

~~Top Secret~~



3.5(c)



FILES



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

~~Top Secret~~



c 214

3.5(c)

17 February 1968

~~Top Secret~~



3.5(c)


The *CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN* is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.



3.5(c)

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

3.5(c)

[redacted]
17 February 1968

3.5(c)

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

[redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

West Berlin: A student rally Sunday could lead to violence. (Page 6)

[redacted]

3.3(h)(2)


Panama: Struggle to control election machinery dims outlook for peaceful election. (Page 8)

[redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

3.5(c)



69634 2-68 CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Vietnam: North Vietnamese gunners shelled allied strongpoints from Khe Sanh eastward along the length of the Demilitarized Zone on 15-16 February. The heaviest barrage came at the Khe Sanh base, where two US Marines were killed and 28 were wounded.

In the eastern section of the Demilitarized Zone enemy tanks were sighted approximately five miles north of Con Thien. This is the first time tanks have been seen in this sector. At last report airstrikes had been called in, but there is no word on the results.

[redacted]
[redacted] the North Vietnamese may be preparing large-scale attacks in the Quang Tri city area. [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] It now appears almost certain that the North Vietnamese 803rd Regiment has crossed the Cua Viet River and joined the 812th north and east of Quang Tri city.

Ground action elsewhere was generally light on 15-16 February. Allied forces are still meeting stubborn enemy resistance in the Hue Citadel, however, and several small but violent skirmishes broke out along the northern coast.

There have been a number of low-level reports in recent days suggesting that new Communist attacks on major urban areas may be imminent. Reports like these are undoubtedly intended to alarm the civilian population and keep allied forces off balance. Nevertheless, the disposition of Communist forces does pose a serious problem to a number of cities and towns throughout the country.

(continued)

17 Feb 68

1

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Viet Cong propaganda has picked up the theme of several recent Hanoi broadcasts and seems to be stressing the longer term effects of the Tet offensive. Communiqués from several Communist regional commands in the South take the line that the offensive has laid the groundwork for more intensive fighting ahead. The propaganda also points out that further "successes" will be costly and that continuing sacrifices and hardships are necessary before final victory. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

17 Feb 68

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)




17 Feb 68

3

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~




3.3(h)(2)

17 Feb 68

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.3(h)(2)

17 Feb 68

5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

West Berlin: An outdoor rally planned this Sunday by organizers of the anti-Vietnam Congress could well lead to violence.

Congress sponsors, including the radical Socialist German Student Federation, appear determined to test the newly expressed resolve of authorities in Bonn and Berlin to keep student unrest in bounds. Mayor Schuetz appears determined not to back down or temporize, lest he suffer the fate of his predecessor, who quit last fall after failing to cope with the growing student problem.

Principal target for the Sunday demonstration is the US headquarters complex in the southwest part of the city. Rally leader Rudi Dutschke has urged participants to wear raincoats and protective headgear and to use flagstaffs and placards as weapons against the police. Although the demonstrators may number more than 5,000, the police should be able to prevent the full impact of the demonstration from reaching the headquarters area. [REDACTED])

3.5(c)

17 Feb 68


6

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)



17 Feb 68

7

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Panama: A struggle for control of the election machinery is dimming the prospects for a peaceful election on 12 May.

Government candidate Samudio, faced with a likely defeat at the polls by National Union candidate Arnulfo Arias, appears determined either to control the electoral process at any cost or to postpone the elections. The struggle is centered on authority within the key electoral tribunal, which now favors Arias.

Samudio scored a tactical victory in getting National Guard Commandant Vallarino to reinstall a Samudio supporter as head of the tribunal's documentation office. For their part, Arias' followers are now considering a special session of the National Assembly to impeach President Robles for electoral misconduct. Arias says he hopes to work out a legal solution. He warns that if the government moves to postpone the elections he will use his majority in the assembly to replace Robles with First Vice President Del Valle, an Arias supporter.

The current conflict could erupt into violence and put Vallarino in a difficult position. He has tried to remain neutral, but he has been under pressure within and outside the Guard to support Samudio. Violence in the streets could force Vallarino to side with the government or, as a last resort, intervene and take over himself.


3.5(c)

17 Feb 68

8

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)



3.3(h)(2)

17 Feb 68

9

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~Top Secret~~

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516



~~Top Secret~~

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516