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8 August 1960

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
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Indonesia-Netherlands: The recent arrival of Dutch naval units, including the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman, in West New Guinea--an area claimed by Indonesia--poses the possibility of an armed clash between Indonesian and Dutch forces. Indonesian public concern over the Dutch naval movements has been deliberately revived by the Djakarta government, and the likelihood of a highly emotional speech on the subject by President Sukarno on 17 August, Indonesian independence day, will further increase tension. The most critical period will be from 24 to 26 August when the Dutch ships are scheduled to be exercising north of New Guinea. Danger would appear to stem, not from deliberate provocation by either side, but from chance encounters between Indonesian air patrols and the Dutch ships, which could lead to an unpremeditated incident.

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### III. THE WEST

Cuba: Fidel and Raul Castro's week-end harangues expressed confidence and determination that neither the US, which Fidel called "militarily second best," nor the "lackey foreign ministers of the OAS," can stop the Cuban revolution and Latin America's "liberation from the Yankee colonial yoke." The Castros' uncompromising vehemence and the decree in effect ordering confiscation of most remaining American properties in Cuba came ten days before the opening of the OAS foreign ministers' meetings. They suggest that the Cuban leaders are convinced that US military intervention in Cuba, which they might even be trying to provoke, would enhance the prospects for Latin America's "revolution of liberation."

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## LATE ITEM

\*Republic of the Congo: President Kasavubu's Abako party, which is strong in the lower Congo region, has revived its pre-independence demands for "independence" within a loose confederation. This may be followed by similar declarations by other opponents of Congolese Premier Lumumba's concept of a highly centralized state. Encouraged by the success of Katanga Province's Premier Tshombé in inducing the UN to hold up its scheduled move of troops into Katanga, the anti-Lumumba elements appear to be attempting to join forces in an effort to undermine and possibly oust Lumumba. Tshombé's regime, meanwhile, is pushing the buildup of its new security force and still appears determined to resist any external force attempting to move into the province.

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The UN Security Council session on the Congo crisis, which was scheduled for 7 August, was postponed until 8 August. Tunisia, Ceylon, Argentina, and Ecuador are reportedly working on a resolution designed both to meet Hammarskjold's request for new assurances to Tshombé of the UN's neutrality in the Congo's constitutional controversy and to gain the acceptance of African countries backing Lumumba. Ghana and Guinea have already offered military assistance to Lumumba independent of the UN effort.

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The Situation in the Congo

As the UN Security Council prepares to consider the Congo crisis again on 8 August, tension has once more risen sharply in the Congo amidst signs pointing toward an early showdown between Premier Lumumba--who is due back in Leopoldville on 8 August--and Congolese political elements opposed to him and his concept of a highly centralized Congo state. President Kasavubu's Abako party, which is dominant in the lower Congo region, revived publicly on 7 August its earlier demands for "independence" within a loosely-joined Congo confederation and adopted a formal expression of no confidence in Lumumba.

Kasavubu's failure to dissociate himself from his party's action suggests he may be behind it and perhaps also working with leaders of other parties to undermine and possibly oust Lumumba. Earlier Kasavubu and Lumumba were bitter rivals for the premiership of the first Congolese government. Premier Tshombé of separatist Katanga Province indicated on 7 August that he was engaged in "negotiations" with other confederation-minded Congolese leaders, including "some" from the lower Congo and also Equator Province.

Time appears to be working against Lumumba's opponents. There is increasing evidence that Lumumba is proceeding rapidly to reorganize the disintegrated Force Publique as part of his personal political organization. This presumably accounts in part for the lack of interest and evasiveness of Lumumba-appointed Congolese officers toward UN suggestions for the organization of a national army.

In Katanga, Tshombé is endeavoring to strengthen his bargaining position in any future negotiations with the central government and to counteract charges that he is merely a Belgian puppet. Tshombé declared on 6 August that his government did not intend to preserve an exclusive role for Belgians in the exploitation of Katanga's great mineral wealth and that Belgian troops would leave the province as soon as the new Katanga forces are strong enough to maintain security. Belgium, apparently encouraged by indications that wide Katangan support for Tshombé is facilitating a rapid build-up of the new force toward a 3,000-man goal, has offered to make

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an early announcement of its intention to withdraw Belgian troops from Katanga within a few weeks, according to a Belgian official in Elisabethville. ]

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Tshombé's regime still appears determined to resist with all its resources any external force, whether or not under UN auspices, which might attempt to move into Katanga Province. Plans for resistance apparently include the harassment of "invaders" by tribesmen employing guerrilla tactics. A Belgian official who visited the province last week returned to Leopoldville with reports that tribes loyal to Tshombé were "preparing for war." Such reports are contributing to the great concern being displayed among the approximately 15,000 Belgian civilians remaining in the Katanga.

Moscow, which has become increasingly critical of the UN intervention, has denounced Hammarskjold for "capitulation to the colonialists." Izvestia on 6 August said the Security Council must call for an immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga and an end to "attempts to tear this province from the Congo Republic."

In a statement of 5 August terming the Congo situation as "absolutely intolerable," the Soviet Government charged Belgium, supported by its NATO allies, with defying the United Nations. While the statement carefully avoided committing the USSR to any unilateral action, it attempted to sustain the impression that Communist bloc countries stand ready to send forces if the present UN contingents are unable to enforce the Security Council's resolutions. Soviet leaders apparently hope that their implied threats of unilateral action will increase pressure for an early withdrawal of Belgian forces, thus enabling the USSR subsequently to claim credit for having protected Congolese independence and unity.

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