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## 12 February 1963

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DAILY BRIEF

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Irag: The new Iraqi regime is consolidating its control, crushing pockets of Communist resistance in the army and throughout the country.
all ministries are operating normally ex-
cept for the Defense Ministry, where "numerous per-
sonnel changes are being made." Four of Qasim's
strongest military supporters, two brigadiers and
two colonels, have been executed.

The Iraqi coup has fanned instability in Syria. New demonstrations calling for "Arab unity" have occurred. Some Syrian Communists have been reported heading for Iraq to support pro-Communist elements therey

In Kuwait, demonstrations celebrating the coup took on a pro-Nasir tone.

The UAR is treating the new Iraqi regime cautiously. Cairo fears that even mention of Arab union by the UAR might push the regime toward the antiNasir Arab states.

Moscow's prompt recognition of the new Iraqi regime is probably the first of a number of efforts to preserve as much as possible of the highly favored position the USSR enjoyed when Qasim was in power. Moscow built up good relations with Qasim largely by providing modern military equipment and by extending large industrial credits. As a demonstration of friendship toward the new regime, the Soviets may offer to grant new credits or to undertake further de-


