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24 March 1961



Copy No. C 78

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Situation in the Congo

[redacted] (Hammaraskjold told Western UN delegates on 22 March that UN forces will run out of supplies if the port of Matadi is not reopened within one week. He believes that uninterrupted transit through Matadi can be assured only by the presence of a small UN force in the port area. Efforts by Hammaraskjold's personal representative, Makki Abbas, to obtain permission from the Ileo government for UN re-entry have not met with success, and unless a favorable decision can be obtained within the next few days, Hammaraskjold sees no alternative but to bring the whole question of the UN effort in the Congo once more before the Security Council. [redacted]

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[redacted] Hammaraskjold is well aware that it is unlikely the Security Council will issue more positive directives on the Congo at this time but he will ask for council action because he is "fed up with bearing full responsibility himself."

[UN troop commander General McKeown is now under orders to proceed from Leopoldville to Matadi with 200 Tunisian soldiers with the objective of taking control of warehouse and other facilities. Troops are instructed to use force only in self-defense, "if stopped and fired upon."]

Mobutu stated on 20 March that "blood would flow" if the UN attempted to retake Matadi, and he is reported to have warned Congolese officials on 22 March that it would be impossible for him to prevent Congolese troops from resisting with force such UN action. He expressed the fear that his troops would turn against their commanders and government officials as well if they were ordered not to resist. In the past, however, Congolese troops have often refused to stand up to a determined military unit.

[redacted] Kasavubu apparently is exploring the possibility of a peaceful UN return to Matadi during his current visit to the region, and Ileo [redacted] that a solution could be found, although he could not predict when the "people" of the city would permit a re-entry. } The Congolese are likely to regard the UN initiative as an ultimatum which disregards

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their recent efforts at conciliation following Dayal's departure, a development which would reverse the recent trend toward improved relations between the Leopoldville regime and the UN Command.

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[Redacted] the Union Miniere had ways of bringing pressure on Tshombé to reach an agreement with Kasavubu, "if it really wanted to," [Redacted]

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Peiping has given a somewhat less than satisfactory response to Gizenga's requests for aid and the naming of a Chinese ambassador to Stanleyville. [Redacted]

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Last fall the Chinese Communists extended a \$2,800,000 monetary grant to Lumumba supporters. Chou accepted the appointment of a Congolese ambassador but said transportation difficulties ruled out the sending of a Chinese ambassador to Stanleyville at this time. [Redacted]

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