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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Hungary-Yugoslavia-USSR: The condemnation of Soviet Marxism by Eastern Europe's foremost living Marxist philosopher will embarrass the Hungarian regime and may become another issue in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

The Yugoslav party daily Borba published an interview with Gyorgy Lukacs in its 29 December and 1-2 January editions. Hungary's Lukacs blasted the Soviets for continuing distortions of Marxism and called for a "Marxist renewal" in all the Socialist countries. He also said that French and Italian workers would not want to live in the Soviets' undemocratic system. Lukacs praised Tito's self-management system--anathema to the Soviets--as a contribution to a resurgence of the basic idea of a workers' democracy. The interview appeared just after the Soviets published their Lenin Theses, which contained criticism of the Yugoslav system.

The 85-year-old Lukacs has long been known as an anti-Stalinist, but this is the first time he has so openly linked current Soviet problems to Stalinist errors. Although he holds no official positions and has often been in trouble in the past, he is a party member, and his attacks will be an embarrassment to party chief Kadar. The Kadar regime may choose to ignore the affair publicly, but it might also have to face Soviet displeasure.

Yugoslav officials will also be concerned about the interview. While they do not disagree with Lukacs, they do not want Hungary's cautious liberalization jeopardized by tighter Soviet controls. When Yugoslav Foreign Minister Tepavac arrives in Budapest on 12 January, he may well deny that the interview had official sanction. [REDACTED]

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
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