

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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*South Vietnam: The Communists are continuing to prepare for widespread offensive operations in the two northernmost provinces.

The opening round of the expected operations came on 19 January with the North Vietnamese probes against Khe Sanh. Although no major fighting was reported in this sector on 23 January, elements of two North Vietnamese divisions, the 325 "C" and the 304th, are maintaining pressure on the Marine defenses.

In the central and eastern parts of northern Quang Tri Province, two North Vietnamese divisions, the 324"B" and possibly the 320th, pose the threat of imminent large-scale ground and artillery attacks against allied strongpoints stretching from the Demilitarized Zone as far south as Quang Tri City.

A North Vietnamese Army deserter who turned himself in at Khe Sanh on 20 January has indicated that his parent unit, the 325"C" Division, has been ordered to overrun every US base between the Laotian border and Con Thien before the Tet holidays at the end of January. The deserter.

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further stated that he had been told that the North Vietnamese troops would go on to ''liberate'' Quang Tri Province, thereby winning a powerful negotiating position for the Communists. The Quang Tri campaign was so important, he claimed, that it was being controlled directly by the North Vietnamese Defense Ministry in Hanoi.

While this schedule seems highly optimistic, there is evidence in communications intelligence that enemy operations in northern I Corps are indeed being closely monitored from Hanoi, as the deserter indicated. On 20 January, the North Vietnamese Army high command in Hanoi was detected passing an unusually heavy volume of messages to both the Tri-Thien-Hue Military

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Region and the major new Communist military headquarters located northwest of Khe Sanh in Laos. This message activity coincided with the initial North Vietnamese ground probes and artillery attacks in the Khe Sanh area and with the southward deployment of the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region headquarters into a position just southeast of the allied coastal enclave of Hue-Phu Bai.


In addition, in the Quang Nam - Quang Tin province area, recent maneuvering by elements of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division and by headquarters elements of the Communist's Military Region 5 command has increased the threat to other allied coastal positions ranging from Da Nang to Tam Ky.

In response to these moves, an additional US Marine battalion has been sent to reinforce the Khe Sanh garrison. Three battalions of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division have been shifted to Phu Bai from their former base camp headquarters at An Khe in Binh Dinh Province. Two of these US Army battalions appear to have been subsequently shifted to Quang Tri Province, where on 23 January, they killed 52 Communists southeast of Quang Tri City.

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Dominican Republic: There are threats of increased violence which may include US citizens as targets.

Speaking to a labor group on 20 January, leaders of the Marxist-Leninist Dominican Popular Movement reportedly said the party has adopted a political line of violence similar to that of the Guatemalan revolutionaries. The spokesmen stressed that their party must strike back against 'repression,' and made it clear that US citizens would be included.

The secretary general of the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party has issued an implied warning that the left will have no recourse but to employ counterterrorism if acts of violence allegedly directed by the right at former "constitutionalists" continue.

Some increase in violence has been apparent during the past few months, but only a few incidents appear to have political overtones and there is no evidence of a calculated campaign of violence by the right or left. Acts of terrorism by the left, however, probably would be met by ruthless counterterrorism from the right.

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*Denmark: The marked shift to the center in yesterday's national elections is expected to lead to the formation of Denmark's first non-Socialist government in almost 15 years.

The biggest losers were Prime Minister Krag's Social Democrats and the parties on the left. The most spectacular gains were made by the Radical Liberals-a party with pacifist inclinations—who more than doubled their representation by winning 28 seats in the 179-member parliament. This small party now holds the balance of power, and there is a strong possibility that it will join with the larger Conservative and Moderate Liberal parties to form a majority government.

Despite its majority position, such a government would not hold out the hope for increased stability or a firmer commitment to NATO and defense policies generally. Faced with Denmark's economic problems, all parties are prepared to slash further the already inadequate defense budget. In addition, the question of Denmark's continued membership in NATO after 1969 could become a contentious issue for the coalition partners since the Radical Liberals favor a referendum on this question.

The election outcome apparently was not greatly influenced by the furor which developed over the crash of a nuclear-armed US bomber in Greenland. The continuing public outcry over this incident, however, is almost certain to lead to pressures on the new government to monitor and control more effectively US activities in Greenland. Copenhagen may seek formal assurances that the US will comply with Denmark's policy of not allowing nuclear weapons on its soil or flights of nuclear-armed aircraft over its territory.

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Venezuela-USSR: Colombia's recent resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR has increased the pressure on Venezuela to follow suit.

The leading Caracas newspaper claims that President Leoni would like to take similar action before his term ends early next year. Many political leaders, including those of the major opposition parties, are on record as favoring a resumption of relations, which were broken in June 1952 following a diplomatic incident fabricated by Venezuela.

Venezuela now has diplomatic relations with Poland, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, and has accepted commercial missions from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. For some time Venezuela has been considering expanding its trade relations with the Soviet Union, and a commercial delegation will visit Moscow this spring.

Some government officials would prefer postponing diplomatic action until the Soviets demonstrate pressure on Castro to cease his intervention in Venezuelan affairs. The US Embassy in Caracas comments, however, that 'as euphoria develops in the absence of any significant insurgency and as domestic campaign pressures grow, Venezuelan resistance to relations obviously diminishes. The Colombian initiative adds to this pressure.'

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
NOTES

USSR: The leadership will not be ready to make decisions on a number of pending questions connected with US-Soviet relations for a month to six weeks. Ambassador Dobrynin told Ambassador Thompson in Moscow last week that ratification of the US-Soviet consular agreement and renewal of the cultural exchange agreement would probably not have top-level approval before then. Dobrynin also indicated that the central committee meeting thought to have been scheduled for this month would not take place for at least another four to six weeks. These revelations suggest that the deliberations now going on in the Politburo are weighty and difficult and that the central committee meeting will await their outcome.

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India: Unrest is mounting again in Tamil-speaking south India over charges that recent legislation does not adequately protect the rights of linguistic minorities. Major disturbances are expected within the next few days in Madras, which three years ago was torn by extensive anti-Hindi rioting. Students have already rioted in Bangalore, the capital of neighboring Mysore state, and sporadic demonstrations are occurring in some areas of Andhra Pradesh. "Anti-Hindi martyrs day," commemorating the death of students in similar riots on 25 January 1965, will be especially touchy.

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