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
16 May 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
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
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Angola: [Angolan leader Holden Roberto now appears willing to ally his National Front for the Liberation of Angola with its rival, the Communist-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Earlier he had resisted considerable pressure from within his own movement and from several African]

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
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Governments to form a united front. Aided by Congolese Interior Minister Kamitatu, a long-standing friend of Roberto's who is trying to mediate among the various Angolan parties in Leopoldville, Roberto now seems to have taken the initiative and is trying to get the MPLA to merge on his terms. He may not obtain a merger on this basis, but he has succeeded in putting the MPLA on the defensive.]

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If the alliance is established, it would not end the factionalism which has hampered the Angolan nationalist movement from its inception. Such a merger would, however, make it easier for some states in Africa and elsewhere to accord recognition to Roberto's "Angolan provisional government."
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Merger Negotiations Among Angolan Nationalists

Although there may be as many as twelve Angolan exile groups in Leopoldville, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) are by far the largest and most important. The FNLA, most of whose membership comes from Roberto's Bakongo tribe and its allies, claims the loyalty of all the guerrilla bands now operating in northern Angola. The MPLA, on the other hand, is primarily a mulatto organization with no known strength inside Angola. Most of its leaders were educated in Europe, where they developed ties with local Communists and acquired Marxist beliefs. As a group their caliber is superior to that of the FNLA leaders, and they seem to have ample funds from bloc sources. Up to now Roberto has adamantly refused to have anything to do with them, partly for ideological and racial reasons, but probably also because he feared that he and his associates would be displaced by the more skillful MPLA leaders.]

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To meet the MPLA threat, Roberto has three assets: his prestige as the instigator of the rebellion, his organization's identification as an African as distinct from a mulatto group, and the active or tacit support of several members of the Congolese Government. He has also received support, funds, and material aid from elsewhere in Africa, particularly from Tunisia and the Algerian rebels. He has attempted to exploit these advantages by forming an "Angolan provisional government," but the obvious dissension within the nationalist movement has kept it from being recognized by any state.]

Kamitatu, who appears to be seeking to establish a sphere of influence for himself in the lower Congo area and presumably would like to have a unified Angolan movement to work with, seems to have helped Roberto to maneuver the MPLA into the uncomfortable role of petitioner, along with other exile groups, for association with the FNLA. All these groups reportedly are to work out a plan.]

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[redacted] for cooperation with the FNLA, which would then be passed on by both Kamitatu and Roberto. The willingness of the MPLA leaders to go along with this scheme remains questionable, however. If they should decide to participate, they presumably would then try to take over the movement from within. [redacted]

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