


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26 May 1958



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
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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26 MAY 1958

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Soviet test vehicle launching on 24 May; for Guided Missile Intelligence Committee statement see Page 1.

Khrushchev considered guiding force behind Soviet attacks on Yugoslavia.


**II. ASIA-AFRICA**

Lebanon - Government forces make gains in new military attacks against opposition. Chamoun may be ready to drop second-term ambitions.

Nasir planning to reduce power of some Syrian officials.

Indonesia - Djakarta forces may land near dissident capital of Menado shortly. Sukarno considering possible cabinet changes.

French-Tunisian armed clashes lead to new demands that French withdraw to Bizerte. Morocco likely to step up its demands for French withdrawal.



**III. THE WEST**

⑦ Showdown on General de Gaulle's return to power expected soon.



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 May 1958

## DAILY BRIEF

*S/RAB*

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet missile launching: The USSR launched a probable ICBM test vehicle on the Tyura Tam missile test range at 1031 GMT (0631 EDT) on 24 May. [redacted]

*No*

the vehicle reached the vicinity of the impact area on Kamchatka Peninsula. The last previous ICBM test vehicle firing occurred on 4 April 1958. For statement by Guided Missile Intelligence Committee, see Page 1. [redacted] (Page 1)

*o/s*

Bloc-Yugoslav dispute: The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow has expressed the opinion that current Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia was initiated by Khrushchev. He rejects the idea that Khrushchev is subject to pressure either from within the Soviet leadership or from without. Ambassador Thompson accepts this appraisal, with the reservation that the Chinese Communists may have influenced Khrushchev's policy toward Yugoslavia. Peiping's summary of the Chinese Communist party congress, which ended on 23 May, endorses Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia and expressly cites Khrushchev's leadership. Khrushchev's routine birthday greetings to Tito, while conciliatory in language, do not suggest any Soviet concessions. [redacted] (Page 2)

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*No*

Lebanon: Following a showdown between President Chamoun and army commander General Shihab, government

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forces have launched a military offensive and have taken Halba and Balabakk. Fighting broke out in Sidon on 25 May. A UAR news agency quotes the first military communiqué from an alleged "Free Lebanese Government." President Chamoun may be ready to abandon his ambitions for a second term, but he is determined to complete his present term of office. Foreign Minister Malik will present Lebanon's charges of UAR intervention to the UN Security Council on 27 May. [redacted] (Page 3) (Map)

*OK*  
United Arab Republic: Nasir may soon begin a series of moves aimed at reducing the authority of Syrian Vice President Hawrani and other officials in the Syrian sector of the UAR who have shown signs of independence from Cairo. Nasir will seek to avoid any dramatic showdown, and will probably maneuver to bring about changes gradually by undercutting Hawrani's support and increasing the power of Interior Minister Sarraj. [redacted] (Page 5)

*OK*  
\*Indonesia: Central government paratroop and amphibious landings near the dissident capital of Menado appear to be imminent. In Djakarta, President Sukarno is considering several plans for reorganizing the cabinet. He appears likely to accept a plan calling for the dropping of some leftists and the retention of Djuanda as prime minister. [redacted] (Page 6)

*ND*  
\*Tunisia-Morocco: The clash between French and Tunisian military units, which began at Remada on 24 May, has continued. French air force units from Algeria reportedly bombed Tunisian positions on 25 May. French diplomatic officials have apparently accepted President Bourguiba's demand that France promise to withdraw its forces to Bizerte, but there is some doubt that local French military leaders in Tunisia will comply. Morocco is likely to continue pressing for immediate withdrawal of French troops, especially from eastern Morocco. [redacted] (Page 8) (Map)

26 May 58

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

## III. THE WEST

*Ns*

\*France: The conflict between civil and military authority in France will probably come to a head today in the special session of the National Assembly. The French government probably can no longer try to maintain the fiction that Paris controls the situation, and may be forced to decide that there is no alternative but to request General de Gaulle to come to power. [redacted]

[redacted] General Salan has told an emissary from Pflimlin that unless the premier resigns on 26 May, the military in Algeria will move against France. The dissidents claim support would come from the French army in Germany and from armored units near Paris. Admiral Auboyneau, commander of the Mediterranean fleet, on 25 May announced his support for the Algerian military. The French Communist party has ordered its members to be ready for a general strike call. [redacted]  
(Page 9)

26 May 58

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Soviet Test ICBM Firing on 24 May 1958

At 0631 EDT (1031 GMT) the USSR launched a vehicle on the Tyura Tam missile test range. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the missile was probably an ICBM test vehicle which reached the vicinity of the impact area.

The Tyura Tam guided missile range has been active on practically every day since 17 May in practice sessions preparatory to a launching attempt. Indication of the imminence of an operation was strengthened by the presence at Tyura Tam range head of three specific indicator type aircraft.

The operation continued through a normal countdown sequence with the hourly alerts indicating some slight fluctuations in time lost and gained. The entire operation reached zero time at 1031 GMT, a net gain in countdown time of about one-half hour or a seven and one-half hour countdown.

Evidence is firm that a launching occurred, that the vehicle reached the Kamchatka area, and that it probably was an ICBM test vehicle. [REDACTED]

The previous ICBM test vehicle firing was on 4 April 1958. [REDACTED]

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Bloc Dispute With Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow has told diplomatic colleagues that he does not believe there has been conflict within the Soviet hierarchy over policy toward Yugoslavia. In his opinion, this policy was inaugurated by Khrushchev personally and has been fully backed by the party presidium. He rejected the idea that Khrushchev is subject to pressure either from within the Soviet leadership or from without--the latter apparently referring to Communist China.


Ambassador Thompson supports this appraisal, with the reservation that he thinks the Chinese Communist position may have influenced Khrushchev's Yugoslav policy.

Possibly to suppress speculation that the Chinese were backing Stalinist opponents of Khrushchev on the issue of Yugoslav revisionism, Peiping has pointedly endorsed the role of Khrushchev personally. In its summary of the proceedings of the Chinese Communist party congress held between 5 May and 23 May, Peiping approved as "necessary and correct" the steps taken toward Yugoslavia since 1954 by the Soviet party central committee "headed by N. S. Khrushchev."

The proceedings at the congress show no retreat from the blanket condemnation of the Yugoslav party program expressed in Peiping's 5 May blast at Belgrade. On 10 May, however, the Chinese Communist foreign minister expressed the opinion that government-to-government relations would not suffer as in 1948.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

### The Situation in Lebanon

Lebanese President Chamoun's "ultimatum" to Army Chief of Staff Shihab on 23 May succeeded in evoking from Shihab a plan for more decisive military action against insurgent forces in Lebanon. Shihab's subsequent regrouping and redeployment of Lebanese security forces, including the formation of a mobile reserve, apparently have resulted in substantial gains for the government. Unconfirmed reports indicate that government forces have recaptured Balabakk and gained full control in Halba, and that insurgents are fleeing across the Syrian border. Street fighting which erupted in Sidon on 25 May has ended in a truce. The army's plan also involves conclusive operations in Tripoli where, [redacted] [redacted] explosions destroyed the city's water tanks on 24 May. [redacted]

The already tenuous unity of the government, however, is threatened by an internal crisis. A compromise proposal that Chamoun abandon his attempt to obtain constitutional changes permitting a second term for himself has been presented by Parliamentary Deputy Raymond Edde.

The cabinet reportedly met in emergency session late on 25 May to consider the proposal, and several ministers are believed to have threatened to resign if Chamoun did not accept the proposal. Two Sunni Moslem ministers had previously resigned. [redacted]


Foreign Minister Malik will present Lebanon's complaint regarding United Arab Republic intervention in the Lebanese rebellion to the United Nations Security Council on 27 May.

[redacted] A canvass of the six nonpermanent members of the council [redacted] reported on 21 May revealed that although all were prepared to support Lebanon

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if it submitted "a strong complaint," most preferred at that time to avoid a meeting unless "absolutely necessary." The [redacted] member feared that discussion of the Lebanese complaint would stir up debate on other subjects such as Egypt's interference in Yemen and Algeria. [redacted]



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Nasir Showdown With Vice President Hawrani  
May Be Imminent

UAR President Nasir may be readying for a showdown with Vice President Akram Hawrani and other Syrians in the UAR cabinet who have displayed too much independence of the Cairo regime. Nasir has said that he became "increasingly hostile" toward Hawrani during their recent trip to the USSR, according to a usually reliable source. He plans to visit Damascus soon, after which he might take action to curb the influence of Hawrani and others.

The conflict between Hawrani's social revolutionary ideas and Nasir's authoritarian, opportunistic approach to solving the problems of the Syrian-Egyptian union has become increasingly apparent. Nasir's order for the abolition of political groupings, including Hawrani's powerful Baath party, in order to insure his own freedom of movement in the UAR's northern region has met covert resistance from the Syrian leader. Also, Hawrani's persistent and open championing of an early move to confiscate much of the holdings of large landowners has violated Nasir's sense of political timing.

The problem of putting checkreins on Syria's most effective politician is a delicate one, and Nasir would probably avoid giving the impression of an open break. If Nasir decides that Hawrani and other Syrians must be inactivated, however, he may either attack and eliminate Hawrani's supporters or allow Syrian Minister of the Interior Sarraj to increase his already extensive authority to such an extent that Hawrani will be effectively barred from exerting any influence on Syrian affairs. Sarraj is not popular among the majority of Syrians, but the strength of his control over the security forces appears sufficient to suppress any countermove on the part of Hawrani's followers.

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~~SECRET~~Situation in Indonesia

The Indonesian Army is making final plans for its assault on the dissident capital of Manado. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
both paratroops and amphibious forces will be used and that small marine detachments and intelligence agents have already infiltrated the area to prepare for the landings. [REDACTED] Manado to fall within three days of the attack.

[REDACTED]

In Djakarta, President Sukarno is considering three plans for cabinet reorganization, although he will make no changes until after the defeat of the North Celebes dissidents. [REDACTED] Sukarno will probably choose to reshuffle the Djuanda cabinet, ousting the leftists, since this choice would evoke less opposition than any other. The army, under Chief of Staff General Nasution, is continuing to press for a complete cabinet change, postponement of the 1959 general elections, and increased power for the executive branch of the government. Although Nasution's plan probably would permit a settlement of the dissident problem, it would also invite considerable Communist opposition which non-army elements, including President Sukarno, may fear they could not handle. Communist party Secretary General Aidit has already stated, in a campaign speech for regional elections in Borneo, that postponement of general elections would be a "sin against the people."

In Central Sumatra, reconstruction problems are besetting central government administrators. Colonel Jani, war administrator for the area, told the assistant American army attaché that trouble can be expected if the government "does not move and quit talking." Currently the problems are


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mainly those of passive resistance to occupation officials and lack of local civil servants who fled with or were intimidated by the dissidents. It is estimated, however, that the equivalent of four dissident battalions are still in North and Central Sumatra capable of waging guerrilla warfare indefinitely. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Sumatran regionalism is now stronger than before the revolt, and the basic objections to the Djakarta regime remain. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Pressure Mounts in Tunisia and Morocco for Evacuation  
Of French Troops

The fighting which broke out on 24 May between French and Tunisian military units at Remada in remote southern Tunisia--the second clash within three days--seems certain to evoke new Tunisian demands for the immediate total evacuation of the 22,000 French troops from the country. President Bourguiba indicated last month that he might revoke the concessions made to the Anglo-American good offices mission that he would negotiate a new arrangement for the continued use by France of the base at Bizerte. Bourguiba is reported to have threatened to protest to the UN Security Council if the French do not promise to regroup their forces at Bizerte, and French diplomatic officials have apparently acceded to his request. There is some doubt, however, that French military leaders in Tunisia will comply.

The 24 May clash, in which five French soldiers were killed and 14 wounded, was precipitated by the efforts of the French units at Remada--which on 18 May surrounded two Tunisian roadblocks some 25 miles outside their base--to retain control of certain caravan routes which may be used to transport arms into Algeria. The Tunisian Government claims that the French Air Force bombed and strafed Tunisian positions the morning of 25 May. The same day, France lodged a formal protest with the Tunisian chargé in Paris, Bourguiba extended the state of emergency existing in the border provinces to include all of Tunisia, and anti-French demonstrations were held at Bizerte and Mateur.

The Remada incident probably will also result in new pressure in Morocco for the evacuation of French troops there, particularly those in eastern Morocco which the Balafrej government on 14 and 20 May urgently requested Paris to withdraw. French Foreign Minister Pleven told American Embassy officials in Paris on 23 May that the desired withdrawal was "not possible under present circumstances." After the establishment of the Algiers Committee of Public Safety on 13 May, a Moroccan Foreign Ministry official conferred with officials in Tunisia. He informed the American Embassy in Rabat that he had been impressed by the identity of views between his government and that of Tunisia.

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### III. THE WEST

#### The French Crisis (as of 0200 hours)

The 26 May special session of the National Assembly will probably bring to a head the conflict between the civil and military authority in France. The government in the next few days may be forced to choose between risking widespread civil unrest and setting the stage for an orderly takeover by De Gaulle. It seems unlikely that Pflimlin's efforts to treat the Corsican and Algerian situations separately can succeed, and any steps he might take against "sedition" in Corsica will risk provoking an open split in the military in France or even its complete alienation. There is a strong possibility that Gaullist supporters in France and Algeria might use the special session to make an all-out bid for General de Gaulle's return, particularly since parliamentary support for Pflimlin is wavering.

[redacted] General Salan told Pflimlin's emissary that unless the premier resigned on 26 May, airborne troops would launch an attack on Paris. He claimed that they would be supported by French army units in Germany and two armored units outside Paris, and that French security forces have been won over to the side of the Algerian junta. The admiral of the Mediterranean fleet has announced that he fully supports the action of the army in Algeria.

Public sentiment in favor of the general is apparently increasing. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Communist Party has told its militants to be ready for a general strike. A number of observers now believe that while Communist and Socialist militants may offer some strong resistance initially, their ability to get broad support from the rank-and-file of either party appears to be limited. [redacted]

[redacted]

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