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10 September 1958

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
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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 September 1958

DAILY BRIEF

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

SPAB Taiwan Strait situation: In the sharpest warning from Communist China thus far, the Peiping People's Daily has said that convoying activity will put the US in a "most precarious situation involving direct armed conflict with China at any moment," adding that there is no room for "ambiguity and compromise." It accused the US of "now carrying on its most dangerous military adventure since the second World War." The editorial called on the US to solve the "international dispute" through peaceful negotiations, but made no reference to ambassadorial talks. (Page 1)

> Communist China: Peiping has announced that the third and final phase of its troop withdrawal from Korea will begin on 25 September. The removal of the remaining 111,000 Chinese Communist troops in Korea is expected to be completed before the end of the year. (Page 3)

ASIA-AFRICA

South Korea: On 3 September Seoul's ambassador to Taipei, who had been in contact with Chiang, advised President Rhee that the Chinese Nationalists foresaw the possible development of the offshore islands hostilities into a counterattack on the mainland which they would try to expand into an "all-out war." The ambassador asserted that Korea should prepare "to march north" and suggested a Korean - Nationalist Chinese military alliance. Rhee, however, has given no

	indication he tion.	intends to exploit the (Page		situa-
014	current finan- factorily." The early agreem	ern assistance to build the cial negotiations with Brahe UK-Egyptian talks in lent on claims resulting ted he would go ahead with the control of the control	ritain are settl Rome appear from the Suez	ed "satis- to promise conflict.
		III. THE W	EST	
OΚ	that he is con hardening. It will not be su early this wir presumably we Democratic I Netherlan sentative to N	nds-Indonesia: The Net	titude toward lent Finnish God may seek the t. Such a governist-front Find (Page 6) therlands pernoric instruction	Finland is vernment formation ernment nish People's manent represents from his
Ho		ter to make a "real row ies to Indonesia.	" in NATO ove	r American (Page 7)
		LATE ITE	M	
	*USSR:			
P	A resumption Geneva talks that Moscow I can and Britis	tests of thermonuclear of prior to the 31 October on a test cessation agre believes the need to keep sh nuclear weapons prograntages which renewed School (Page 8)	devices in the ropening of schement would in pace with records	neduled ndicate cent Ameri- s the po-
*	10 Sept 58	DAILY BRI	EF	ii

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I THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Taiwan Strait Situation

Peiping is continuing its stress on the "dangerous" nature of the offshore islands situation. On the mainland, tension is being sustained by demonstrations and propaganda calling for "determination to defend the motherland."

The Peiping People's Daily has told Chinese Communist readers, in an editorial featuring the sharpest warning to date from the Chinese in the present crisis, that a clash with US forces may be imminent. The English-language broadcast by the Chinese Communists said that continued convoying activity will put the US in a "most precarious situation involving direct armed conflict with China at any moment." The article called present US activity in the Taiwan Strait area America's "most dangerous military adventure since the second World War," and urged Washington to settle the dispute by negotiation. The People's Daily editorial made no reference, however, to the ambassadorial talks.

The American Consulate General in Hong Kong believes that if Sino-American talks are resumed, the Chinese Communists may propose that negotiations be transferred to a bilateral ministerial conference or a multilateral summit meeting with Chinese Communist participation, while the ambassadors in Warsaw confine their efforts to preliminary airing of views and establishing the ground rules. At any meeting, Peiping may seek to negotiate the withdrawal of Chinese Nationalist troops from the Kinmens and Matsus.

The consulate general also believes that the question of Taiwan and the Penghus is of a different nature, and that neither side could negotiate that issue without a major policy change. Peiping's propaganda on 9 September stressed the "immediate threat" posed by the Kinmens and the Matsus, but placed Taiwan and the Penghus in the category of territory which will be "restored sooner or later."

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on the Kinmens on 8 September, and continued firing at a reduced rate through the morning of 10 September.	
Two Communist naval vessels, possibly landing ships, moved south from Tsingtao to Shanghai between 7 and 8 Sep-	
tember,	
Chinese Nationalist handling of the resupply convoys to the Kinmens on 7 and 8 September was marked by lack of co-	
ordination, preparedness, and direction of effort at the beaches	s
by the Kinmen Defense Command, Neither convoy unloaded all	l
of its supplies, and an LSM from the second convoy was lost No smoke screen was laid to shield the landing ships on the	
beach, and counterbattery fire suffered from improper position	1-
ing of Nationalist guns as well as lack of precise knowledge of	
the Communist gun positions. The convoy for 9 September was canceled.	•

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Chinese Communist Withdrawal From Korea

The Chinese Communists have announced that the third and final phase of their withdrawal from Korea will begin on 25 September. Remaining to be withdrawn during this phase are about 111,000 troops, including the Chinese Communist 1st Army, two artillery divisions, an antiaircraft artillery division, and a rocket-launcher division. Four armies and support units totaling about 200,000 troops have already been withdrawn from Korea. The 16th and 23rd Armies were withdrawn during the first stage completed on 25 April, and the 21st and 54th Armies withdrew during the second stage completed on 14 August.

The repositioning of the North Korean Army, which has
a strength of about 334,000 men, has resulted in some loss
of defensive depth, but the Chinese are maintaining strong
forces across the border and have announced that they will
return to North Korea if hostilities are resumed. There
are at present no indications that the Communists intend to
initiate hostilities in North Korea.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Chiang	Urges	South	Korean	Preparation	for	March	North

Chiang Kai-shek,	
	urged that the
Korean Army make preparations for war breaks out in the Formosa Strait	
mformed Described Discribed the N.	Kim subsequently
nformed President Rhee that the Nat seize the opportunity to counterattach oresaw the possibility of expanding a sist air battle into an all-out war.	k the mainland, and they
The ambassador suggested a Sounationalist military alliance, and not hing else" Seoul now should regain it authority over Korean troops present for the eventuality of a decision to at additional handicap of the logistic limits of the forces, which make them incompletely without United States supposed	ted that "above every- ts freedom to exercise tly under UN command, tack North Korea. The nitations of the South apable of a sustained
President Rhee has been relative ion to the Taiwan Strait situation and situation by inspired mass demonstrated continue to insist on a firm free-communism, but will be reluctant, and the state of the	d has not exploited the ations. He probably -world stand against as he has been in the
oast, to undertake military alliances	•

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Nasir May Request Western Aid to Build Aswan Dam

President Nasir	
intended to request Western assistance in con-	
structing the high dam at Aswan, provided the present UI	_
Egyptian financial talks in Rome end "satisfactorily." He	
feels that these talks are going well, and it appears that s	et-
tlement of the claims arising out of the 1956 Suez conflict	,
may be reached soon.	
Nasir indicated he may go ahead with plans for the dawithout consulting the Sudan. He feels the Sudan's decision	on
last July to divert part of the Nile waters for a local irrig	ζa-

last July to divert part of the Nile waters for a local irrigation project constituted a unilateral abrogation of the 1929 agreement, and justified independent UAR action. The Sudan declared on 20 August it would no longer abide by the agreement, signed before Sudanese independence, and is seeking a renegotiation with the UAR in an effort to secure a more favorable division of the waters. The UAR press and radio vigorously attacked the Sudan's announcement, and Cairo has given no indication of willingness to meet the request for new talks. If it maintains this attitude, its influence in the Sudan will probably suffer.

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III. THE WEST

President Kekkonen Feels Finland Must Follow Flexible Policy Toward USSR

President Kekkonen of Finland is convinced that the USSR's attitude toward Finland is hardening and will become even harder in the coming year. There is no conclusive evidence to support his fear. Kekkonen feels, however, that Finland must be prepared to follow a flexible policy and to
make ''tactical concessions,''

President Kekkonen and the powerful Agrarian party have certain reservations regarding the flexibility of the incumbent government and may consider it wise to replace it with another coalition. The present cabinet, formed on 29 August, is a coalition of Social Democrats, Agrarians, Conservatives, Finnish Liberals, and the Swedish People's party. The Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), the largest party in parliament, and the splinter Social Democratic opposition are not in the government.

A new coalition would presumably include the Agrarians, the SKDL, and the Social Democratic opposition. Such a development is not likely to occur until early winter after the passage of a new farm-support bill. Despite the accommodation of some Agrarian leaders to the idea of including the SKDL, there would be strong opposition from the rank and file.

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Netherlands to Make Protest in NATO Over US Arms Deliveries to Indonesia

Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns has sent instructions to the Dutch representative in NATO, Dirk U. Stikker, to make a "real row" over American arms deliveries to Indonesia. Luns is greatly concerned about the possible use of these arms as a threat to West New Guinea. His attitude probably reflects the views of other members of the Dutch cabinet as well as the results of his talks with Australian Foreign Minister Casey on closer Australian-Dutch cooperation on the West New Guinea question.

Plans to implement the Australian-Dutch agreement of 1957, which was designed to promote closer administrative cooperation between the two countries, were worked out by Luns and Casey in their 29-30 August talks at The Hague. Although a military pact was not signed, Casey apparently assured Luns that the Australians would assist the Dutch if a military attack were made on West New Guinea.

According to Stikker, his government, encouraged by British agreement to cancel the intended sale of aircraft to Indonesia, now opposes arms deliveries of any kind. If NATO support develops for an embargo on arms shipments from NATO countries to Indonesia, he expects Belgian permanent representative De Staercke to make such a proposal. Luns had previously expressed fear that Belgium and other NATO countries would follow the US lead and ship small-arms ammunition to Indonesia. The Dutch also contend that arms deliveries are contrary to assurances given them in NATO discussions of the Indonesian situation last February.

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LATE ITEM

USSR May Be Preparing Resumption of Nuclear Testing the USSR will probably resume thermonuclear testing in the Novaya Zemlya area. the reactivation of a single-channel scrambler link between naval headquarters at Severomorsk and Belushya on 29 August; a brief closure of the Kola Gulf on 3 September; and the flight of at least two and possibly four aircraft associated with nuclear testing from their base at Kerch/ Bagerova to Olenya airfield on 6 September. In the past, such activities have preceded testing of nuclear weapons in the Novaya Zemlya area. The preparations detected would

indicate resumption prior to the scheduled 31 October start

of Geneva talks on a test cessation agreement.

Khrushchev in a <u>Pravda</u> interview warned on 29 August that continued American and British testing "relieves" the Soviet Union of the obligation it had assumed unilaterally" on 31 March 1958, when the Supreme Soviet declared a test moratorium. He noted that the moratorium declaration had provided for resumption of tests under just such circumstances.

A resumption of tests prior to the Geneva talks would seriously weaken the effectiveness of Moscow's repeated charges that continued American and British tests prove the insincerity of Western proposals for a test suspension agreement. A test resumption before the talks thus would indicate that, in Moscow's judgment, the need to keep pace with recent US-UK nuclear weapons progress outweighs the international political disadvantages of renewed testing. Khrushchev in his interview remarked, "Fine figures we, the leaders of the Soviet State, would cut, if in the face of such actions of the Western powers we should ignore the vital and lawful interests of our country's security."

In view of the fact that Khrushchev again expressed pessimism regarding Anglo-American willingness to agree to terminate tests, it is possible that the preparations noted recently are timed to permit resumption of testing immediately after a possible breakdown in the Geneva talks.

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