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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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
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\* South Vietnam: The widely anticipated "second phase" of the Communist offensive against urban areas of South Vietnam has still not materialized.

The past weekend actually saw a general easing of enemy pressure around cities and towns in some areas of South Vietnam, although new attacks were reported against two provincial capitals and two allied airfields in the delta.

Except for a damaging rocket attack against Bien Hoa Air Base on 10 February and continued enemy resistance to allied clearing operations in Cholon, the Saigon area remained relatively quiet over the weekend, with life in the capital gradually returning to normal. [REDACTED]

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In the northern provinces, the US Marine combat base at Khe Sanh came under heavy artillery, rocket, and mortar fire on 10 and 11 February, although no accompanying North Vietnamese ground probes were reported. While no major new fighting erupted elsewhere in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) - northern Quang Tri Province area, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
the shipment of large quantities of heavy caliber ammunition--up to 152 mm--to points just north of the DMZ within the past week. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] 18 truckloads of 130 mm. ammunition were delivered on 8 February. [redacted]

[redacted] the NVA 320th and 324 "B" divisions, the 270th Independent Regiment, and the 27th Independent Battalion have revealed preparations for attacks against allied positions in the north-central DMZ area, in the northeastern coastal quadrant of Quang Tri Province, and in the Quang Tri city area.

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In Hue, newly reinforced South Vietnamese troops this weekend continued their efforts to dislodge stubbornly resisting enemy forces from the Citadel area. Late press reports indicate that a 400-man US Marine amphibious assault force has also joined the fray in a flanking maneuver designed to trap Communist elements holding out in the northern part of the city.

Elsewhere in I Corps, allied ground and air operations appear to have broken up a major concentration of enemy units threatening Da Nang from the south. These forces, spearheaded by the NVA 2nd Division, were last reported in a withdrawal to the southwest.

The highland and coastal provinces of central Vietnam reported no significant new enemy initiatives over the weekend, but sizable Communist forces continued to maneuver in the vicinity of a number of provincial and district capitals.

Liberation Front spokesmen continue to give the impression that they intend to establish unilaterally a coalition government in opposition to Saigon. There is still no indication, however, that they have plans to do so immediately.

In discussions on 8 and 9 February, the Liberation Front representative in Phnom Penh, Nguyen Van Hien, said that the creation of a "provisional government" was now a Front objective, but that the timing of its establishment would be decided "in consultation with other revolutionary forces and in the light of future developments."

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South Korea: President Pak Chong-hui is expected to press for new **US** commitments to Seoul in his meetings with **US** presidential envoy Cyrus R. Vance.

Pak primarily seeks to have the Mutual Defense Treaty amended to guarantee immediate **US** assistance in the event of all-out North Korean attack and to assure a similar response to such Communist intrusions as last month's presidential assassination attempt. Seoul believes the treaty's stipulation that "constitutional processes" must precede **US** intervention might delay or even bar timely **US** assistance.

Pak probably would also like to gain--but not necessarily use--the power to withdraw South Korean troops from UN command operational control, to recall his troops from Vietnam, and to mount attacks on North Korea. Some of these points, which are reported to have been considered in a recent National Assembly session, may come up in the course of Pak's negotiations.

In the past two days the government has stressed the "military aid is not enough" theme through the press and has permitted several small protest rallies and demonstrations to take place. [REDACTED]

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India: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi may move to impose direct rule from New Delhi on volatile West Bengal to avoid a scheduled confidence vote in the state assembly. The Congress Party dominates the state coalition government, but a growing dissident group, with which Mrs. Gandhi shares dislike for West Bengal party boss Atulya Ghosh, could undermine the coalition's narrow majority. Although New Delhi has long sought to avoid direct rule in West Bengal, Mrs. Gandhi may prefer it to either a less satisfactory new non-Communist coalition or a return to power of the Communist-dominated United Front.

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