes that it is a distinct possibility these units have been equipped to fire ballistic missiles. If equipped for this purpose, it is estimated that each submarine can carry two missiles having a 100- to 200-nautical-mile range with circular error probability of 2 to 4 nautical miles and a payload of 1,000 pounds. The two domes on top of the conning tower could be the covers of vertical tubes for launching these missiles. These modifications to the Z class could serve the dual role of providing the USSR a limited operational capability and serving as a research and development system for a later, more advanced missile and submarine system.

Four and possibly	ed that the USSR har of five of this class the Northern Fleet,	are in the P	acific Fleet,
the Baltic Fleet.	•		

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Chinese Communist Arms Offer Refused by UAR

the artillery offered to the UAR by the Chinese People's Republic is "not suitable," and that no contract is to be concluded.	
A UAR military mission, described as a coastal defens committee, in early December witnessed a demonstration in China of 122-mm. and 152-mm. artillery pieces. The mission planned to begin discussing a draft agreement with Peiping for the purchase of these arms in mid-December.	1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Hanoi Discusses Peiping's Taiwan Strait Strategy

	·
a "conflict" bet	ween
the United States and Nationalist China might be sharped	ened
by current Chinese Communist tactics"to fire at tim	es
and cease fire at times" and "not to liberate Quemoy a	nd
Matsu immediately." The "conflict" stems from the al	leged
US desire for a withdrawal of Nationalist forces from	the two
island groups in order "to build up Taiwan into a separ	
China" and the opposition to this by Chiang Kai-shek,	who is
attempting to "maintain the status quo."	,,,,,,
attempting to manitum the status quo:	
Peiping's policy wa	as to
"win over world opinion" and that if the United States	
tains its position, "it will be held in contempt." The A	mer-
ican position is already increasingly unpopular among	Chinese
on Chinmen, Matsu, and Taiwan. This line of reasoni	ng sug-
gests that the Chinese Communists are counting on a l	ong-
term political effort together with some military press	sure to
prevent a "two-Chinas" situation from developing.	
bickout a two current prosection and and and	
by drawing certa	in par-
allels between the situation in South Vietnam and the	
Strait. indicates close coordination between Peiping a	nd Hanoi.
the United States has aroused the suspice	cion of
its smaller allies since, "If it wants to remain, it ren	nains: if
it wants to withdraw, it withdraws."	
it waites to withdraw, it withdraws.	

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Yugoslavs Lash Back at Khrushchev

In retaliation for Khrushchev's anti-Yugoslav remarks at the Soviet 21st party congress, the Yugoslav party's daily, Borba, on 30 January published the strongest attack Belgrade has made on him since the Yugoslav-bloc dispute was renewed last spring. The Yugoslavs appear finally to have given up any hope they may have had that Khrushchev might be inclined to moderate the bloc's attitude toward Yugoslavia.

Borba emphasized that Khrushchev had interfered in Yugo-slavia's internal affairs, an accusation which the Kremlin has tried to avoid since the renewal of the dispute. Yugoslav executive committee member Djuro Pucar, in a speech to a meeting of the Yugoslav Federation of Student Organizations, accused Khrushchev personally of reviving Stalin's tactics. Yugoslav Foreign Ministry spokesman Drago Kunc, in his 30 January press conference, joined the chorus, stating that Khrushchev's simultaneous attack on both the foreign and domestic policies of Yugoslavia leaves little room for the cooperation he says he desires.

The Yugoslavs say they are being attacked bed slav workers are better off than any others in the world and because the Russians don't want to admit	Communist
world and because the Russians don't want to admir	t tilet tilej
are in many ways copying Yugoslav experience.	

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31 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Taiwan Strait Situation	
Chinese Nationalist Navy, is 30 January that he has rece Ministry of Defense to interin the Taiwan Strait from ju	no, commander in chief of the informed American officials on lived orders from the Nationalist rept Chinese Communist shipping ast north of Matsu to just south of eation that British shipping is in-
Matsus and the Chinmens we ment in the past has been emunist small craft moving near the Matsus. Shortly a gan last August, however, tinued. Most sweeps in the	y out this plan, it is likely that patrol forces in the vicinity of the vill be utilized. Similar harassmployed particularly against Comin and out of the Min River estuary after the offshore island crisis bethis type of activity was discontopast have been conducted by light lists use their destroyers, Comore severe.
"victory" to the public at the in early February. They n	lists have sought to present a ne time of the Chinese New Year, may also want to keep US and the Taiwan Strait problem.

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Shah States His Terms for Iranian-Sovret Nonaggression Pact

The Shah of Iran informed the Pakistani ambassador to Iran and a British Foreign Office official in separate audiences on 29 January that he has offered to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union which would include as its minimum terms a Soviet assurance that the USSR would not attack Iran and that it would discontinue hostile propaganda against Iran. In return Tehran would agree not to sign the pending bilateral defense agreement with the US and would not permit use of Iran as a base for aggression against the Soviet Union. The Shah stated that Iran would remain in the Baghdad Pact and that he has refused Soviet economic aid. The Soviet delegation which arrived by special plane in Tehran on 29 January presumably brought a response to the Shah's terms or at least authority to negotiate further.

have second thoughts." The Pakistani ambassador had reported his government that the Shah intended to sign a 30-year nonagg sion pact with the USSR on 1 February.	res-
the Shah had indicat	
he would wait one week before making his final decision regarding an Iranian-Soviet treaty.	L -
Turkish officials,	
fear he may take precipitate action which will have serious re-	
percussions both on domestic politics in Turkey and throughout the Middle East. Turkish Prime Minister Menderes was particularly depressed following these talks. The Shah emphasize to the Turks Iran's dissatisfaction with the "small repayment" for joining the Baghdad Pact, and reiterated Iran's need for \$107,000,000 in budgetary assistance. He criticized the US for offering only \$20,000,000 and complained that the US would not supply Iran with antiaircraft missiles and training necessary for their use.	ed

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Plotting Against Cambodian Government Accelerated			
Preparations by Cambodian General Dap Chhuon for an internal coup against Prince Sihanouk may shortly be coordinated with the heretofore separate Thai-Vietnamese intrigues against the Sihanouk government. Chhuon, whose military command region in northwestern Cambodia fronts on Thailand. urgently requesting support for his planned move against the Sihanouk government around 8-10 February. Chhuon presumably is seeking logistical support in the form of gasoline and ammunition.			
Chhuon's request will probably elicit sympathetic response from Thai officials, although they have become much more circumspect in their plotting against Sihanouk as a result of the presence of a UN special mediator, Baron Beck-Friis. Even if diplomatic relations between Cambodia and Thailand are restored through his efforts, this would not change the basic Thai premise that Sihanouk must be eliminated before his soft attitude toward international Communism imperils all of Southeast Asia.			
of Cambodian Resistance" broadcasts will soon be started from a mobile station on the Thai-Cambodian frontier. In these broadcasts and in Cambodian-language pamphlets prepared for wide distribution throughout Cambodia, Sihanouk is to be portrayed as endangering the nation's welfare by his despotic leadership and pro-Communist policies. Sam Sary, former Cambodian royal councilor who is now in Bangkok working with the Thais and Vietnamese against Sihanouk, is in charge of this propaganda campaign.			
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Japan Precipitates New Crisis With South Korea

A Japanese cabinet decision, announced by Foreign Minister Fujiyama on 30 January, to allow Korean residents in Japan to leave for North Korea almost certainly will cause South Korean President Syngman Rhee to terminate present negotiations with Japan. South Korea's minister in Tokyo already has stated that the decision is "tantamount to breaking off current normalization talks."

South Korea may also step up its seizures of Japanese fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of the "Rhee line" and may instigate demonstrations in South Korea which could serve to divert foreign and domestic attention from the controversy over the recently passed National Security Law.

The repatriation issue has been a major obstacle in the Tokyo-Seoul talks. Despite South Korean objections, Japanese officials long have asserted that "voluntary repatriation" is a "humanitarian" principle which they cannot oppose. The Kishi government may have felt that it could be attacked domestically for yielding to the South Korean viewpoint, while the public is not likely to react strongly to the suspension of negotiations which were considered to have little promise in any event.

Korean leftists in Japan claim that 100,000 of the 600,000 Korean residents would accept repatriation to North Korea, but this estimate seems grossly exaggerated. The North Korean Government has issued a standing offer to provide transportation and guarantee a livelihood for all such returnees.

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