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15 September 1958

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN





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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 September 1958

DAILY BRIEF

SRAB	Taiwan Strait situation: The Nationalists continue to attempt to get supplies through to Kinmen, but with little success. Chiang Kai-shek told US officials that "drastic steps" would have to be taken if there is no improvement in the resupply operations during this week. There are new Communist jet aircraft movements from both the north and south toward the strait area. (Page 1) (Map)
	II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraq-UAR:
No	
	the struggle between the UAR supporters and other elements may be coming to a head. (Page 4)
	Iraqi arms:
No	delivery from Egypt by sea

i

to Basra rather than directly from the USSR. The delivery is probably in accordance with the Iraqi-UAR military agreement signed on 19 July. A group of Iraqi officers arrived in Cairo last week to discuss Iraqi requirements for Soviet bloc arms. Foreign Minister Meir has indicated Israel: that Israel may move to occupy Jordanian territory in the event of "chaos" in Jordan or the "impending presence" of the UAR on the west bank. (Page 5) Morocco-UAR: Istiqlal left-wing leader Mehdi ben Barka told the UAR ambassador in Rabat that he would like to pay Egypt an official visit. The ambassador then recommended that Cairo invite not only Ben Barka but also influential Istiqlal theoretician Allal el-Fassi and King Mohamed V. These overtures are of particular significance in light of the Istiqlal leftwing's efforts to supplant the moderate Balafrej regime. (Page 6) Afghanistan-USSR: Afghan Foreign Minister Naim is now scheduled to visit Moscow in mid-October. The US ambassador in Kabul believes an agreement probably will be concluded on the Soviet Union's reported offer of a long-term credit to finance the entire cost of an Afghan civil air development program. Naim's visit will precede his planned trips to Peiping and Washington. Indonesia: The army commander in North Sumatra, reported indications that dissidents in Tapanuli were prepared to surrender en masse. He sought policy guidance from Chief of Staff Nasution as to how any such surrender attempt should be handled. The surrender of this group, which has been the most aggressive of all dissident elements on Sumatra, would be a severe blow to dissident (Page 7) (Map) morale and capabilities. ii DAILY BRIEF 15 Sept 58


I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Taiwan Strait Situation

Taiwaii Strait Situation	
Nationalist attempts to resupply Kinmen on 13 a 14 September again ran into heavy and accurate artifire. Of the three LSM's scheduled to unload on 13 sber, only one succeeded in putting cargo-five amplitractors—ashore before being driven off.	illery Septem-
•	nake supplies s is very
Chiang Kai-shek told Admiral Smoot on 12 Sept that if the US-Nationalist capability to land supplies men did not show marked improvement in five days, tic steps would have to be taken." Nationalist Vice of Foreign Affairs Chou Shu-kai, told another offici the Control Yuan expressed anger over the resupply to the cabinet on 13 September. With the Legislativ convening on 16 September, Chou felt that the cabin expect no peace from any quarter.	on Kin- , ''dras- Minister al that , problem e Yuan
A large group of jet fighters, possibly a naval unmoved from Hainan Island to Canton to Nanchang on September apparently continued to Hangchow on 11 September.	9-10
Associated transport flights suggest that the will continue to Ningpo, from where they might depl of the northern strait coastal fields.	

Another large group of jet aircraft moved from the Nanchang area to Canton on 14 September. It could not be determined whether they were fighters or light bombers. It is

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possible, however, that these are jet fighters which were training in the Nanchang area on 6 September and which may have been withdrawn from some of the coastal fields for that purpose. In any case, it seems probable that they will deploy to coastal fields from Canton.

Six North China Fleet vessels--two submarines, three sub chasers, and an auxiliary--which moved from Tsingtao to Shanghai on 10 September apparently remained in that area through 12 September.

Poland has announced that the first meeting between Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang Ping-nan and Ambassador Beam will take place on 15 September in Warsaw's Mysliwiecki Palace.

In its first comment on President Eisenhower's speech, Peiping, in a People's Daily editorial on 15 September, uses abusive language in denying charges of aggression and reiterating its adamant position on Taiwan and the offshore islands. The editorial's tone is somewhat moderated in commenting on the prospect of negotiations, stating "This is not a bad thing if it is not aimed at deceiving world opinion." It warns, however, of "grave consequences" if US convoying operations do not cease, a threat which probably will be repeated at the ambassadorial talks to increase world apprehension and to underscore Peiping's insistence that the fate of the offshore islands is an internal matter.

Soviet bloc commentaries are describing the speech as indicating an "unchanged" US position and as an effort to justify "provocation" against Communist China. A Pravda editorial of 13 September suggested that the Soviet UN delegation may propose in the General Assembly session a ban on the "movement of foreign fleets for purposes of political pressure, blackmail, and provocation."

The Chinese Communists are using the Taiwan Strait situation to expand the regime's militia organizations and integrate them with the new "communes," where they are to strengthen control over the peasants and provide a large organized labor

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pool. Peiping's propaganda asserts that militiamen will fight the US "with arms in one hand and tools in the other."	

II. ASIA-AFRICA

AR R	eports on Ir	<u>'aqi Affairs</u>		<u> </u>]
continuing conflicts within the new regime in Baghdad and growing Egyptian involvement in Iraqi affairs. The question of union with the UAR is apparently a major cause of the internal struggle, and Nasir is attempting to allay suspicions of various Iraqis regarding his intentions.					
		2			
if had	convinced	Qasim of th	e ''necess	itv'' of re	eplacing Iraqi
er, Aighdad as d	rif's own sta on 12 Septe	usters with atus is uncle ember that I of staff. H	members ear, since ne had bee	of the are it was a en relieve	my. How- nnounced in ed of his posi-
	tor or miter	ioi and dep	ulv brime	minister	
rces:	<u>NSA</u> 3/0/Q0.	D/T21452, T2	21238, and	T21245,	6, 9, and

Israeli Concern Over Jordanian Situation

Israeli Foreign Minister Meir has suggested that, if Nasir's domination of Jordan becomes apparent, Israel may move to occupy Jordanian territory without waiting for any overt act of aggression on the part of the UAR,	
over the or appropriation the part of the offig	

UAR Activities in Morocco


of King Mohamed V.

The ambassador suggested that a second invitation be directed simultaneously to the influential Istiqlal theoretician, Allal el-Fassi, "out of flattery to him." El-Fassi--notably cool toward Cairo for the past year--has been actively attempting to heal the breach between the moderate and left-wing factions of the party.

The ambassador's third recommendation was that Nasir send a letter to the Moroccan King inviting him to Cairo and expressing support for his position regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from North Africa, for Algeria, and for liberation of North Africa from the vestiges of imperialism. Such a letter, he said, would reassure the King and "put an end to the intrigue which wishes to portray us as the greedy one who is desirous of imposing his authority on North Africa."

The American Embassy in Rabat reports that since the UAR ambassador's arrival this summer he has attempted to present himself as the conscience of the Arabs. He and the UAR military attaché, who maintains close contacts with Algerian rebels in Morocco, with the Istiqlal left wing, and with Moroccan irregulars are probably attempting to cultivate all groups in an effort to enhance Cairo's influence during the present political instability in Morocco.

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Major Dissident Group on Sumatra May Surrender
Ever since the collapse of formal resistance to central government forces on Sumatra last May, the Tapanuli dissidents have been perhaps the most active and effective of all rebel elements on the island in mounting guerrilla attacks on central government outposts and lines of communication. During the first half of August, they maintained a sustained offensive against major government-held towns in Tapanuli, but their activities have since subsided, probably because of the virtual exhaustion of their slender stocks of ammunition. In addition, communications intelligence contains some indication of differences between the two major dissident commanders in North Sumatra, which might also be a factor inclining the Tapanuli elements toward surrender.
The surrender of their forces in Tapanuli would be a severe blow to the morale and capabilities of the Sumatran dissidents and would greatly facilitate the central government's task of suppressing by military means those rebel elements still remaining in the field in Central Sumatra and the east coast region of North Sumatra.

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Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

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The Secretary of State

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The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

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