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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

3.5(c)



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14 November 1967

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
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3.5(c)

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

3.5(c)

[]
14 November 1967

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

USSR: Moscow schedules meeting to discuss possible "world Communist conference." (Page 2)

Iraq: Despite discontent, the overthrow of the regime does not seem at hand. (Page 3)


Peru: Belaunde's political prestige suffers new setbacks. (Page 4)

Rhodesia-UK: Stiffened terms (Page 5)

[] 3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

3.5(c)



3.5(c)

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14 Nov 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

*South Vietnam: Allied troops fought again with North Vietnamese regulars around Dak To in the central highlands on 12-13 November.

Communist forces in this sector appear to be operating in battalion-size units. They have been trying to ambush smaller US patrols from dug-in positions.

[redacted]

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current disposition of an estimated five North Vietnamese regiments in the vicinity of Dak To points to the possibility of new, large-scale clashes there.

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[redacted] Communists intend to broaden their offensive activity in the highlands by launching attacks in Darlac Province. Captured notes based on a combat plan prepared by an element of the North Vietnamese 33rd Regiment reveal that the regiment will try to draw allied units into good terrain for ambushes. This is to mark the opening of the regiment's "winter-spring campaign."

In southern II Corps, Communist military activity has increased, and it has been directed for the most part against vital lines of communications in an effort to erode government security in the area. On 12 November, a Communist force destroyed a bridge on strategic Route 20 some 25 miles east of Bao Lac and then ambushed a South Vietnamese reaction force sent to the scene. Simultaneously, another enemy force attacked South Vietnamese military compounds at nearby Di Linh. As a result, traffic between Bao Lac and Da Lat in Tuyen Duc Province via Route 20 has been suspended. This road has been secured by South Vietnamese forces for several months, thus denying the Communists between \$8,000 and \$16,000 a day in estimated tax booty collected at former roadblocks along the route. The recent enemy military action has also served to draw friendly forces out of southwestern Lam Dong Province where most of the tax collection points were located.

3.5(c)

[redacted] (Map)

14 Nov 67

1

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3.5(c)

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USSR: The Soviets have succeeded in scheduling a meeting of Communist representatives to discuss a "world Communist conference,"

[redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

To avoid any suggestion of an implicit anti-Chinese aspect to the meeting, the Soviets apparently have agreed that it will stay away from ideological questions. It will take up only "practical political problems" such as solidarity with North Vietnam, European security, and the Middle East situation.

Although the Soviets will probably bill the meeting as preliminary to an international Communist get-together, they are still far from getting a full-dress international conference. [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]

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the resistance of several parties, particularly the North Vietnamese who want to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet quarrel, has shown little sign of waning.

The Soviets will use the session to strengthen the appearance of unity among the majority of parties while trying to keep the Chinese on the defensive. Any subsequent meeting the Soviets may arrange is also likely to accomplish only this limited, albeit useful, purpose for Moscow. [redacted]

3.5(c)

14 Nov 67

2

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3.5(c)

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Iraq: Despite underlying discontent with the regime, its overthrow does not seem imminent.

[redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

There is no leader able to muster sufficient power to take over and none eager to inherit responsibility during the period of stalemate with Israel.

Without exception, Iraqis [redacted] would follow Nasir's lead on an Arab-Israeli settlement. Nasir apparently is still viewed as "the only Arab leader" by the man in the street. Iraqi moderates [redacted] urged the US to press for a "reasonable" Arab-Israeli solution. Otherwise, they claimed, Arab moderates would have no chance to survive the militant radicalism that would come to dominate the Arab world. [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

14 Nov 67

3

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3.5(c)

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Peru: Recent developments pose a new threat to Peru's fragile political and economic stability.

President Belaunde's political prestige received several sharp blows on 12 November. His party lost an important congressional by-election in which the extreme left made a very strong showing.

On the same day the Christian Democratic Party withdrew from the Belaunde government. The decision of the Christian Democrats to sever their four-year-old ties with the administration stems in part from disillusionment with the pace of economic and social reforms and in part from the President's irresolution in coping with the country's economic problems.

The split in the government alliance will increase public demands that Belaunde either deal decisively with the country's problems or step down.

Meanwhile, the economic outlook worsens. The country's foreign exchange reserves are almost exhausted, and the administration will soon have to choose between further devaluation and strict economic controls. Either course will provoke further demands for wage adjustments to match the rising cost of living.

In this charged atmosphere, military leaders are making contingency plans to take over the government if the situation deteriorates to the point where they believe such a step is necessary. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

14 Nov 67

4

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3.5(c)

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NOTES

Rhodesia-UK: The Rhodesians reportedly have stiffened their terms for a settlement of the two-year-old independence dispute with Britain. Last year they claimed a willingness to provide constitutional guarantees to Africans, but now are said to insist that Rhodesian whites alone will determine the future political progress of Africans. At the same time, the government has tightened racial separation and security laws. Nevertheless, both Salisbury and London have left the door open for further discussions. [redacted]

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

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14 Nov 67

5

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3.5(c)

~~Top Secret~~



~~Top Secret~~