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28 April 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

28 April 1961

## DAILY BRIEF

Laos: The Pathet Lao reportedly have rejected General Phoumi's proposal that cease-fire negotiations begin today in Luang Prabang, and have repeated their suggestion that the talks be held in Xieng Khouang town. Vientiane subsequently issued a declaration calling for a cease-fire to become effective at noon on the same date. In an effort at compromise, the Boun Oum government plans today to attempt an informal contact with the Pathet Lao in the Vang Vieng area to establish the time and place for future discussions. Meanwhile, Laotian and foreign dignitaries, including Prince Sihanouk, are converging on Luang Prabang for the funeral ceremonies for the late King. Thus far, there has been no definite word as to whether Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao representatives will attend.

\*No major military developments have been reported, but Communist pressure on government positions continues.

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The Watch Committee in a special meeting on 27 April examined the status of bloc military forces in relation to a possible overt bloc military intervention in Laos, and issued the following statement:

We have re-examined the military situation in Laos, North Vietnam, and Communist China in relation to the recent Communist military operations in Laos and see no development which would suggest any direct intervention by outside Communist forces at this time.

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No other military movements related to Laos by either Communist ground or naval forces outside of Laos have been discerned. It is to be noted, however, that Communist forces have a capability of intervention with little or no warning.

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
DAILY BRIEF

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Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold, noting signs of improved relations between the UN and the Kasavubu government, has characterized the Congo problem as in a "most hopeful" new phase. Commenting on the political difficulties besetting President Tshombé, Hammarskjold observed that the UN's task would be "keeping Kasavubu close and Tshombé low." He indicated that while Dayal would have to return to the Congo, he might shortly be removed by substituting a five-man commission for the post of senior UN representative.

The circumstances surrounding Tshombé's detention at Coquilhatville continue obscure, with spokesmen for the Leopoldville government denying that he is under arrest. Reports that Interior Minister Munongo has seized power in Katanga are unconfirmed. [REDACTED]

(Backup, Page 4) (Map)

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Nepal: Following recent conversations in New Delhi with Nehru and Defense Minister Menon, Nepali Congress party resistance leader Subarna Shumshere [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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
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[redacted] plans an "all-out" effort against King Mahendra in mid-June. Subarna, who has been in India since the King's takeover in Katmandu in December, recognizes that his plans are dependent on the success of his efforts during the coming month to obtain arms and additional financing. Nehru, who has been disturbed by the King's autocratic actions, reportedly again assured Subarna of his "sympathy," but the degree of support which New Delhi will give Subarna is at present unclear. [redacted] (b)(1)

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**SELECTED INTELLIGENCE  
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES**

(Available during the preceding week)

**Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles. U. S. I. B. NIE 11-5-61.**  
25 April 1961. [redacted] (b)(3)

**Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany.**  
U. S. I. B. NIE 11-7-61. 25 April 1961. [redacted] (b)(3)

**Possibility of Soviet Nuclear Testing During the Moratorium.**  
U. S. I. B. NIE 11-9-61. 25 April 1961. [redacted] (b)(3)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Situation in Laos

North of Phou Khoun junction, on Route 13, enemy artillery and mortar fire continues to harass government troops occupying blocking positions on the southern approach to Luang Prabang. However, ground reconnaissance revealed the arrival in this area by 26 April of a 20-truck enemy convoy, and the local government commander is expecting an imminent attack. On 25 April, aerial reconnaissance had spotted probably the same convoy of 20 vehicles--including two-and-one-half-ton trucks and armored cars--heading west along Route 7 from the Plaine des Jarres. Below Vang Vieng, shelling of the government battalion just north of the Nam Lik continues, and there are some indications that the enemy will attempt a flanking movement.

North of Luang Prabang, the former garrison force at Muong Sai is withdrawing southwest from that post without apparent enemy pursuit. However, the enemy force, estimated at three battalions with artillery and mortar support, is considered capable of advancing virtually unopposed toward Luang Prabang at any time of its choosing. MAAG personnel evacuated from Muong Sai report that the accuracy and timing of the enemy artillery, mortars, and heavy weapons during the attack indicated that highly trained troops were involved. In the Pak Sane area, the enemy has undertaken small-scale probing attacks on Borikhane. (SECRET NOFORN)

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Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin on 25 April indicated the USSR's displeasure with the UK's announcement following the joint cease-fire appeal that it would not attend the conference without prior verification of an effective cease-fire. Pushkin's remarks apparently were designed to lay the groundwork for placing the blame on the West for any postponement or collapse of the Geneva conference scheduled to begin on 12 May. The Soviet official reiterated Moscow's position that only the Laotians themselves could work out cease-fire arrangements and that this was not the responsibility of either the UK or the Soviet Union.

Communist propaganda is already seeking to place on the US and Vientiane the onus for any failure to reach a truce in Laos. Hanoi on 27 April quoted a Pathet Lao radio charge that the Phoumi - Boun Oum forces have "launched new attacks" and that the Vientiane government does not really want a cease-fire. Hanoi also quoted Khamsouk Keola, acting premier of the Xieng Khouang "government," as warning that in the face of defeat the "US and its followers" have called for negotiations to gain time to "consolidate their forces and launch a new attack."

Enlarging on the Peiping government's statement of 26 April, a People's Daily editorial commented on the "aspects" involved in "bringing about" a cease-fire. The Chinese called for a "check" on assistance to Phoumi, the withdrawal by the US and its allies of all military personnel and equipment in Laos, and the expulsion of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars. Insisting that a cease-fire can "only" be achieved through negotiation between the "parties concerned," the Chinese indicated that the prospects for a cease-fire would depend on the attitude of the Vientiane authorities.

Although Chinese Communists did not label these "aspects" as explicit conditions for a cease-fire, they clearly regard them

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as legitimate points for consideration in cease-fire negotiations. They afford the Communists excellent gambits for delaying an effective truce while the military situation continues to develop in their favor.



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~~SECRET~~The Situation in the Congo

Hammarskjold's characterization of the Congo as in a "most hopeful" phase stems in part from his satisfaction at the return of the UN to Matadi and at Tshombé's failing political fortunes. Hammarskjold expressed the belief that Kasavubu's ascendancy over Tshombé will improve prospects for agreement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville, adding that he had received confirmation of the existence of a military agreement between the Mobutu and Gizenga forces.

Hammarskjold's expressed optimism may be in part intended to prepare the way for a retreat on Dayal. When the intention to remove Dayal is communicated to Kasavubu, this should diminish the danger of demonstrations when Dayal returns to the Congo. It is not certain, however, whether Dayal's return to the Congo will be under sufficiently harmonious conditions to permit Hammarskjold to remove him without seeming to bow to Congolese pressure.

The director of the Katanga Information Service has urged Hammarskjold to use his good offices to secure Tshombé's release from detention in Coquilhatville. He also asked the United States to make representations to Hammarskjold, urging that Tshombé's immediate release was required to prevent a coup in Katanga by "more intractable elements."

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~~SECRET~~Nepali Congress Exiles Planning Stepped-up Campaign Against King

Following Nehru's initial public criticism of the King's actions in December, he appeared willing to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, maintaining normal relations with the King while affording the exiles a haven in India. [REDACTED]

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Nehru's recent meetings with Subarna suggest that he may be moving toward more direct support of the Nepali Congress party. [REDACTED] at their meeting early in April, Nehru interposed no obstacles to Subarna's plans to promote non-violent agitation from India. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] suggests Nehru did not express disapproval of resort to violence as well. In addition, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Krishna Menon gave no indication he would keep Subarna from importing arms, although Menon refused any direct assistance. Subarna, who has long financed the Nepali Congress party, has been in touch with Socialist leaders abroad, and has already reportedly arranged an arms purchase from representatives of the Israeli Mapai party.

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There is little doubt that at this time only active Indian support would ensure the success of a Nepali Congress party effort to return to power. Unless there is a threat of a Communist takeover, however, New Delhi is unlikely to intervene directly as it did in 1950 when the Nepali Congress party overthrew the Rana oligarchy. The Indian leaders are more likely to encourage the exiles covertly while hoping that time, combined with Nepali Congress party agitation, will so erode the King's position that the need for active Indian intervention will be obviated. [REDACTED]

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The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

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Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

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The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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