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P. Owen



2 March 1961



Copy No. 1

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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Subsequent discussion by the subcommittee indicated that both Nehru and Defense Minister Menon are thinking in terms of sending a brigade-size unit (about 3,000 men) of Indian soldiers to the Congo. A final decision, however, awaits assurances from Hammarskjold that Belgian personnel are in fact being withdrawn from the Congo. In addition, Nehru is awaiting a reply from Nasir to a letter sent on 26 February in which the Indian leader sought to persuade Nasir of the desirability of reinforcing the UN forces in the Congo. Furthermore, Nehru is reported especially concerned about avoiding clashes between Indian troops and any African troops which might be sent unilaterally to support the Gizenga regime. [redacted]

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France: The fourth French nuclear weapons test in the Sahara is expected to be a tower shot in late March or April. The test will coincide with US-UK-USSR test ban talks which are to be resumed in Geneva beginning 21 March. De Gaulle, determined to obtain "full membership in the atomic club," continues to maintain that France would not agree to a test ban unless it were bound up with agreements on the destruction of nuclear weapons stockpiles. Paris is apparently willing to face the increasingly hostile reaction which is expected from African and Middle Eastern states, including a censure move in the United Nations. The announcement that later French tests will be underground is unlikely to calm this hostile reaction.

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Communist China: Peiping appears to feel the need for a limited liberalization of scientific thought and an increase in freedom of expression among the country's intellectuals. An editorial published in the 28 February issue of the party journal, Red Flag, reviving the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom," states that the findings of scientists should be welcomed even if they lack a "Marxist-Leninist viewpoint." The Chinese Communists have recently released and allowed to appear in public several prominent intellectuals who were arrested in the aftermath of the 1957 liberalization fiasco. Remembering the campaign against those who had expressed themselves too freely before, the intellectuals will be extremely wary about the new invitation to "bloom and contend."


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Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] intends to resign at the cabinet meeting on 3 March, unless President Velasco agrees to change his increasingly favorable policy toward Cuba. Chiriboga's resignation could provoke a cabinet crisis. The foreign minister's stand is directly related to the return from Havana of the pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet former minister of government, Manuel Araujo, a key lieutenant of Velasco who publicly denounced Chiriboga on 21 February as a "State Department servant." Araujo reportedly plans to promote mass unrest and may have gained a dominant influence over Velasco in regard to policies toward both Cuba and the Soviet bloc. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

- A. No change from last week.
- B. No change from last week.
- C. No significant military activity has occurred in Laos during the last week. There are no indications that the Communist forces in the Plaine des Jarres intend to launch

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a counter-offensive in the immediate future, although they have the capability to do so. There is an unconfirmed report that the Communists have a plan to initiate operations at an unspecified time in the south of Laos. They have the capability to initiate such action on a small diversionary basis using Pathet Lao - Kong Le resources. Large-scale action would require outside resources such as Viet Minh; we consider this to be unlikely at this time. Meanwhile, the Communist bloc continues its build-up of Souvanna Phouma as the "legal" prime minister and persists in its refusal to negotiate except on its terms.

- D. None of the contending factions in the Congo seems able at present to impose a military solution, although the situation appears to favor whichever faction is willing to take the initiative. Out of fear of each other and distrust of the UN, the factions will go as far as they think they can get away with in resisting any UN move to neutralize their forces. Under the impetus of the Kasavubu-Kalonji-Tshombe agreement, the start of political compromise is possible, but there is no evidence Gizenga is willing to enter into political negotiations with the other factions.
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Situation in the Congo

The threat the Gizengist incursion into Luluabourg appeared to pose to Leopoldville reportedly aroused many leaders of Kasavubu's government to the point of being willing, for the first time, to take forceful action. These leaders are said to be urging Mobutu, who is now near Bumba with about 1,500 men, to attack Orientale Province "even if the troops must open fire." It is questionable, however, whether Mobutu's forces would fight even if such an order were given, especially since the threat to Leopoldville has at least temporarily been reduced.

Hammarskjold said that the Luluabourg episode was not a military victory for Stanleyville but that it did show the disintegration of the Congolese Army. He implied that a parallel situation is now shaping up in Equateur Province, where Stanleyville troops easily disarmed the garrison at Ikela and are now moving toward Coquilhatville, which is virtually unguarded by troops of the Leopoldville government because Mobutu has taken most of its garrison to the Bumba area. Press reports on 1 March say that Mobutu forces in Coquilhatville are defecting to Gizenga.

Hammarskjold also questioned where Mobutu stood in relation to recent events, pointing out that he was not particularly loyal to Kasavubu or Ileo, and that he had never broken personally with Lumumba. The secretary general pointed out that Mobutu had started toward Stanleyville with "the most publicized--and slowest--military offensive in history" and then last week told UN Commander McKeown that he was taking up positions only for defense against infiltrators from Stanleyville. Hammarskjold felt there was a chance, although not a probability, that Mobutu and Lundula, Gizenga's chief of staff, might be planning a military grouping directed against all politicians.

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
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
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Foreign Minister Arinos has publicly suggested a Tito visit to Brazil.

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Yugoslavia's first serious effort to broaden its economic and political relations with Latin America came in mid-1959 when a Yugoslav cabinet officer led a good-will mission to seven Latin American capitals. Several months later, another high regime official visited four other Latin American states, resulting in rumors that Tito would tour the area the following year.


Yugoslavia's relations with the West are generally good; the West is Belgrade's primary source of developmental capital and provides roughly 65 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade. In January, Yugoslavia put into effect a foreign trade and exchange reform which brings its foreign trade practices into closer accord with those of the West. Tito has long wanted to make an official state visit to the United States, but his regime continues publicly to view the West as the chief villain in international affairs.

Tito is currently in Ghana, the first stop on a two-month African tour that will include official visits to Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia and an unofficial call on UAR

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President Nasir. This is the third tour Tito has made to increase Yugoslavia's ties with the uncommitted and underdeveloped countries; trips through the Middle and Far East were made in 1954-55 and 1958-59. Belgrade believes that close identification with the uncommitted states is its best defense against possible future political and economic pressure from East or West and the best possible platform from which to voice its views on international affairs. At the UN session last fall, the UAR's Nasir--long Yugoslavia's closest collaborator--Ghana's Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and India's Nehru worked closely with Tito in an effort to ease East-West tensions. Since then, Belgrade has advocated that the neutrals confer more often, collaborate more closely, and act in concert more frequently.

In contrast to virtually nonexistent party-to-party relations, Belgrade has generally satisfactory relations with the Communist world at the state level, except for Albania and Communist China. Tito and Khrushchev held conversations in New York last fall, one result of which was an agreement to exchange visits by their foreign ministers. Moscow and Belgrade hold similar views on most international issues, such as disarmament and colonialism. Albania and Communist China disapprove of close state relations with Yugoslavia and maintain them at a minimal level.



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Violence May Break Out in Ecuador Over the Cuban Issue

Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaum in early February that he was greatly concerned over the Ecuadorean political situation, and predicted another postponement of the eleventh Inter-American Conference now set for Quito on 24 May. He noted President Velasco's desire for closer relations with Cuba, his friendship for Araujo, and his refusal to take action against Communist or Cuban activities in Ecuador.

The potential for violence over the Cuban issue was indicated recently by Communist-backed student unrest in both Quito and Guayaquil which caused demonstrations against Chiriboga and the incumbent minister of government. The Castro regime has cultivated relations with Velasco, particularly by expressing support for Ecuador in its long-standing boundary dispute with Peru.

Chiriboga also stated to an American official on 28 February that a military coup was being planned in Guayaquil. Such an attempt has been considered by a group of about 50 high-ranking officers, under the leadership of the former army commander, who were retired soon after Velasco was inaugurated last September. As minister of government, Araujo accused these officials of treason--a move which touched off a political controversy and helped precipitate his resignation. Although Velasco has a substantial following among the officer corps, he might alienate it if he reappoints Araujo to a top government position and follows a pro-Castro, pro-Soviet policy. Chiriboga said he had information that at a cabinet meeting last Saturday Velasco agreed to repudiate Araujo and threaten him with jail if he continued his activities; but Chiriboga also said he was certain Velasco will not follow through on this.

Araujo recently spent about three weeks in Cuba, and he has reportedly maintained close contact with the Cuban Embassy in Quito. An advocate of close relations with the bloc, he possibly contacted one or more bloc missions while in Havana.

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