


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14 May 1959



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN




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14 MAY 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet fighters display increased altitude capability. []

Khrushchev invites Afghan prime minister to visit Moscow. []

USSR replacing its ambassador to Burma.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Cairo "not to carry out any action in Jordan at present." []

Burma concerned over activities of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in its border areas. []

Indonesia - Dissidents demand payment from Goodyear rubber estate as "guarantee" against further attacks.

- ①
- ②
- ③
- ④
- ⑤
- ⑥



III. THE WEST

⑦ Relations between France and Guinea extremely tense.

LATE ITEMS

⑧ Laos - Two former Pathet Lao battalions resist integration into regular army.

⑨ Peruvian government alerted to possible coup attempt.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 May 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: [redacted]

NO [redacted] flight activity at unusually high altitudes, especially in the Baltic area, suggest that the USSR is employing a new type of fighter aircraft or an improved current model high-performance aircraft. The altitudes in these instances ranged from 59,000 to 74,000 feet. [redacted]

(Page 1)

NO USSR-Afghanistan: [Khrushchev has invited Afghan Prime Minister Daud to visit Moscow on his way back to Kabul from Switzerland where he has been under medical treatment. Daud has requested his government's view on the invitation. If he accepts, the visit will probably take place in late May. Khrushchev can be expected to emphasize Soviet willingness to provide more aid and seek to stimulate Afghan suspicions of the Ayub regime in Pakistan.] [redacted]

(Page 2)

OK USSR-Burma: Apparently as a result of the severe damage done recently to the USSR's prestige in Burma, Moscow is replacing its ambassador, A. D. Shchiborin, who would have become dean of the diplomatic corps next month. Hostile public reaction to the Soviet Embassy's high-handed methods in handling the case of the Soviet military attaché and Shchiborin's failure to quash a libel suit against a TASS representative probably prompted Moscow's decision.

(Page 3)

NO Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: No significant indications bearing on the possibility of hostilities. [redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

No

UAR-Jordan: Cairo authorities have informed Damascus that "it has been decided not to carry out any action in Jordan at present." [redacted] the decision commented a "rebellion" would not be certain to succeed. [redacted] [redacted] former Jordanian Army Chief of Staff Sadiq Shara to take refuge in Syria "without any publicity." Shara was removed from his post in Jordan last week. [redacted]

(Page 4)

NO

Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.

Iraq: Qasim shows no signs that he is taking resolute anti-Communist action; consequently the Communists pursue their course toward control of Iraq. [redacted]

No

Burma - Nationalist China: The Burmese Government is investigating reports that Chinese Nationalist irregulars are training recruits in the Sino-Burmese border area. Previous reports indicate that Taiwan is in fact attempting to strengthen its irregular forces in Burma and to augment them with refugees from Communist China and insurgent Karens. (Prime Minister Ne Win may eventually become sufficiently concerned to request American intercession in bringing about Taipei's withdrawal of support from the irregulars.) [redacted]

(Page 5)

OK
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Indonesia: In return for a "guarantee" against further attacks on Goodyear's Wingfoot rubber estate, the largest in Sumatra, the Indonesian dissidents have demanded 10 percent of the estate's revenue. Both Goodyear and US Rubber interests in Sumatra have been severely harassed in recent months. The dissidents estimate the proposed levy on Goodyear would amount to the equivalent of about \$30,000 monthly at the official exchange rate. [redacted] (Page 6)

14 May 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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III. THE WEST

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France-Guinea: [Relations between Paris and Conakry have become increasingly tense following the arrival of recent Soviet bloc arms shipments. There are even reports that certain elements in the French Government are plotting to overthrow or assassinate Guinea President Sekou Touré. One plan calls for passing arms to opposition factions in Guinea by way of intermediaries in the Ivory Coast government.] [redacted] (Page 7)

LATE ITEMS

OK

*Laos: Two battalions of former Communist dissident troops, scheduled to be integrated into the Laotian Army on 11 May, boycotted the ceremonies and have barricaded themselves in their compounds, located in northern and central Laos. These former Pathet Lao units, although surrounded by superior Laotian Army forces, are armed and may attempt to break out and resume dissidence. [redacted] (Page 8)

OK

*Peru: The Peruvian Government apparently expects disaffected military elements, with some backing from the oligarchy, to attempt assassinations of key political figures and the overthrow of the government within the next few days. A coup attempt is unlikely to succeed, but the government alert may be a prelude to a new suspension of constitutional guarantees or may lead to intervention by the regular military to remove President Prado from office. [redacted] (Page 9)

14 May 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Increased Altitude Capability of Soviet Fighters

[] aircraft flying at altitudes from 59,000 to 74,000 feet in the Baltic area. On one occasion [] an aircraft achieved an altitude of 73,800 feet and then "descended" immediately. On another occasion a fighter climbed from 59,040 feet to 62,320 feet in 75 seconds, indicating a rate of climb of 2,600 feet per minute.

During these flights, [] two engines and the use of afterburners to attain altitude. [] these flights may have been made by an improved model of the **FARMER (MIG-19)**, although a newer type of fighter could have been employed.

[] these high altitudes more likely were attained through a high-speed "zoom" maneuver either by a newer type of high-performance fighter or a **FARMER (MIG-19)**.

Aircraft of the **FITTER/FISHPOT, FACEPLATE/FISHBED** series, observed as early as 1956, are currently estimated to be in production in the USSR, but these are believed to be single-engine aircraft. []

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~~TOP SECRET~~ []Khrushchev Invites Afghan Prime Minister to Moscow

[]

[Khrushchev presumably would like to stimulate Afghan suspicion of the Ayub regime in Pakistan, and may also express a willingness to consider further aid to Afghanistan. Thus far the USSR has provided approximately \$120,000,000 in credits for development of surface and air transport, power, and natural resources, as well as some "show" projects in the field of consumer industry; approximately two thirds of these credits have been obligated. Afghanistan has already received jet aircraft, tanks, artillery, and other equipment, exhausting a \$25,000,000 Soviet credit for military items.] []

[In addition, an Afghan delegation recently visited Moscow in an effort to arrange for a grant of up to \$20,000,000 worth of consumer goods which would be sold in Afghanistan to pay for local costs involved in Soviet aid projects. The USSR, however, maintained its policy of offering only loans at low interest rates-- not gifts or grants. In view of the apparent impasse, Khrushchev may also wish to discuss this problem with Daud.] []

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USSR Replaces Ambassador in Burma Following Incidents

Soviet Ambassador A. D. Shchiborin in Rangoon revealed [redacted] [to the Burmese foreign minister] on 11 May that he was being re-assigned, [and requested agrément for his successor, tentatively identified as A. M. Ledovsky, a former deputy chief of the Far East Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.] Shchiborin had been assigned to Rangoon since September, 1954; he would have become dean of the diplomatic corps there next month. [redacted]

The change apparently results from Burmese reaction to the Soviet Embassy's high-handed methods in handling the case of the Soviet military attaché on 26 April, as well as Shchiborin's recent failure to quash a libel suit against a TASS representative. The continued decline of Soviet prestige and influence in Burma since the Ne Win government came to power last September may also have influenced the replacement.

[redacted] [redacted] the general Burmese reaction will probably be one of satisfaction that the ambassador is apparently being punished for the incident. [redacted]

[redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Cairo to Postpone Action Against Jordan

Cairo has decided that it will not attempt action against the Jordanian Government "at present," because a "rebellion" would not be certain of success, [redacted]

[redacted] Jordan's former Army Chief of Staff Major General Sadiq Shara, whose recent implication in conspiracy against the monarchy led to the fall of the Rifai government, could quietly be given refuge in Syria.

The successful maneuvering by the Jordanian Army's Bedouin officers against the remnants of the pro-UAR "Irbid group," of which Shara was the leader, was probably taken as a setback by Cairo. Officers from Irbid, a large town in northwest Jordan near the Syrian border, have long tended to conspire against the Jordanian monarchy with the help of Egypt and Syria. Shara was implicated in the UAR-supported conspiracy in Jordan early last summer but, because of insufficient evidence, was not among those arrested at that time. Since about 3 May, Shara has been on leave and under virtual house arrest, pending investigation of new charges of plotting against the regime.

Indication that the UAR was considering some form of retaliatory action against Jordan following a border incident appeared [redacted]. The purge of the Irbid officer group, and the installation of [redacted] Hazza Majalli, [redacted] as premier of Jordan appear to have provoked the UAR authorities still further. Syrian Interior Minister Sarraj, who has been in Cairo since 28 April, has often urged more active intervention in neighboring Arab countries than has been condoned by Egypt.

While Cairo's decision against attempting a coup in Jordan may have been influenced by reluctance to risk difficulties with the West while Nasir is attacking Communism in the Middle East, the effective purge of pro-UAR leadership in the Jordanian Army precluded UAR success in a coup attempt employing the army. The UAR may in time, however, attempt to increase agitation among Jordan's West Bank citizens and the refugees from Israeli-held areas of Palestine, who together comprise more than half of Jordan's population. [redacted]

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Burma Investigating Reports of Chinese Nationalist Irregular Recruiting Activity

[redacted] Burma to investigate reports that Chinese Nationalist irregulars were training 500 recruits who might be either recently arrived refugees from Communist China or dissident Shans.

[redacted] Chinese Nationalists are in fact attempting to strengthen the irregular forces in the Burma-Laos-China border and to augment them with refugees from Yunnan Province in China. Closer collaboration between the irregulars and insurgent Karen elements in Burma is suggested [redacted]

[redacted] (Chiang Ching-kuo, the Nationalist security boss, has admitted the resumption of air supply drops to the irregulars, and) on 7 May the Nationalist press reported that \$50,000 would be provided for relief to "refugees" along the Burma-Thai-Laos border.

[Prime Minister Ne Win may eventually become sufficiently concerned over these developments to request American intercession in bringing about Taipei's withdrawal of support from the irregulars. In any event, preoccupation with this problem may serve to detract from his efforts to suppress internal Communism in Burma.] [redacted]

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Indonesian Dissidents Demand Protection Money From American-Owned Rubber Estate

Indonesian dissidents on 4 May demanded ten percent of the income from Goodyear's Wingfoot rubber estate, the largest in Sumatra, in return for a "guarantee" against further attack, according to Wingfoot's manager. The manager told the American consul at Medan that the dissidents estimated this amount at 300,000 rupiahs monthly--approximately \$30,000 at the official exchange rate. A similar approach has been made to a Goodyear official in Singapore, where a dissident representative stated that the rebels' increased activity against Goodyear was provoked by American arms aid to the central government.

Goodyear's managing director for Indonesia gave the American consul the impression that he is prepared to recommend acceptance of the rebel proposal, since adequate security appears otherwise unavailable in the immediate future. The rebels have given Wingfoot two weeks to consider the proposition. The deputy territorial army commander in North Sumatra appears "not unduly disturbed," and told the consul more troops would be stationed eventually in the Wingfoot area. [Prime Minister Djuanda also stated recently that a decision had been made to transfer additional troops to Sumatra.]

Despite army claims of improved security, Indonesian government forces have been notably unsuccessful in protecting the estate area, and even an increase in forces assigned is unlikely to forestall hit-and-run raids. Goodyear's Wingfoot estate alone comprises 40,000 acres. With the exception of the towns, the area appears largely rebel controlled. The government's two limited offensives in the past six months were disastrously ambushed by the dissidents.

US Rubber, with the knowledge of the local Indonesian army commander, agreed in mid-April to a dissident demand that the rebels be permitted to tap a section of US Rubber's Damoeli estate. Dissident attacks on foreign estates in North Sumatra began in June 1958, and have become increasingly serious since January 1959.

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III. THE WEST

French May Attempt Intervention in Guinea [REDACTED]

[Important elements in the French Government are plotting to get rid of Guinea President Sekou Touré, [REDACTED]]

The plans allegedly involve passing arms to opposition factions in Guinea via intermediaries in the Ivory Coast government, and they may include an assassination attempt. Although the officials involved apparently believe that Guinea can eventually be brought back into the French Community, French Army leaders are said to believe that any use of force against the country would destroy French influence in all of West Africa.]

[Relations between Paris and Conakry, which have been strained since Guinea voted in September 1958 against remaining a part of France, have become increasingly tense following the recent arrival of Soviet bloc arms shipments to Guinea. A new French military command for the community was set up last month, and the "common service for external security" created by the Community Executive Council may be a counter-subversion agency.]

[French officials profess deep concern that the arms being received from the Communist bloc, which they claim to be far in excess of Guinea's requirements, may be intended for use against neighboring territories. Guinea's gestures of support for the Algerian rebels and for the Mali Federation, which appears to be moving toward independence from France, will undoubtedly increase the tension between Paris and Conakry.]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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LATE ITEM

Former Pathet Lao Troops Resist Integration

Two battalions of former dissident Pathet Lao troops have defied an order to integrate into the Laotian Army and have barricaded themselves in their compounds in northern and central Laos. Although Laotian army units in superior force have surrounded these troops and have given them an ultimatum to surrender, they may attempt to break out.

These former Pathet Lao troops, who are armed and considered hard-core pro-Communists, have been virtually held prisoner since January, 1958, when they placed themselves under Laotian command as required by the unification settlement. Their treatment has fostered discontent, and there have been some desertions. [There were reports that they feared the government planned to wipe them out.] Vientiane's plan to disperse the two battalions throughout the regular army in small units, in this context, may be construed by the former Pathet Lao as the first step toward repression and elimination.

The Central Committee of the Communist-dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ), political successor to the Pathet Lao, reportedly had earlier instructed cadres to take a "soft line" in order to avoid pretexts for repression by the government, and has appeared determined to maintain the party's legal status. [Despite these instructions, groups of armed former Pathet Lao soldiers in Luang Prabang province have fled their villages recently on the pretext that the army and police were preparing to arrest them]

In the event the NLHZ should feel compelled to resume major armed dissidence, the Laotian army could probably maintain internal security only along major communications routes and in populated areas.

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LATE ITEMPeruvian Government Expects Coup Attempt

The Peruvian Government expects disaffected military elements, with some backing from the oligarchy, to attempt assassinations of key political figures and the overthrow of the government within the next few days, according to American Ambassador Achilles. The minister of government is staying away from home and has warned certain others--including the leader of APRA, Peru's most popular political party--to do likewise. The government prefers to catch the conspirators in the act rather than make preventive arrests.

The constitutional government of conservative President Prado has completed almost three years in office, despite the country's long tradition of authoritarian rule. Prado's weak leadership in the face of deteriorating economic conditions and increasing Communist activity, however, has led to considerable dissatisfaction and unrest. Army Chief of Staff Cuadra told the American ambassador prior to a 30-day suspension of constitutional guarantees, which is to end on 16 May, that the motivation for such a step would be the regime's concern over a Communist-aided revolutionary effort on 17 March.

Although the possible coup attempt probably would be unsuccessful, the present government alert may foreshadow a new suspension of constitutional guarantees and could even be a prelude to intervention by the military to remove President Prado in favor of an equally conservative but more energetic regime.
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THE PRESIDENT**The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House****Special Assistant for National Security Affairs****Scientific Adviser to the President****Director of the Budget****Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization****Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination****Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities****Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy****Executive Secretary, National Security Council****The Treasury Department****The Secretary of the Treasury****The Department of State****The Secretary of State****The Under Secretary of State****The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs****The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs****The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration****The Counselor****Director, International Cooperation Administration****The Director of Intelligence and Research****The Department of Defense****The Secretary of Defense****The Deputy Secretary of Defense****Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs****The Secretary of the Army****The Secretary of the Navy****The Secretary of the Air Force****The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff****Commandant, United States Marine Corps****The Director, The Joint Staff****Chief of Staff, United States Army****Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy****Chief of Staff, United States Air Force****Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations****Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff****Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army****Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy****Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force****Supreme Allied Commander, Europe****Commander in Chief, Pacific****The Department of the Interior****The Secretary of the Interior****The Department of Commerce****The Secretary of Commerce****Federal Bureau of Investigation****The Director****Atomic Energy Commission****The Chairman****National Security Agency****The Director****National Indications Center****The Director****United States Information Agency****The Director**

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