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3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)



19 November 1958



Copy No. C 60

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 22  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS, S, C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 4/4/80 REVIEWER:



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### III. THE WEST

#### The Berlin Situation

[redacted]

[redacted] the West cannot prevent the eventual transfer of Soviet functions in Berlin to the East German regime, and that nobody in the West would believe that avoiding recognition is worth a war. [redacted] the West should make an initial attempt to deal with representatives of the GDR on practical matters without implying recognition, it anticipates almost immediately being confronted with a further choice between recognition of East Germany or exposing Berlin to a blockade which could only be broken by force.

[redacted]

Even de facto dealings with East German officials would be strongly opposed by Chancellor Adenauer as undermining his entire foreign policy, which is, in effect, based on Bonn's claim to represent all of Germany. In addition, Western contacts with East German officials would sharply increase the already growing sentiment found in all West German parties, favoring direct talks with East Germany on unification.

Chancellor Adenauer has maintained that his "policy of strength" within the NATO alliance, will eventually force Moscow to agree to Western terms for unification. Recognition of East Germany, however, would place Adenauer in an isolated position and could force a modification of Bonn's whole European policy. [redacted]

[redacted]

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