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26 March 1959

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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26 MARCH 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Air Force intensifies electronic reconnaissance in Alaskan area and Far East.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

King of Morocco wants US to be primary supplier of military equipment.



Sudan - Gradual weakening of pro-Western elements may result from death of Ansar sect leader.

London agrees to joint investigation of Yemen-Aden border incidents; local British officials doubtful of results.

US-Philippine negotiations on revised bases agreement.

Japanese Socialists facing severe domestic criticism for their support of Communist line on Asia.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 March 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

W **USSR:** Two Soviet BADGERS conducted what were probably ELINT/COMINT reconnaissance operations against Alaskan radar installations and Distant Early Warning (DEW) line sites as far eastward as the Mackenzie Bay area of Canada on 23-24 March. On 24-25 March, two planes which were probably BADGERS flew over the Sea of Japan to within 50 to 70 nautical miles of the main Japanese islands in what appeared to be ELINT/COMINT reconnaissance operations. These, together with other similar activities since 4 March, may indicate the introduction of a broader Soviet ELINT/COMINT collection program. The Soviet Air Force has for some time had the capability for these operations. [redacted] (Page 1)
(2 Maps)

W Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: No significant changes bearing on the possibility of hostilities. [redacted]
[redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

W **Morocco:** [The Moroccan minister of defense asked on 23 March whether the United States would be willing in principle to supply substantial amounts of military equipment to modernize Morocco's 31,000-man army. The defense minister implied that the US response would have an important bearing on his government's attitude toward US interests in Morocco and stressed that the King is under considerable pressure to continue arms procurement from the Soviet bloc. He also indicated that a firm decision has been made not to rely on France as Morocco's primary source of materiel.] [redacted]
[redacted] (Page 2)

ok - delete TP 2

Sudan: [The death on 24 March of the Mahdi, leader of the Ansar religious sect, may be followed by a gradual loss in the strength and unity of pro-Western elements. Sayyid Siddiq the Mahdi's 48-year-old son installed as new leader, has nothing like his father's great prestige among the 1,500,000 Ansari. He does, however, have political aspirations of his own and might resort to some dramatic and risky action to rally the Ansari around him in opposition to the faction-ridden military government.] [redacted]

(Page 3)

ok - delete TP 4

Britain-Yemen: [London has accepted Yemen's suggestion for a joint commission to investigate incidents on the Yemen-Aden border, and proposes that it meet within a month. London's aim is to demonstrate its good intentions, but British officials in Aden are dubious about the usefulness of the move in view of a recent renewal of border clashes and evidence that the Yemenis plan shortly to launch a major campaign of subversion in the Aden Protectorate.] [redacted]

(Page 4)

us

Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.

Iraq: The drift of Iraq toward Communist control continues.

Jordan: The absence of King Husayn and Prime Minister Rifai from Jordan provides opportunity for intensified political activity among disaffected elements and a possible coup attempt.

[redacted]

ok - delete 2nd sentence of TP 3

Philippines: [US-Philippine negotiations to revise the agreement governing American bases continue to be hampered by Philippine Government maneuvers aimed at increasing its authority over the bases and over American personnel. At]

[redacted]

26 Mar 59

DAILY BRIEF



ii

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[the same time, Philippine reluctance to adopt drastic fiscal and monetary reforms as prerequisites to American economic assistance is leading the Garcia administration increasingly to make the United States a scapegoat for domestic difficulties.] [redacted] (Page 5)

Japan: [Strong condemnation of the Socialist party is developing in Japan over its recent action in support of Communist policies in Asia. The press, including those newspapers normally friendly to the Socialists, are highly critical of the party for its "subservience" to Peiping. Considerable dissension has also arisen within Socialist ranks, with some right-wing elements threatening to bolt the party. The conservatives will probably exploit this issue to the greatest extent possible and hope thus to reverse Socialist electoral gains of recent years.] [redacted] (Page 6)

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Intensifies Reconnaissance Operations in Alaskan Area And the Far East

Two Soviet **BADGERs** probably conducted **ELINT/COMINT** reconnaissance operations against Alaskan radar installations and **Distant Early Warning (DEW)** line sites as far east as the Mackenzie Bay area of Canada on 23/24 March.

Similar flights were conducted on 18/19 March but did not extend beyond the area of Point Barrow, Alaska. Flights from Anadyr on 4, 6, and 9 March approached to within 50 nautical miles of St. Lawrence Island, where an Alaskan Air Command aircraft-control and warning site is located.

On 24/25 March, two aircraft--probably **BADGERs**--flew over the Sea of Japan to within 50 and 70 nautical miles of the main Japanese islands in what appeared to be **ELINT/COMINT** operations. **BADGERs** and **BEAGLEs** have made a number of other flights in this area since 13 March.

Schedules of 18 March indicate flights may have been performed along the Aleutian chain on that date.

Although flights by Soviet aircraft over the waters adjacent to Japan and the Aleutians have been taking place since July 1957, this month's more extensive activities may mark the introduction of a broader Soviet **ELINT/COMINT** collection program. [redacted]

[redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

[REDACTED]

Morocco Indicates Desire to Purchase US Arms

[Moroccan Defense Minister Mohamed Aouad inquired on 23 March whether the United States would supply some \$19,000,000 to \$23,000,000 worth of military equipment to modernize Morocco's 31,000-man army. Aouad said Morocco wants tanks, trucks, communications equipment, machine guns, submachine guns and ammunition, fighter and observation aircraft, and helicopters. He implied that the King is under considerable pressure--presumably from the left-wing members of the Ibrahim government--to continue to procure arms from the Soviet bloc, and indicated that the government has made a firm decision not to rely any longer on France as its primary source of materiel.]

[The more conservative Balafrej government, which had been unsuccessful in its efforts to obtain large quantities of light arms and ammunition and a munitions factory from Italy last year, had contracted for an unknown quantity of Czech arms. A part of this materiel--900 tons of light arms and ammunition--was delivered early in January; an unspecified amount of heavy equipment, according to Aouad, remains to be delivered.]

[Aouad's inquiry is a follow-up to a tentative approach he made earlier this year as well as an informal request made during the King's visit to Washington in November 1957. With much the same motivation as Tunisia, which will not consider arms procurement from France while the Algerian rebellion continues, Morocco probably would resist even a suggestion that it should continue to place primary reliance for its materiel on France, if only for the sake of standardization. The Moroccan approach probably will create new tensions in French-American relations and may complicate negotiations for the retention of the five American air bases in Morocco.] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Sudanese Situation

[The death on 24 March of 73-year-old Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, powerful leader of the Ansar religious sect and the Umma party, introduces a new element of uncertainty into the already highly unstable situation in the Sudan. The military government is split into competing factions, and the leaders of the suspended political parties are taking advantage of the government's indecisiveness to try to rebuild their organizations and increase their influence. They are trying to line up support within the army leadership as well, hoping to pave the way for participation in a new civilian government.]

[Brigadier Shannan, leader of the junior dissident officers' movement, postponed and modified his plan to seize complete control of the government late last week, reportedly because he feared a violent reaction that might lead to civil war. However, he and the two other troop commanders who forced their inclusion in the government on 5 March are expected to make some attempt in the near future to improve their position.]

[The danger of a clash after the early March coup between Ansari tribesmen and military units has receded. The possibility remains, however, that Siddiq al-Mahdi, the new 48-year-old Ansari religious head, who lacks his father's prestige, may attempt some rash and dramatic action to rally the Ansari around him in opposition to the military government. In any event, the Mahdi's death will probably reduce the strength and unity of the Ansar sect and weaken the pro-Western Umma party elements which it supports.]

—SECRET—

Developments in British-Yemeni Relations

[London has accepted Yemen's suggestion for a joint commission to investigate incidents on the Yemen-Aden border, and proposes that it meet within a month. Yemen offered in February to discuss only two particular incidents, but the British are submitting broad terms of reference to permit discussion of frontier incidents in 1959, the 1934 and 1951 agreements, and cases of Yemeni subversion within the Aden Protectorate.]

[The Foreign Office has long favored such a commission and now wants to demonstrate its good intentions by endorsing the Yemeni gesture toward improving relations. One obstacle to real improvement, however, is the Yemeni contention that Britain has, by its inauguration in February of the Federation of Protectorate Rulers, violated promises in the earlier treaties to preserve the status quo.]

[The Colonial Office and the Aden governor doubt that much will be accomplished in view of evidence that the Yemenis have de-emphasized outright frontier warfare in favor of subversion and now are planning a major campaign within the Protectorate. The governor had preferred to try to unify the new federation by firm retaliation against the common enemy.]

[The Yemeni mayor of the frontier town of Baidha, in particular, has been successfully making contacts and gaining recruits among dissident Protectorate tribesmen, 600 of whom have recently gone to Baidha to obtain arms. The Imam told the Baidha mayor as early as February that "everything is up to you," and Baidha reported back on 23 March that "all the tribal elders are ready and waiting for a call."]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]Philippines [redacted]

[Current US-Philippine talks on revising the agreement on American bases continue to be hampered by Philippine insistence on full legal authority over the bases, particularly with regard to jurisdiction over offenses involving American military personnel. Although Philippine officials now are publicly asserting that the talks are progressing, a resolution recently introduced in the Philippine Senate may have been aimed at strengthening the government's negotiating position. The resolution endorses a strongly nationalist position which could jeopardize the present status of the bases if adopted as official policy and indicates that certain extremist elements may be maneuvering to force a breakdown of the talks.]

[At the same time, the Garcia administration continues to blame much of its present economic difficulty on the United States. Philippine officials have recently charged deliberate slowness in the implementation of American credits, and are pressing for satisfaction of multi-million-dollar claims against the United States to solve their foreign-exchange crisis and for a tax on foreign exchange which would violate their trade agreement with the United States.]

[Faced with local and senatorial elections in November, the government is reluctant to undertake drastic fiscal reforms and apparently intends to ignore the recommendations of an International Monetary Fund survey that the peso be devaluated. [redacted] Concern that the IMF mission is a form of American interference is reflected in [redacted]

[redacted] the mission would use Ambassador Bohlen's "good offices" to confer with Garcia and recommending that the President "refuse to see them... and cut them down to size." [redacted]

[A confidant of the President has hinted that, if American financial aid is not forthcoming, Garcia intends to divert attention from economic issues in the forthcoming election campaign by making relations with the United States the major issue.]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Japanese Socialist Party's Leftward Trend Criticized

[Strong condemnation of the Socialist party is developing in Japan over statements in Peiping by party Secretary General Inejiro Asanuma in support of Chinese Communist policies in Asia. Asanuma, on returning to Japan on 23 March, defended the leftist position he assumed in Peiping and called for popular support for an early restoration of relations with Communist China.]

[The press, including those newspapers normally friendly to the Socialists, are highly critical of the party for its apparent abandonment of neutrality. An editorial in Asahi, a generally left-wing newspaper with the largest circulation in Japan, warned the Socialists that a "pro-Communist subservient diplomacy" would not win the support of the people.]

[Considerable dissension has also arisen within Socialist ranks, with some right-wing elements threatening to bolt the party unless the leftist trend is reversed. The faction led by Suehiro Nishio has openly criticized Asanuma's statement in Peiping that the United States is the "common enemy" of Japan and China. The right wing generally has shown dismay over Asanuma's issuing a joint communiqué with the Peiping regime which endorsed Communist political objectives in Asia and has denounced a decision to form a joint front with the Communist party and other leftist organizations in opposition to the US-Japan security treaty.]

[The conservatives will probably continue to exploit this issue in an effort to halt further Socialist gains in the upper-house elections in June. Ambassador MacArthur believes the willingness of government leaders to meet squarely the issue raised by Asanuma is in healthy contrast to the tendency in past election campaigns to avoid such controversial questions. He also said that if the conservatives exploit the issue properly throughout the election period, the Socialists should suffer from the attitude of the Asanuma mission to Peiping.]

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

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Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

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The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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