


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


8 November 1958



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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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8 NOVEMBER 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet mission due in Iraq to sign arms agreement. [redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA


Iraq - Qasim arrests leaders of pro-UAR party.

The Arab-Israeli situation.

Military units in southeast Turkey alerted. [redacted]

Jordan - King may have one member of royal family remain in country.

Sudan - Political tensions increasing.



- ⑦ Tribal unrest and political maneuvering threaten Moroccan stability.
- ⑧ Thailand - Strained relations in coup group may lead to Sarit's losing control.

III. THE WEST

- ⑨ De Gaulle faced with reluctance of respected Moslems to file for 30 November elections.
- ⑩ Finland - USSR's delay in starting trade talks may bring cabinet re-organization.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

8 November 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Iraq: A Soviet military mission is due in Iraq about 10 November to sign an arms agreement with the Iraqi Government. The agreement was negotiated by an Iraqi mission which was in Moscow last month, UAR efforts to act as intermediary having been ignored. The UAR military attaché in Baghdad learned from the Iraqis that the terms of the arms agreement are of the same liberal nature as those of Soviet-UAR arms deals.

(Page 1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

*Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim on 7 November rounded up leaders of the pro-UAR Baath party and closed the party newspaper, even though the Baath had taken no action against Qasim following the arrest of its spokesman, former Deputy Premier Arif. The regime was supported by large street demonstrations organized by Communists and other anti-UAR elements. A source of the US Embassy in Baghdad claims "sweeping changes" in the government will occur this week-end. Nasir, meanwhile, is reported to have been "astonished" by the news of Arif's arrest, and to be gloomy over the situation in Iraq.


Arab-Israeli situation: Approximately a battalion of Israeli reserves were mobilized on the night of 5 November, and a small truck convoy was seen leaving an ordnance depot the same evening. While this activity could be normal training operations, it could also be a selective precautionary mobilization in view of Arab-Israeli tensions.

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The United Arab Republic now has two of its submarines, two mine sweepers, and 12 torpedo boats south of the Suez Canal. This build-up of naval units south of Suez would be necessary if a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba were intended or if hostilities forced closure of the canal. Most of the vessels completed their transit of the canal on 6 November.

[redacted] (Page 3)

Turkey: Turkish military units at Diyarbakir, in southeastern Turkey, have been alerted and their leaves canceled.

[redacted]

No

This alert has not been confirmed by other sources, but Ankara previously has used the alerting and movement of troops along the Syrian border to apply pressure on the UAR. Diyarbakir, however, is located in the Kurdish region of Turkey and such action could be a precautionary move against Kurdish nationalist agitation. [redacted] (See map on opposite page)

[redacted]

Jordan: King Husayn is considering the advisability of having the Queen Mother return to Jordan shortly after his scheduled departure on vacation on 10 November so that at least one member of the royal family will be in the country. Should the queen return, however, her presence would not necessarily be any obstacle to subversive action by pro-UAR elements. Husayn has been alerted by the Turkish Government to a report of a coup attempt to be made a few days after he leaves. While there is no confirmation for this particular report, Jordanian emigrés in the UAR and dissident elements in Jordan almost certainly see the King's absence as an opportunity for possible action against the government.

No

[redacted] (Page 5)

Sudan: Political tensions are increasing in anticipation of the opening of a new session of Parliament on 17 November. Members of the pro-Western government are still considering extralegal action to enable them to curb domestic

No

8 Nov 58

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

opposition and UAR-inspired subversion. Unless such a move is made before Parliament convenes, the government faces the prospect of strong attacks on its acceptance of American economic and British military assistance. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 7)

OK
Morocco: The governing Istiqlal party is playing up the theme of foreign meddling behind localized Berber unrest in the Rif region of northern Morocco as a tactic in its continuing campaign to wrest the country's military and security forces from the direct control of the King. Energetic measures taken by the government seem to have alleviated at least momentarily the danger of a Berber uprising. The tribal unrest and a struggle within the party for control of the labor movement, however, pose continuing threats to Morocco's internal stability. [redacted] (Page 8)

NO
Thailand: Strained relations among members of the military coup group may lead to a loss of control by Marshal Sarit. The American Embassy in Bangkok concludes that unless Sarit can reverse the present trend, a move against him is likely, and it could come with little or no warning. [redacted]

III. THE WEST

NO
France-Algeria: De Gaulle's plans for negotiating with elected Algerian representatives for an early political settlement are threatened by the general reluctance of Moslems commanding prestige among their co-religionists to run in the 30 November French parliamentary elections. They apparently fear both army intervention in favor of "pro-integration" lists and FLN reprisals for participating in "a French election." De Gaulle is said to be so concerned that he is planning some "spectacular gesture" before the 9 November filing deadline. [redacted] (Page 9)

8 Nov 58

DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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OK

Finland: The delay of the USSR in starting annual trade talks is causing increasing concern among Finnish leaders. Some non-Communist elements, especially those belonging to the radical wing of the Agrarian party and reportedly including President Kekkonen, are seeking to bring about a reorganization of the cabinet in an effort to allay Moscow's suspicions of its allegedly "rightist" orientation. [redacted]

(Page 10)

8 Nov 58

DAILY BRIEF

iv

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet-Iraqi Arms Deal

The UAR military attaché in Baghdad informed Cairo on 6 November that the Iraqi mission which had gone to Moscow early last month to negotiate an arms agreement had returned and that a Soviet mission was scheduled to arrive at Basra on 10 November to conclude the agreement. Mention of Basra suggests that facilities at this Persian Gulf port may be inspected by the Soviet delegation to determine the feasibility of shipping the arms directly to Iraq by sea instead of off-loading them at Latakia for transit overland through Syria.

The UAR military attaché in Baghdad learned from the Iraqis that the terms of the arms agreement are similar to those of previous Soviet-UAR arms deals, which provided for substantial discounts and extended payments. The Soviet Union probably will provide the Iraqi Air Force, whose chief was a member of the Iraqi delegation to Moscow, with jet fighters and possibly jet light bombers. Moscow probably will also supply the medium tanks the Iraqi Army earlier expressed an interest in receiving, artillery--particularly anti-aircraft guns, and other land armaments.

The Soviet Union has indicated its displeasure to the UAR arms-purchasing mission in Moscow over earlier UAR offers of bloc arms to Iraq and over Cairo's attempts to be the middleman in Iraqi arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. The use of an all-sea route for delivering Soviet materiel to Iraq would tend to eliminate UAR influence in this transaction. Furthermore, direct deliveries of bloc arms to Iraq would tend to strengthen the hand of Iraqi Communists and pro-Communist elements in their contest with pro-UAR forces for influence within Iraq.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq Arresting Pro-UAR Elements

The Iraqi regime is rounding up pro-UAR elements. Those arrested reportedly include the commandant of the military college, the directors general of police and security, and the head of military intelligence, all supporters of former Deputy Prime Minister Arif who had been chief spokesman for the Baath party. The Baath newspaper in Baghdad was closed on 7 November and its five editors--all party leaders--were arrested.

The Baath had hoped that if it did not oppose Prime Minister Qasim over Arif's arrest it would be left alone to build up strength for a showdown with the Communists who, together with other anti-UAR elements, have been organizing demonstrations of "popular" support for Qasim.

While the Communists seem to have played the largest role in stimulating a campaign of vilification against Arif, other anti-UAR elements led by National Democratic party (NDP) leader Kamil Chadirchi and Minister of Finance Muhammad Hadid also participate. The NDP wishes to work toward taking Syria out of the union with Egypt, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Nasir is reported to have been "astonished" by the news of Arif's arrest and to have "predicted" that Iraq would go Communist within two weeks unless there was some moderating influence. However, he denied any intention of interfering in Iraq. Meanwhile, UAR representatives in Baghdad appear to be increasingly disturbed over the turn of events. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Arab-Israeli Situation

Arab-Israeli tensions remain high on the eve of King Husayn's departure from Jordan. Approximately a battalion of Israeli reserves was mobilized on the night of 5 November, and a convoy of 30 trucks was observed leaving an ordnance depot on the same evening. These activities are not abnormal for this time of year, however, and a detailed reconnaissance of northern Israel by the American military attaché on 5 November revealed only a normal pattern of training operations. Nevertheless, a selective precautionary mobilization may be undertaken in view of current tensions and recent border incidents. [redacted]

UAR concern over the situation does not appear substantially diminished, despite some reports that alert measures have been relaxed. [redacted]

[redacted] "many changes might take place in the next 15 days." [redacted]

[redacted] joint military planning between the two countries has been going forward, [redacted]

[redacted] a possible meeting in Baghdad for joint planning purposes on 8 November.

The Iraqis, for their part, are concerned over Turkish activity. [redacted]

[redacted] Turkish units at Diyarbakir, in southeastern Turkey, had been alerted and their leaves canceled. Ankara has previously used such activity as a form of pressure on the UAR. Diyarbakir, however, is located in the Kurdish region of Turkey and such action could be a precautionary move against Kurdish nationalist agitation. (See map opposite p. ii) [redacted]

The Turks may become further embroiled with the UAR and, in consequence, with the Arab-Israeli problem, as a result of the seizure and interrogation of a Turkish plain-clothes policeman by officials of the UAR Embassy in Ankara. Publicity for this incident could be used by the Menderes government to counter criticism of a future aggressive attitude toward the UAR. ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Israelis have long sought to bring Turkey into the Arab-Israeli picture, and apparently are seeking to develop closer ties with Turkey in military and intelligence matters. The former deputy chief of staff of the Israeli Army, Brigadier Zvi Tsur, is believed to have been in Turkey recently and may still be there on an undisclosed mission.

The naval movements which the UAR initiated last week are continuing, and the Egyptian Navy now has two of its submarines, two mine sweepers, and twelve or thirteen torpedo boats south of the Suez Canal. Most of the vessels completed their transit of the canal on 6 November, and should be in a position either to defend the Gulf of Suez against Israeli naval action in case the canal is blocked or to attempt to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Developments in Jordan

King Husayn is considering the advisability of having his mother return to Jordan about 16 November, shortly after his departure for a vacation in Europe, apparently in response to widespread concern that the absence of all members of the royal family demonstrated their fear of remaining in Jordan. While Husayn's decision suggests that he does intend to return, the presence of Queen Zayn in Amman would not be an obstacle to antiregime action by pro-UAR elements.

The Regency Council which will function during the King's absence from Jordan apparently will not, [redacted] include West Jordanian nationalist Dr. Husayn Khalidi. King Husayn is [redacted] to suspect that Khalil is ambitious to become premier and is working with opposition political groups. The King now apparently desires that the issue of council membership be removed from politics, and favors including only Senate President Said Mufti and Jordan's two senior judges.

The Turkish Government has advised King Husayn that it has learned of plans for a pro-UAR coup attempt against his government a few days after he leaves the country on 10 November. [redacted] Premier Rifai, Chief of Staff Majalli, and Royal Chamberlain Talhuni are marked for assassination. While there is no confirmation for this particular report, Jordanian emigrés in the UAR and dissident elements in Jordan probably see the King's scheduled absence as an opportunity for possible UAR-supported action against the government. [redacted] terrorists and other antiregime personnel are again infiltrating Jordan from Syria.

[redacted] there is considerable evidence that funds and arms and ammunition

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from national guard stocks are being distributed to Bedouin tribesmen, and that some officers and noncommissioned officers are engaged in unspecified training duties among the Bedouins. It is likely that this activity is being conducted by the King as a precaution against possible disloyalty in certain army units. Armed Bedouin tribesmen were brought into the vicinity of Amman to support the King during his successful suppression of an ultranationalist coup attempt in April 1957.

While the Bedouins have been the principal factor in the King's control over the army, [redacted] they now are split over the question of support for the regime. [redacted] Husayn that the Saudi Arabians are distributing money to the influential Bani Sakhir tribe, [redacted] to draw the tribe away from support of the regime. Loss of this support would virtually seal the fate of the monarchy and of Premier Rifai.

On 4 November King Husayn denied recent reports that re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the UAR was imminent and that Jordan was planning to accept a military mission from the UAR. The King agreed, however, that normal relations with the UAR would be resumed eventually. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Political Tensions Growing in the Sudan

Prime Minister Khalil, facing the prospect of intense parliamentary opposition to his acceptance of American and British aid, may soon feel compelled to take the extralegal action he has long threatened to ensure the continuance of his government. Khalil intends to install a new cabinet including some army officers and "loyal" politicians, with himself remaining as prime minister.

The government's position on the political, economic, and propaganda front is considered critical, and opposition forces apparently intend to make an all-out effort to unseat the present coalition in the parliamentary session scheduled to begin on 17 November. The American ambassador in Khartoum feels that the government can no longer afford to compete with the opposition, apparently well-supplied with UAR funds, in buying parliamentary votes.

[redacted] Khalil's plan could not be carried out until a week or more after Parliament convenes, which would give the army time to prepare itself to assist the government move. Numerous armed members of the Ansar sect, supporters of Khalil's party and its religious sponsor, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, are said to be gathering in the neighborhood of the capital. The possibility of sudden action by the government appears to be an open secret in Khartoum, with antigovernment elements strongly suspecting the government's intentions. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Moroccan Party Continues to Strive for Control of Military Forces

The governing Istiqlal party is playing up the theme of foreign meddling behind localized Berber unrest in the Rif region of northern Morocco as a tactic in its continuing campaign to wrest the country's army and security forces from the direct control of King Mohamed V. The King is resisting these efforts to curtail his power and has in fact encouraged some of his close followers to create a party in opposition to the Istiqlal. The Istiqlal has implied that these followers received foreign assistance.

Discontent in the Rif lacks political coherence and is local in origin, stemming partly from economic distress and partly from traditional Riffian distrust of outsiders. Antagonism toward Istiqlal appointees sent to govern the Rif was aggravated by the arrest early last month of Berber leaders who had had some measure of success in aligning support in outlying areas for an organization opposing Istiqlal and supporting the King. Units of the Royal Moroccan Army now have been deployed in the area and the government has replaced the provincial governor--an Istiqlal member--with a native Riffi army officer. These energetic measures seem to have alleviated, at least momentarily, the danger of a tribal uprising.

Mounting opposition in other rural areas and a struggle between Istiqlal left- and right-wing factions for control of the labor movement--which erupted on 4 November in a strike of dockers at the port of Casablanca--pose continuing threats to the tenuous alliance of the King and the party.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

III. THE WEST

Electoral Situation in Algeria May Jeopardize De Gaulle's Hopes for Solution

French Premier de Gaulle is reported so disturbed over the lack of "desirable" Algerian Moslem and European candidates for the National Assembly elections that he is planning further action, possibly a "spectacular gesture," to remedy the situation before the 9 November filing deadline. Despite De Gaulle's instructions to the French Army in Algeria to guarantee free elections, potential Moslem and liberal European candidates have been reluctant to present themselves on platforms diverging from the army's known preference for integration of Algeria with France. Only a handful of Moslem and liberal European candidates have filed for the 70 National Assembly seats which will be up for election in Algeria and the Saharan Departments on 28-30 November.

The liberal ex-mayor of Algiers, Jacques Chevallier, has privately charged the French military with rigging the elections to discourage candidates it dislikes, and a high French civil official in Algiers in effect admits that the army generals acting as prefects are discouraging, if not actually prohibiting, candidacies they do not favor.

De Gaulle has promised to negotiate the future status of Algeria with the Algerian deputies, of whom he has specified at least two-thirds must be Moslems. Should true representatives of the Moslem masses not be elected, the premier might be unable to achieve his hope of negotiating a meaningful settlement without the politically dangerous necessity of recognizing the Algerian Liberation Front as spokesman for Algeria.

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Cabinet Realignment Possible in Finland

The Soviet Union's delay in starting annual trade talks is causing Finnish leaders increasing concern. The second date suggested by the Finns, 27 October, was ignored by the USSR. The direct economic effects of continued delay will not be felt until the existing trade agreement lapses at the end of December. Left-wing elements in the Agrarian party, reportedly supported by President Kekkonen, are seeking to bring about a reorganization of the Fagerholm cabinet in order to allay Moscow's suspicions of its allegedly "rightist" orientation.

The reluctance of the Social Democrats and Conservatives to accept a reorganization involving the sacrifice of some of their cabinet posts might force the Agrarians to form a completely new government, possibly including the Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL).

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