




DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin



3.5(c)

Controlled Dissem

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

3.5(c)

Inp Secret

20.00 20.00

and the second

11.2 11.2 11.2

Ľ

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 TOP SECRET

3.5(c)


3.5(c)

2 November 1967

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

	<u>Vietnam:</u> Situation report. (Page 1)
3.3(h)(2)	
	USSR: Second ABM radar has operational capability. (Page 4)
	Panama: Four parties may bolt Robles coalition. (Page 5)
	Congo (Kinshasa): Congolese claim clash with mer- cenaries on Angola border. (Page 6)
3.3(h)(2)	<u>USSR</u> : Security tightened (Page 7)
•	Afghanistan: New prime minister (Page 7)
3.3(h)(2)	Egypt: Attitude hardens (Page 8)
	Ecuador: Continued student demonstrations (Page 8)
	TOP SECRET 3.5(c)



Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) TOP SECRET

*South Vietnam: The Communists kept up the pressure on allied positions at Loc Ninh on 2 November for the fifth consecutive day.


The assaults on Loc Ninh may be in part a diversion to the Communist build-up around Song Be and Phuoc Binh, some 30 miles to the east. Two regiments--the North Vietnamese 88th and the Viet Cong's 275th--have recently moved into the area. Ambushes and blocking positions have been set up along routes allied reaction forces would be likely to use to reinforce the Song Be -Phuoc Binh area.

The Communists may be aiming to launch a new series of regimental attacks in this area similar to those in early 1965.

					3.3(h)(2)
2 Nov 67		1]		
	TOP SE	ERET		3.5(c)	

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c)









Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)





3.3(h)(2) ·



Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c)

<u>USSR</u>: Another segment of the Soviet ABM system 3.3(h)(2) probably has achieved operational capability.

The Skrunda and Olenegorsk radars cover the northern attack corridors to European USSR and can track multiple targets for the Soviet ABM system. Some of the defensive missile launchers at Moscow will be finished next year, and the system is expected to be fully operational in 1971. Even then, its capability to defend against a sophisticated ballistic missile attack will be limited. 3.5(c)

2 Nov 67	4	
	TOP SECRET	3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C031916243.5(c)


Panama: Four of the eight parties in the government coalition seem likely to break away and form an electoral alliance with opposition leader Arnulfo Arias.

The four parties oppose President Robles' choice of Finance Minister David Samudio as head of the government ticket in the presidential election in May 1968.

3.3(h)(2)

The hopes of the rebel parties that Minister of the Presidency Ramirez might emerge as a compromise candidate have been dashed by his losses to Samudio in the election of delegates to the Liberal Party's nominating convention. The prospect of an Arias victory, however, could yet force Robles to make a last-ditch attempt to salvage his ramshackle coalition by settling on another candidate.

The intense political maneuvering has forced the canal treaty issue into the background. Unless Robles can patch up his coalition, his administration will be so weakened that it will be unlikely to expend any major effort on the treaties during its final months in office. 3.5(c)



Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 <u>TOP SECRE</u>T

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

*Congo (Kinshasa): Congolese Army units and ''mer- cenaries'' engaged in battle last night at Kisenge on the Angolan-Katangan border
This possibly
could be a first step of a mercenary ''invasion'' from
Angola which has been rumored for some time.

3.3(h)(2)

There have also been er	acoun- 3.3(h)(2)
ters between Angolan nationalists and Portugues	e author-
ities, during which the Portuguese have chased t	the rebels
over the Congolese border. It is possible that a	nother
such clash took place and, given the Congolese'	
nervous state of mind, observers assumed that t	the white 3.5(c)
men were mercenaries.	



Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c)

NOTES

3.3(h)(2)

Afghanistan: The King yesterday appointed Nur Ahmad Etemadi as prime minister to succeed Mohammad Maiwandwal who resigned because of poor health. Etemadi is considered conservative and pro-West and unlikely to initiate any major shifts in Afghan foreign or domestic affairs.

7

3.5(c)

(continued)

2 Nov 67

3.5(c)TOP SECRET

3.5(c)

Egypt: Egypt's position on acceptable terms for 3.3(h)(2) a settlement of the Middle East impasse has hardened recently. An article in the newspaper <u>Al-Ahram</u>

said the amended Indian UN draft resolution was as far as Cairo would go toward finding a political solution to the Middle East crisis. This may be in part a tactical position, but the hardened stance probably reflects Cairo's pessimism on the chances of getting an acceptable Middle East resolution.

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

*Ecuador: Student demonstrators in Guayaquil have intensified their activities in an attempt to force the resignation of Mayor Assad Bucaram. In the third day of violence there were several casualties and the headquarters of Bucaram's political party was set afire. Army tanks have been called into the city to protect the municipal palace. The central government in Quito, seemingly indifferent to Bucaram's fate, has been reluctant to get involved in the conflict but if the situation continues to deteriorate there could be serious repercussions for the national government.

8

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

2 Nov 67

TOP SECRET



Top Secret

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624

.

١