


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
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
Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

Japan: The Sato government may be made more cautious on Vietnam by new demonstrations. (Page 3)

Thailand: Army may postpone operations against guerrillas in north after costly setbacks. (Page 4)



3.3(h)(2)

Poland: New demonstrations (Page 8)



3.3(h)(2)

Panama: Impeachment voted (Page 8)

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
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
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*Vietnam:

North Vietnam: Hanoi's attitude toward a negotiated settlement is firm and uncompromising in the wake of the Tet offensive, according to soundings taken by the French and Austrians.



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3.3(h)(2)

On the military front, unusual North Vietnamese flight activity in recent days may signal Communist air operations over Laos or northern South Vietnam. There are indications that these missions may include an IL-28 bombing raid, a bombing or supply mission by AN-2 and IL-14 transports, and perhaps MIG attacks against allied aircraft.


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At the same time, the Communists are improving their air defenses over wide areas of North and South Vietnam. Hanoi has recently broadened its surface-to-air missile coverage of key areas in north-central and southern North Vietnam.

[redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

South Vietnam: [redacted]

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[redacted] Communist forces may be preparing for another round of coordinated attacks in key areas of the country, possibly as soon as 15 March.

Military activity yesterday was light. [redacted]

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15 Mar 68


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Japan: The possibility of intensified anti-US demonstrations may make the Sato government more cautious in handling problems related to Vietnam.

The Japanese Communist Party has issued an appeal to "all democratic organizations and people" to "crush" US activities in Japan and Okinawa related to the war and to strengthen support for the Vietnamese Communists. The Communists call for intensified action against port calls by US nuclear-powered vessels, against the stationing of B-52s on Okinawa and against the manufacture and transport of goods in support of South Vietnam.

The wide dissemination given the appeal suggests something more than a propaganda gambit and may presage a significant step-up in leftist demonstrations. The Communists probably are encouraged by the unusual degree of solidarity among opposition parties which produced several setbacks for the Sato government in the current Diet session. The Communists hope to attract support from nonleftist elements who are increasingly concerned about US policies.



3.3(h)(2)

Sato has already responded to Okinawan pressures over the B-52 issue by agreeing to send a commission to hold open meetings on the base problem. Recent demonstrations by ultraleftist students against the establishment of a US field hospital in Tokyo apparently have led to the indefinite postponement of its scheduled opening this month.

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
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Thailand: Area of Insurgent Activity



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Thailand: The army may temporarily drop its sweep operations against Communist-led guerrillas in the north.

Senior army leaders have admitted to US officials that little progress has been made against insurgent bands in Nan Province, and that they are reluctant to continue operations in the face of mounting government casualties. They also acknowledge that the army's effort to deny the guerrillas a popular base by forcefully relocating tribesmen and destroying villages has increased tribal tensions, and could open the way for further Communist gains.

The government is now seeking new approaches to the security problem in the north. Thai troops in the area will receive US Special Forces training, and will be given additional helicopters to ease their severe mobility and logistical problems. In addition, Bangkok plans to develop a hill tribe security force and to increase assistance to tribal refugees. Thai officials are also trying to persuade commanders of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars to settle their forces in the affected area and keep the lid on for the time being.

Bangkok's reappraisal is clearly overdue and these measures, if implemented, should contribute to its ability to deal with the problem.

A more lasting solution to the Communist threat in the north will, of course, require a comprehensive program of economic and social assistance by the government to bridge the gap with the tribal people. []

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

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
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



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NOTES

Poland: New street demonstrations took place yesterday in Poznan and Lodz. Warsaw was quiet but tense. The party has called for "exemplary punishment" of the instigators of the riots, and demanded the purge of "Zionist elements." At the same time, at least one of the numerous resolutions setting out student grievances will reportedly be transmitted by school authorities to the government, which could use the occasion to open a dialogue with the students.

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*Panama: In a stormy session last night the National Assembly voted, 30 to 0, to impeach President Robles, and subsequently scheduled the impeachment trial for 24 March. Government deputies walked out of the assembly hall after refusing to vote. The opposition-controlled legislature did not exercise the judicial right to suspend Robles during the trial, and action to remove him is likely to be deferred until the expected verdict of guilty is reached, probably on 27 or 28 March.

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15 Mar 68

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 14 March 1968 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

SNIE 51-68 "Insurgency in Burma"

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15 Mar 68

9

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