


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30 July 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 July 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

[Redacted content]

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*No*  
Republic of the Congo: Tension is mounting in Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga, according to the American Consulate. The African populace is said to fear violence stemming from Katanga's secession. Its pro-Belgian premier, Moise Tshombé, is making an effort to ensure the loyalty of the Katanga Army and the police. Although Belgian troops have been largely successful in restoring order in Katanga, its claim to independence has been disavowed by Tshombé's parliamentary opposition, the Balubakat party. The consulate believes that the Lumumba government may encourage an incident in Katanga to dramatize "popular opposition" to an independent Katanga and the need for UN troops.

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Japan: Foreign Minister Kosaka implied to Ambassador MacArthur on 27 July that any move toward accommodation with Peiping would be delayed until after the general election expected this fall. Kosaka stressed, however, the government's need to maintain a public posture of "reasonableness and desire" to improve relations with Japan's Communist neighbors; this might initially be limited to the negotiation of a series of technical agreements on such matters as postal affairs and meteorological exchanges. He expressed his personal view that the issue of Okinawa's reversion to Japanese control should be avoided during the coming election campaign. Kosaka also appeared personally more willing to compromise with South Korea--within the limits imposed by public opinion--than did his predecessor.

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30 July 60

DAILY BRIEF

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Katanga Situation Approaching Critical Stage

Tension is mounting in Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga, in the absence of any agreement among the Belgians, the United Nations, and the Congolese concerning Katanga's political future. Africans in Elisabethville reportedly fear violence, and many have sent their families out of the city. Premier Tshombé has strengthened his personal security measures and has announced that all members of the Force Publique and police who have demonstrated their loyalty to his government are to be given an extra month's pay.

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, who reportedly was invited to visit Katanga by Tshombé, has rejected suggestions that he go there. His refusal to meet with Tshombé reflects Hammarskjold's tough stand in favor of Congo unity and his insistence on a complete Belgian troop withdrawal. Brussels' announcement that it will withdraw to Belgium 1,500 of its 10,000 troops in the Congo appears designed as a gesture in the direction of compliance with the UN resolution for the evacuation of Belgian forces. Brussels apparently hopes that Tshombé will be able to negotiate with Lumumba conditions under which Katanga could rejoin the Congo; Belgian Premier Eyskens declared on 28 July that the question is "no longer" the unity of the Congo but the form which a unified Congo should take. Tshombé is opposed to the highly centralized form of government espoused by Lumumba, but is prepared to accept a loosely joined Congo federation.

Despite some support in Brussels, Tshombé's position appears tenuous. Not even Belgium has formally recognized Katanga's independence, and Tshombé's parliamentary opposition walked out of the assembly on 27 July in protest over the premier's "arbitrary" declaration of Katanga's independence. The US Consulate observes that the Lumumba government may encourage an incident in Katanga to dramatize "popular opposition" to an independent Katanga and the need for UN troops.

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New Japanese Government's Foreign Policy

[ Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka implied to Ambassador MacArthur on 27 July that Japan's new government would delay in seeking any accommodation with Communist China until after the general election expected this fall. However, he emphasized the government's need to maintain a public posture of "reasonableness and desire" to improve relations with Japan's Communist neighbors; this might initially be limited to the negotiation of a series of agreements relating to postal affairs, exchange of meteorological information, and other technical matters. ]

[ Kosaka flatly rejected a neutralist course for Japan and said that a decisive Liberal-Democratic party victory in the election must be the new government's first step in restoring free-world confidence in Japan. He indicated his personal intent to avoid pressing the US to return Okinawa as long as the American civil administration does not try to alienate the Okinawans from Japan and continues to cooperate with the Japanese in long-term economic development projects on Okinawa. Kosaka complained, however, of the US refusal to allow the Okinawans to fly Japanese flags. He added that he hoped Tokyo would be permitted to introduce on Okinawa a family registration system along Japanese lines. ]

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[ Kosaka said he and Prime Minister Ikeda consider South Korea the first line of Japanese defense against Communist aggression and acknowledged the need to improve relations with Seoul. He appeared more willing than his predecessor to consider South Korean objections to the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea but emphasized that Japanese opinion, especially during an election campaign, would limit his ability to compromise. ]

[ Ikeda told MacArthur on 28 July that he plans to stress domestic rather than foreign policy issues during the coming campaign and will concentrate on improving social welfare and strengthening democratic government. Ikeda asserted that, while he felt quite expert on domestic problems, he plans to regard former Prime Minister Yoshida as his main adviser on international matters. Because Kosaka lacks diplomatic experience, it is likely that Yoshida and Ikeda rather than the foreign minister will set the foreign policy line.

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Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

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