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alternative to his control would be a pro-Castro regime, he is believed capable of attempting to align his regime with Castro or even with the Soviet bloc. Moscow is likely to be very cautious in responding to such overtures, especially in view of the unanimity of Latin American opinion against the Dominican Republic as expressed in the OAS. [REDACTED]

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LATE ITEMS

*Republic of the Congo: Katangan President Tshombé has seized upon Lumumba's retreat from his attacks on the UN to express "confidence" in the UN and to reiterate the independence of Katanga. Tshombé probably regards the Security Council consensus as strengthening his hand with respect to Lumumba; his statement that he has "consulted" with anti-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congolese confederation suggests that he still favors confederation as the most acceptable resolution of the Katanga crisis.

According to press reports from Elisabethville, the 566-man Mali UN contingent in northern Katanga have become involved in fighting apparently stemming from activities by pro-Lumumba, anti-Tshombé tribesmen. Should tribal violence spread, the position of the Tshombé government would be badly undermined.

Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia reportedly will take favorable action on an anticipated Congolese request for several hundred secondary schoolteachers.. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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~~SECRET~~The Situation in the Congo

Katanga President Tshombé has taken advantage of Lumumba's retreat from his attacks on the UN to express "confidence" in the UN and to reiterate the independence of Katanga. Tshombé probably regards the Security Council consensus in favor of Hammarskjold as strengthening his hand with respect to Lumumba; his statement that he has "consulted" with anti-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congo confederation suggests that he still favors this means of resolving the Katanga crisis.

[redacted] Albert Deconinck, the Belgian Communist party leader responsible for Congo affairs, now is planning to arrive in Leopoldville on 29 or 30 August. He will be accompanied by Jean Terfve, the principal Belgian Communist adviser to the Congolese. Both men have had extensive contacts with the principal Congolese leaders, especially Lumumba. They may hope to play a leading role in advising the Congolese, as well as to establish a party apparatus in the Congo.]

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[The Belgian party has systematically followed up its initial contacts with Congolese leaders. After making numerous contacts among Congolese delegates to the round-table conference in Brussels last January, and at the economic conference last April, the party concentrated on infiltrating Congolese political parties and encouraging close Congolese cooperation with the Soviet bloc. Trips to Moscow and Prague were granted numerous Congolese for "study purposes."]

In Leopoldville, Lumumba continues concerned over possible unrest. Congolese officials reportedly suspect collusion between Tshombé and elements in the former French Congo. New rumors of support for Tshombé from President Youlou in Brazzaville appear to have been stimulated by the forced landing in Luluabourg of a Belgian airliner en route from

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Brazzaville to Elisabethville with a group of anti-Lumumba Congolese.

Elsewhere there are press reports that General von Horn, who commands UN forces in the Congo, may be replaced by Finnish General A. E. Martola. Von Horn has been under severe criticism by Premier Lumumba and by some Western observers; his removal, following the replacement of UN representative Bunche, would indicate that Hammarskjold plans a major reorganization of the UN group in the Congo. General Martola was active in organizing the UN Emergency Force during the Suez crisis.

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