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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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*Cyprus: Nicosia continues to withhold approval of the proposals accepted by Athens and Ankara.

Presidential envoy Vance returned to Nicosia yesterday after it became apparent that the Cypriot Government was having difficulties with some details of the agreement. Before meeting with Makarios, Vance was reported to be optimistic about the final outcome, but no announcement of agreement was made at the conclusion of a four-hour talk at the presidential palace. Another meeting was convened about 2:30 AM EST today.

Makarios' objections are believed to center on the disarmament of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the retention of Greek and Turkish contingents under the London-Zurich agreements. Discussions between the representatives of the interested parties have also been held at the UN.


Ankara's eventual reaction to Makarios' actions is not yet clear. A Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman, however, reportedly said that Athens had accepted the Turkish demands and should take a lesson from the affair. This statement, although ostensibly directed at Athens, and another Turkish overflight of Cyprus yesterday are probably calculated to maintain pressure on Makarios. [redacted] 3.5(c)

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*Vietnam:

South Vietnam: The Communists are keeping up the military pressure against allied strongpoints in several areas of the country.

South Vietnamese and US units have had several sharp engagements with enemy units during the past few days in the vicinity of the Special Forces camp at Bu Dop in Phuoc Long Province. Casualties have reportedly been heavy on both sides.

Northeast of Con Thieu, Communist elements have fought several sharp, although small scale, actions with US patrols. The force involved is believed to be from the North Vietnamese 803rd Regiment which recently moved back to the Con Thien area after a period of rest and replenishment.

Farther west, the enemy is getting ready for a new series of assaults against the Special Forces camp at Khe Sanh. Communications intelligence has disclosed a possible concentration of enemy elements in Laos southwest of Khe Sanh. Enemy forces north of the outpost began to harass American patrols on 29 November.

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Greece: The Cyprus crisis may cause some realignment in the Greek domestic political scene.


Although the general public is not yet aware of the implications of the Cyprus crisis, the withdrawal of the Greek troops from the island will be regarded by many as capitulation to Ankara and will further damage the junta image. Some antijunta Greeks already believe the government mishandled the Greek-Turkish talks in September. The junta will be hard put to present its handling of later developments in a way which does not harm its standing.

Antijunta elements in the army reportedly are disgruntled over the events of recent days, and the return of the troops from the island will do little to allay the bitterness. There is no sign so far, however, that disaffected army elements are ready to move against the regime.

There reportedly is disagreement within the junta itself over the handling of the crisis, and the more fanatical members may be looking for a scapegoat for the affair. The most likely candidates so far appear to be Defense Minister Spandidakis, whom the junta may try to blame for the Ayios Theodoros - Kophinou affair, and recently appointed Foreign Minister Pipinelis, who conceivably could be charged with mishandling the Vance negotiations.

Former prime minister Karamanlis, still popular in conservative circles, has now made public his dislike for the junta. His statement has further damaged the junta.

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
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
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Singapore: Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's visit to Cambodia is intended to reemphasize Singapore's nonalignment in the wake of his recent trip to the US. Lee has appeared disturbed that his public support for American policy in Vietnam has come under fire from some members of his cabinet and the island's predominantly Chinese population.

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
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
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