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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Central Intelligence Bulletin



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
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#### \*Vietnam:

South Vietnam: A widespread, coordinated offensive by enemy forces in the northern part of South Vietnam seems imminent.	
Action so far has been confined to probes and harassment against Khe Sanh, but references to ''N-Day'' have appeared with frequency	3.3( <u>h)</u> (2)
"N-Day" is believed to be the Vietnamese equivalent of "D-Day" and in the past has been used to mark the initiation of Communist offensive operations, particularly in the Demilitarized Zone.	
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Sporadic shellings of allied installations in areas	
where the enemy threat appears greatest have occurred in the past few days and could be the prelude to a wider offensive. Unless the Communists are prepared, however, to carry out major violations of their own cease-fire which is scheduled to begin today at noon (EST), the major thrust will be postponed until after the Lunar New Year period ends on 2 February.	
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26 Jan 68 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

North Vietnam: Hanoi may establish a limited jet fighter capability in the southern part of North Vietnam.

On 24 January US fighters intercepted two MIG-21s as they were attempting to land at Vinh. The field at Vinh was not operable as of 5 January.

It is possible that the runway at Vinh has been repaired in the past three weeks. If Hanoi elects to reestablish Vinh Airfield only limited facilities would be required since Soviet-built MIG fighters are capable of operating from primitive airstrips. No maintenance or hangar facilities would be required if the field were used only as an occasional refueling and rearming station.

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
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
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### THE SUEZ CANAL AREA



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Egypt: Egyptian operations, aimed at eventually releasing the 15 cargo ships trapped in the Suez Canal since last June, are scheduled to begin tomorrow.

An initial survey, using echo-sounding equipment along the entire canal, is expected to take about a week. After this the Egyptians plan to send divers down to inspect sunken obstacles south of Ismailia. It may take over two months actually to remove the trapped ships

Although Egypt has maintained that Israel's agreement was not necessary in order to begin the removal work and the Egyptians reject the idea of any direct contact,

The issue may not be completely resolved, however, and the situation along the canal is still dangerous. Egypt apparently plans to carry out some exploratory work in the northern section of the canal, while Israel's "consent" appears to relate only to activities in the southern portion. Although Israel might hesitate to use force to stop useful, nonmilitary activities in the canal, some kind of military clash is possible.

Even if the survey operation goes without incident, no significant improvement in the atmosphere is likely, and the canal probably will remain closed to commercial traffic for some time.

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#### NOTE

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\*Brazil: The Brazilian military, at least in the vital southern part of the country, reportedly are on alert. The reason for this is not clear but it could reflect an attempt to pressure President Costa E Silva to crack down on politicians who are attempting to stir up the populace, particularly the fiery Carlos Lacerda. Some hard line military men-mainly Army colonels-are known to be dissatisfied with Costa E Silva's lack of firm leadership and tolerance of vocal political opposition, but there has been no previous indication that they have had widespread military backing.

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