


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13 October 1958



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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13 OCTOBER 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Peiping extends Chinmen cease-fire two more weeks.



USSR - Tyura Tam launching on 11 October more likely a space venture than an ICBM.

Soviet nuclear explosion at Novaya Zemlya on 12 October in megaton range.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanon - Shihab temporarily drops plan to remove Karame. Negotiations to widen cabinet continue.

Tunisia - Bourguiba likely to be isolated in Arab world as result of denouncing Nasir.



- ⑥ Algeria - Rebels now ready to begin negotiations with Paris.
- ⑦ Afghanistan - Recent report of Soviet loan now considered doubtful.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

13 October 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Taiwan Strait situation: The Chinese Communist defense minister's order extending suspension of the Chinmen shelling for two weeks repeats the condition that "should there be any US escort, the bombardment will immediately be resumed." The order explains that the suspension is designed "to see what the opposite side is going to do." [redacted]

Chinese Communist naval movements of landing ship - type vessels south from the Shanghai area have continued and two new jet fighter units have been deployed to airfields in the strait area, probably replacing units previously based there. [redacted]

(Page 1) (Map)

USSR: The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee has made the following announcement:

no

"A valid countdown sequence on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range (TTMTR) probably culminated in a launch at approximately 1740 EDT on 11 October, almost exactly eight hours after its initiation. The information now available is insufficient to permit us to make a determination of the type of vehicle or mission intended, although the activity noted would indicate that it was more likely a space venture than an ICBM." [redacted]

Soviet megaton nuclear test: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee made the following announcement at 1500 hours on 12 October 1958.

no

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"The Atomic Energy Detection System has reported that an explosion occurred at about 0754 hours Zebra on 12 October 1958 in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya (74°N, 55°E). [redacted]

[redacted]

This is the ninth nuclear explosion since the Soviet Union resumed its testing program on 30 September. A TU-95 and a TU-16 aircraft were involved in the operation, [redacted]

[redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanon: President Shihab for the time being has dropped his plans for a caretaker cabinet in the face of Prime Minister Karame's refusal to resign. More negotiations to widen the Karame cabinet to include pro-Chamoun representatives are under way, and Shihab hopes the opposing factions will reach a settlement soon out of sheer weariness. [redacted] There still seems to be strong pressure from some Moslem rebel elements against concessions, however, and rebel Druze leader Jumblatt is reported to have threatened to "come down to Beirut" to take control himself if Shihab does not "give firm orders for returning Lebanon to normal." [redacted] (Page 3)

Tunisia - UAR: Bourguiba's use of a public meeting of the Arab League to denounce Nasir's domination of the league machinery and UAR subversive activity against other governments seems almost certain to leave the Tunisian leader isolated within the Arab world. It may also weaken his position in Tunisia as well. League delegations from Morocco and Iraq, two league countries generally inclined toward independence of the UAR, quickly dissociated themselves from the Tunisian action. Cairo radio is naming Bourguiba as the imperialists' choice to oppose Nasir; he is being compared to assassinated Iraqi leader Nuri Said. [redacted] (Page 4)

13 Oct 58

DAILY BRIEF

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Algeria: The Algerian rebel government now appears willing to negotiate with Paris without prior French agreement to independence for Algeria. A rebel newspaper in Tunis, has published an editorial which amounts to an invitation to start negotiating, and an FLN official has indicated the rebels are eager for talks. The rebels intend to release some French prisoners, regardless of Paris' response to their move, in an effort to "improve the atmosphere." [redacted] (Page 5)

MO
Afghanistan: A previous report of a \$30,000,000 Soviet loan to Afghanistan has not been confirmed and is now regarded as doubtful (see Central Intelligence Bulletin of 3 October). Financial arrangements for a Soviet civil air assistance agreement for Afghanistan may still be under negotiation. [redacted]


13 Oct 58

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Taiwan Strait Situation

Peiping's Minister of National Defense Peng Te-huai has issued an order to the People's Liberation Army at the Fukien Front to "suspend the shelling of Quemoy (Chinmen) for another two weeks" on the condition that the "Americans must not conduct escort operations." The order, [REDACTED] specifies that the suspension is designed "so as to see what the opposite side is going to do."

Stating that "a clear-cut line must be drawn between the Chinese and the Americans," the order reiterates that the Taiwan Strait situation is part of China's "civil war" and an "internal affair." Peng adds that "so long as the Kuomintang on Taiwan has not yet entered into negotiations with us and a reasonable solution has not been worked out, the civil war still continues." The humanitarian theme is again underlined with a statement that the action will "enable our compatriots on Quemoy, both military and civilian, to get sufficient supplies."

Peiping is continuing its efforts to forestall UN consideration of the Taiwan Strait situation. On 10 October, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen I visited the hospital bed of Finnish Ambassador Sundstrom in Peiping to tell the ambassador of his impression that an "arrangement" on the offshore islands could be reached with the United States but that Chiang remained unalterably opposed to such a move. The Chinese Communists may believe that would-be intermediaries will restrain themselves as long as there is hope for success at Warsaw.

The Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry issued its 28th and 29th "serious warnings" on 11 and 12 October, with brief and routine charges of US intrusions in the Matsu and Pingtan areas. By confining the last five warnings to "intrusions" in the northern part of the strait, Peiping may be attempting to avoid disturbing the uneasy calm in the Chinmen area while

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~~SECRET~~TAIWAN STRAIT TALLY SHEETAir Situation

(Plane losses claimed through 11 Oct)

	TODAY			CUMULATIVE		
	Destroyed	Probable	Possible	Destroyed	Probable	Possible
Communist	0	0	0	33	4	8
Nationalist	0	0	0	6**	0	2*

*Damaged

**Includes 2 C-46's, 2 F-84G's, and 2 F-86's.

Chinmen Supply Situation -

(Tonnage through 10 Oct)

	<u>Total</u>
Delivery - 1 - 10 Oct	10,584
Totals (since 7 Sept)	13,984
Average Daily Rate for Sept	125
Average Daily Rate for Oct	1,058
Minimum Austere Daily Requirements	320
Cumulative Deficiency Since 7 Sept	None

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continuing to augment its record of alleged US violations of Communist-claimed territorial waters.

[REDACTED]

At least a regiment of Communist jet fighters moved to the Swatow area from Huiyang airfield the morning of 12 October. This is the second unit during the past four days that has been deployed forward to the strait area, the first being a move to Lungchi from Liencheng on 9 October. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

about a regiment of fighters left Lungchi for Liencheng on 11 October, which suggests that the Communists are rotating units and possibly introducing more experienced and better trained pilots into the strait area.

Flights of some 8th Air Division jet light bombers from Changshu to Nanking on 10 October indicate that bombers of this division are being rotated between those two fields rather than withdrawing from Changshu, to which at least part of the division was deployed on 22 August. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

The Situation in Lebanon

President Shihab has abandoned for the present his plan to install a caretaker cabinet, and a meeting between Christian Phalange leader Pierre Gemayel and Prime Minister Karame has failed to result in any progress toward a resolution of the political impasse. Shihab, nevertheless, remains optimistic; he expects the very weariness of the opposing factions to produce an agreement on a compromise government.

Saeb Salaam has stated that he and other "more moderate" rebel leaders have privately agreed to support broader representation within a Karame cabinet. Salaam also believes the rank and file on both sides are impatient for a solution of the crisis. Certain Moslem rebel elements, however, including a faction led by Abdullah Yafi, still adamantly oppose granting any concessions to the Christians. The Basta mob, which supports this position, apparently forced Karame to withdraw his resignation and to assume a more uncompromising stand. Gemayel has said he and his Phalangist followers cannot agree to a Karame-led cabinet in view of Karame's "insincerity."

Rebel Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt has threatened to "come down to Beirut to gain control of the situation" himself if Shihab does not "give firm orders for returning Lebanon to normal," [redacted]

[redacted] a report from Karame to Syrian Region Minister of Interior Sarraj, said Jumblatt had met with a representative from the Phalange, as Sarraj had suggested, in an endeavor "to detach them from Chamoun." The results of this effort are unknown. [redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Tunisian President Attacks UAR Role in Arab League

The anti-UAR blast delivered in Cairo on 11 October by Tunisian President Bourguiba's representative at a public session of the Arab League Council called especially to welcome Tunisia into the league probably presages an early rupture between Cairo and Tunis. It may precipitate an all-out effort by Nasir to oust Bourguiba and install a more subservient regime in Tunis. Bourguiba's tactics, flouting the proprieties of Arab politics, which call for fervent lip service to the "mystique" of Arab unity on all official public occasions, appear to have left him, at least initially, without overt support from other Arab states and may have weakened his heretofore relatively strong domestic position.

The speech by Tunisia's delegate, accusing "some Arab countries" of attempting to dominate the league, and a follow-up statement issued by the Tunisian Embassy in Cairo, calling cooperation between Tunisia and the UAR "impossible," are the culminating products of Bourguiba's long-developing antagonism toward the Nasir regime. This antagonism, which is felt much more strongly by the President than by other Tunisian leaders, springs particularly from Cairo's continued harboring and apparent clandestine material support of Bourguiba's exiled political rival, Salah ben Youssef. In late September Bourguiba recalled his ambassador in Cairo over this issue.

The UAR, probably encouraged by the Moroccan and Iraqi delegates' quick dissociation of their governments from the Tunisian action, has already launched a bitter press and radio campaign against Bourguiba. The position expressed by Tunisia's representative is being equated with the views of the "imperialist press," and Bourguiba himself has been castigated as "the imperialists'" choice to "check Nasir."

In addition to strengthening those elements in Tunisia which were already either hostile to Bourguiba or at least increasingly critical of his attitude toward Nasir, Bourguiba's open attack on the UAR will further reduce his already circumscribed ability to act independently of the Algerian rebels, who continue to be strongly entrenched in Tunisia. This is likely to be reflected almost immediately in the negotiations with France, which Tunisia now is reportedly ready to begin, over the status of the French air and naval base at Bizerte.

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Algerian Rebels Step Up Efforts to Induce Peace Talks

The Algerian rebel government formed last month by the National Liberation Front (FLN) has launched a new bid for early cease-fire talks with France. Possibly influenced in part by their inability to prevent an overwhelming vote in favor of the De Gaulle constitution on 28 September and by the unique position of authority which De Gaulle enjoys pending the establishment of new French institutions, the rebels appear to have adopted a more flexible attitude toward such talks. Heretofore, they have demanded France's prior recognition of at least Algeria's "right" to independence.

An editorial published on 10 October in the FLN's official newspaper El Moujahid reiterates the "ineluctable" will of the Algerian people to win independence, but fails to attach any qualification to an offer to meet French representatives "at any moment to determine the military and political conditions of a cease-fire." Subsequently, Ferhat Abbas, premier in the rebel cabinet, told an American journalist in Tunis that the creation of the Algerian provisional government and the consolidation of De Gaulle's authority made it possible to drop any preconditions for peace talks, since "any time the French negotiate with us now, this will in itself imply recognition of Algeria's right to independence."

Meanwhile, in an acknowledged effort to establish a "new climate," the rebel leaders have announced their intention to release shortly about 100 of an unknown but probably not very large number of French soldiers held captive by the FLN army. The leaders are also reportedly attempting to stop attacks at least "on persons" in France. However, any significant diminution of rebel activity in Algeria--which has recently returned to its "normal" level following a period of more intensified guerrilla operations during September--seems unlikely at this time.

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The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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