


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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
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16 JULY 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC



Moscow gives new Iraqi regime support in UN.

Hungary - Kadar apparently has surrendered most of his remaining authority to Moscow.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Marines receive friendly reception from Lebanese public. Cairo and Damascus denounce landing.

Report received that UK has requested and received approval from Israel for overflights to Jordan.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

16 July 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

SRAB

*USSR - Middle East: Moscow's initial diplomatic and propaganda reaction to the landing of US forces in Lebanon has contained no warnings or hints of possible Soviet counteraction. The USSR has already indicated support of the new Iraqi Government by attempting to bloc the seating of the former regime's delegate in the UN Security Council. Except for its UN resolution, Moscow has refrained from elaborating on its position, probably pending assessment of Western actions and the Iraqi internal situation. [redacted]

no

[redacted]

Otherwise, there has been no discernible Soviet military reaction to the landing of US Marines in Lebanon. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (Map)

Hungary: Hungarian party First Secretary Janos Kadar appears to have lost what little independent authority Moscow permitted him to exercise and may no longer fully control the Hungarian regime. Kadar's recent attempts to deny complicity in the Nagy regime are indicative of the weakness of his internal position. At least one, and possibly two, of Kadar's recent speeches were substantially doctored before release and one of his chief lieutenants, Gyula Kallai, appears to have switched his loyalties to the Stalinist wing of the Hungarian party. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Page 4)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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 *Middle East: Initial Lebanese public reaction to the US landing has been friendly. Army commander Shihab is cooperating but fears the move may split his army. Vehement denunciations by the UAR mask indecision over its course of action regarding Lebanon, but Cairo and Damascus are vigorously seeking means to exploit developments in Iraq and to instigate action in Jordan. [redacted]
 (Page 5)

Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee concerning developments in Iraq, the IAC concludes that:

1. Iraqi army units sympathetic to the UAR have taken control of Baghdad. While information is sketchy as to the adherence to the coup by Iraqi units elsewhere in Iraqi territory, forces within Iraq are unlikely to prevent the new government from consolidating its position.

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 2. UAR complicity in the coup is strongly suspected but the evidence is still only circumstantial. Nasir is likely to move swiftly to consolidate the gain--probably offer the new regime military aid and membership in the UAR.

3. The effect of the Iraqi coup in Jordan will be to hasten the deterioration of King Husayn's position, already weakened by factionalism and UAR penetration of the military forces, by loss of some Bedouin support, and by popular sympathy with the Iraqi coup.

4. In Lebanon, the Iraqi developments have further reduced the chances of a pro-Western regime remaining in power and have strengthened the morale and intransigence of rebel forces.

5. No unilateral action by Saudi Arabia is expected. King Saud has already notified the US ambassador that failure of the

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West to intervene in the Middle East now will be the finish of Western influence in the area and will result in Saudi Arabia's adherence to UAR foreign policy.

6. No Soviet military or diplomatic reactions to the Iraqi coup have been observed as yet, and there is little reason for such measures until reactions of the US, the UK and other nations in the Middle East become apparent. The USSR will undoubtedly welcome the developments in Iraq and will do what it feels it safely can, without direct involvement in overt hostilities, to support the chain reaction that may result in other Arab countries. Strong Soviet warnings against Western intervention will probably be issued. The USSR would undoubtedly react strongly to direct military action by Turkey or Iran, but it would probably hesitate over action which it felt contained grave risk of general war.

7. The Israeli reaction to the coup will undoubtedly be one of grave concern. There is as yet no evidence of military movements within Israel. In the event of a coup in Jordan, the Israelis would probably move to secure the west bank of the Jordan River. Israel will probably exert heavy pressure upon the Western powers for intervention in the Middle East.

8. Turkey's reaction will be extremely sharp and unilateral military moves cannot be ruled out. Turkish forces on the Syrian frontier have been recently strengthened and Turkey has the military capability for extensive intervention in Iraq and Syria.

9. France alone or with Israel probably cannot act in Iraq without US knowledge and support but will provide at least logistic support for any action by Israel, particularly in the event of Jordan's collapse. France can be expected to participate in any Western intervention in the Middle East.

10. The current meeting of the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact will probably result in strong pressure on the US and the UK for major intervention in the Middle East.

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11. In view of the grave threat to Iraqi and Kuwait oil resources, the UK can be expected to bring strong pressure on the US to concert a Western military intervention, reserving the right to act alone or with Turkey, Iran, France or Israel in the event of a US refusal. British forces recently deployed to Cyprus are available for a limited intervention in Iraq if airlift is provided. [redacted]

*UK-Israel: [redacted]

no

Britain has requested and received permission from the Israeli Government for overflights of Israel in order to move men and materiel to Jordan. [redacted]


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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Military Reaction to Middle East Developments

There is no indication of Soviet air activity which might be directly related to the Middle East situation. Elements of the 50th Long Range Air Army based in the European USSR have been engaged in a probable deployment exercise to the Far East since approximately 10 July. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As of early 15 July, Black Sea naval units appeared to be engaged in routine operations.

In the fields of diplomacy and propaganda, the USSR's initial reaction to the landing of American forces in Lebanon has contained no warnings or hints of possible Soviet counteraction. Moscow's cautious warnings in the latter part of June that Soviet "volunteers" would be sent to oppose any Western military intervention in Lebanon have so far not been repeated. The main lines of the Soviet propaganda counterattack were

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set forth in the USSR's resolution in the UN Security Council, condemning the American action as a "grave threat to international peace and security," and calling on the United States to stop armed interference in the internal affairs of the Arab states and to withdraw its forces from Lebanon immediately.

Moscow is attempting to portray the landing in Lebanon as the first step toward "armed aggression against Iraq" and as part of a broader design to suppress the Arab "national liberation movement" throughout the Middle East. The USSR has already indicated support for the revolutionary regime in Baghdad by attempting to bloc the seating of the Iraqi delegate in the UN Security Council. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Kadar May Be Losing Control of Hungarian Regime

Hungarian party First Secretary Janos Kadar appears to have lost what little independent authority Moscow permitted him to exercise and may no longer fully control the Hungarian regime. Kadar's continued usefulness to the Kremlin has been in doubt since the Moscow-Belgrade rupture and particularly since the Nagy execution. His recent efforts to deny any culpability for his involvement in Nagy's short-lived government indicate the weakness of his present position.

The East German radio, after broadcasting a recording of Kadar's innocuous 12 July address at the East German party congress, added a blast against the Yugoslavs which the announcer attributed to Kadar. The addition included a pledge that "we do not tolerate revisionists in any field of social life, and least of all in the party." Kadar's remarks at the Budapest airport on 29 June on his return from Bulgaria reportedly were "thoroughly edited and doctored" before publication to remove his references to Yugoslavia, possibly because they were too mild. Publication of the speech had been held up for two days.

In Kadar's absence, his closest associate in Hungary, party secretary and politburo member Gyula Kallai, published an article in the party's daily newspaper on 13 July completely endorsing the position of the Stalinist wing of the party. This declaration, apparently a change of allegiance, ended with the ominous threat that they would "fight with all their strength against the still existing remnants of revisionism."

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Middle East Situation (as of 0400 EDT 16 July)

The landing of American marines in Lebanon has been given a friendly initial reception by the Lebanese public, especially by Christian elements who are reported to have indulged in "jubilation shooting" in Beirut. The full impact of the action on the public probably has not yet been felt, however, Rebel leaders claim moderates have joined them in a protest to the UN. President Chamoun apparently remains wary of the public reaction, since his address to the nation following the landing did not refer directly to the American forces. Lebanese army commander General Shihab has agreed to cooperate and "accept" the landing as a "fact," but he is extremely discouraged and fears that he may no longer be able to maintain unity in the army. A military coup against Chamoun appears to have been narrowly avoided, at least temporarily; a group of officers was reported to have agreed to arrest the President on the afternoon of 15 July, but may have been dissuaded by Shihab. The general is still Chamoun's choice for president--Chamoun has said that as commander in chief he would instruct Shihab to be a candidate--and Chamoun asserts he intends to go ahead with plans for holding a presidential election on 24 July.

The UAR does not seem to have decided what its response should be to the American action in Lebanon. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Syrian Regional Interior Minister Sarraj had ask Cairo earlier in the day whether he should intervene in the event of an American landing or whether he should abide by a previous agreement not to intervene. [REDACTED]

The United Nations observation group in Lebanon has accumulated indications by night aerial reconnaissance that UAR support for the rebels had been substantially increased already.

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The observers have found a heavy movement of trucks at night, at slow speed as if heavily laden, on all three of the main Syrian-Lebanese roads in the north. Convoys as large as 50 trucks have been seen despite efforts by the convoys to avoid aerial observation. UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has said that he cannot put this information before the Security Council until the observation group takes formal responsibility for it. He has, however, made a demarche to the UAR representative.

Cairo is seeking means at the same time to press its advantages in other directions. [REDACTED]

Inside Iraq, the army coup group apparently is consolidating its hold over the country. Former Prime Minister Nuri Said is reported [REDACTED] to have been caught and either shot or hanged on 15 July. There is still no firm information on the whereabouts of King Faysal. Both the American and British ambassadors, in separate interviews on 15 July with the new prime minister, Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim, and other officials of the regime, were assured that measures would be taken to protect the lives and property of British and American citizens and that, if necessary, safe conduct for evacuation would be provided. The officers were somewhat reluctant to provide the latter assurance, but protested friendship for both Britain and the United States. This

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surface attitude almost certainly has been adopted in the hope of parrying Western intervention against the regime. At the same time, the regime has formally denounced the Arab Union between Iraq and Jordan; similar action regarding Iraq's agreement with Britain and the Baghdad Pact may be delayed until the regime is more firmly in control.

There are some indications that the Iraqi rebels have not yet determined the loyalty of troops guarding the northern oil fields and the Habbaniya airfield, but intend to take over by force if necessary. The latter move would be a logical one to secure a means of receiving support from Cairo through Damascus and to deny the base to any intervening air-borne force. Iraqi troops who appeared friendly to the British training mission were still guarding Habbaniya.


In Jordan, King Husayn's government has tightened security measures and has suppressed demonstrations in West Jordan in favor of the Iraqi coup. The mood of the radical nationalist opposition in Amman is jubilant, although some opposition sympathizers have stated that the chances of a coup seem slight unless the leaders of the Baath party return to the country. The Iraqi composite brigade stationed in Jordan was allowed to return to Iraq on 15 July after its officers had threatened to shoot their way out unless permission were granted. Some sixty Iraqi staff officers in Jordan on an inspection tour are also to be released. The Jordanians apparently expect some kind of Turkish action; a Turkish aircraft arrived in Amman on 15 July, ostensibly to evacuate former Iraqi Chief of Staff Arif if he should still be there. Ankara continues to emphasize its belief that Jordan must be supported directly to the fullest extent.

Pressure in favor of the Iraqi coup has developed quickly in Kuwait. The acting ruler, who is in charge while the actual ruler is visiting in Damascus, has made a minor show of force in the face of popular parading of Iraqi flags with shouts of "long live the Iraqi Army." Reports have been received that Bahrein

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is also demonstrating enthusiasm. Both of the developments appear ominous to the British position in the Persian Gulf oil area.

A general atmosphere of public calm prevails in Israel, although there is obvious intense concern for the immediate future of Jordan and the eventual possibility that an Egyptian-dominated ring may close around the country. A check by the American military attaché at all mobilization points and freight stations in the vicinity of Tel Aviv revealed no unusual activity. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has stated, however, that Israel is now prepared to ask the United States for arms, planes, and antisubmarine weapons since, unless the Iraqi coup is crushed, Israel will be in "mortal danger."



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