

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, European Division	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CALL REDCOAT CATOPHA' Request for Renewal of Project CATOPHAT		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: Approval of Project

Reference: EGNS-4154, 2 January 1969

1. Forwarded herewith and under separate cover is the request for the renewal of Project CATOPHAT for FY 1970.

2. You will note that paragraph 19 A contains the proposed salaries for CATOPHAT/9, CATOPHAT/13 and IDENTITY 2. These have as yet not been formalized by an MOA, but will be by the time this Project becomes effective. Therefore, they were included in order to reflect proposed expenditures.

3. HIDRONE was recruited as an access agent to the CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF target. He has been included in this Project for planning purposes. A request for his reencryption as a CATOPHAT asset will be forwarded in the near future.

APPROVED: [Signature]

Attachments (Split Pouch)

1. Left side h/w
2. Right side USC
3. IDENTITIES USC

09 Apr 69

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGNA-38040	DATE 28 March 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 32W-6-168/1

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment #3 to
EGNA-38040, 28 March 1969

IDENTITIES:

1. Nikolajs PICKA []
2. Ahmed Kamal HAMDI []
3. Gennadiy Mikhaylovich LIPILIN []

SECRET

S E C R E T

Left Side

Right Side

IDENTIFICATION

1. CATOPHAT is the cryptonym assigned to the ^{soviet} FJSTEAL Embassy located near Bonn, West Germany. CAPAYOFF is the Cryptonym assigned to the ^{soviet} FJSTEAL Trade Mission located in Cologne, West Germany. Project CATOPHAT is an operation directed against ^{soviet Embassy Bonn, Trade Mission, Cologne} CATOPHAT, CAPAYOFF and the personnel assigned to both installations. Of the 89 persons officially assigned to CATOPHAT, 37 are known or suspect members of ^{soviet} FJSTEAL intelligence. Of the 73 persons officially assigned to CAPAYOFF, 21 are known or suspect members of ^{soviet} FJSTEAL intelligence.

OBJECTIVES

2. To acquire positive intelligence information on ^{soviet} FJSTEAL military research, military and political plans and ^{soviet} FJSTEAL intelligence activity through the recruitment or defection of personnel assigned to ^{soviet Trade Mission, Cologne} CATOPHAT and CAPAYOFF, with primary emphasis on those members of the ^{soviet} FJSTEAL intelligence services who are most likely to have access to such information. (Priority A-1 of the current German Station Operating Directive.)


³ To acquire counter-intelligence information relative to ^{soviet} FJSTEAL clandestine activity conducted by ^{soviet Embassy Bonn} CATOPHAT and ^{soviet Trade Mission, Cologne} CAPAYOFF personnel, especially that which is directed against ^{US} WOLADY interests.

CHANGES

4. During Spring 1968, the ^{soviet} FJSTEAL branch ^{IMPURE}. This has resulted in a closer and more natural association of ^{soviet} FJSTEAL branch officers with the local diplomatic and German communities, the principal milieu in which CATOPHAT personnel operate.

A. In November 1968, the ^{mail intercept} CALLIKAK monitoring responsibility for the ^{soviet Trade Mission, Cologne} CATOPHAT and CAPAYOFF installations was taken over by ^{FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY} MBERDSH authorities. Although this resulted in a temporary hiatus in this important coverage, the flow of operational information from this source has resumed. The raw ^{mail intercept} material (CALLIKAK on ^{soviet Embassy Bonn} CATOPHAT and specified ^{mail intercept} CATOPHAT personal residences) is currently passed to the ^{mail intercept} RESCREEN team, with the transcribed results and used tapes being returned to ^{Landeskriminalverfassungssutze (LfV)} CAWHISPER. Only recently has the ^{soviet Embassy mail intercept} CAPAYOFF CALLIKAK

S E C R E T



Transcribers and translators

coverage (under the control of ~~CATUSK~~) resumed and in this case, only the finished ~~CATUSK~~ reports are passed to ~~WOFIRM~~.
CIA *BND*

B. In Fall 1968 the major operational effort of the ~~FJSTEAL~~ branch was directed against two members of ~~CATOPHAT~~, who were the ~~ANKICK~~ and ~~ABGRIP~~ residents, respectively. As a by-product, this effort has led to a revised method of handling leads provided by ~~CALLIKAK~~ and ~~CAPRAIRIE~~, which in turn has resulted in an earlier identification of ~~CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF~~ contacts.
Soviet Embassy, Bonn *MAU intercep*
Bonn surveillance team *Soviet Embassy Bonn / Soviet Trade Mission, Cologne*

C. During mid-Winter 1968 Soviet branch Bonn began a search for controllable access agents among varied groups of people, who although perhaps presently not in contact with members of ~~CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF~~, could be placed in positions in the local diplomatic and German communities where they would have an opportunity of establishing meaningful access. Our chief criterion in selecting such people is that they have the necessary attributes needed for good access agents. It is hoped by this method to broaden the scope of our attack on the local Soviet target.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

5. The major product of this Project has been and probably will continue to be operational and counter-intelligence information concerning the persons and activities of the ~~CATOPHAT~~ and ~~CAPAYOFF~~ installations. This type of information has increased our operational intelligence holdings on both the ~~CATOPHAT~~ and ~~CAPAYOFF~~ targets and has allowed one successful PNG action in liaison with ~~CAWHISPER~~.
Although an increased number of intelligence reports concerning matters of ~~FJSTEAL~~ interest have been disseminated during the past Project year as opposed to previous years, they have almost invariably resulted from members of the East Bloc official and semi-official community wittingly speaking with ~~WOLADY~~ officials (actually members of ~~WOFIRM~~).
We do not expect any significant increase in meaningful, hard intelligence reporting, in keeping with the above stated Paragraph 2 objectives of this Project, until an ~~FJSTEAL~~ intelligence officer has been recruited and is fully cooperative.
Soviet Embassy Bonn *Soviet Trade Mission Cologne* *LFU* *CIA*

EFFECTIVENESS

6. During the past Project year ~~CATOPHAT~~ assets have provided biographic and assessment data on members of ~~CATOPHAT~~.
Soviet Embassy *the Embassy*

Trade Mission
 and ~~CAPAYOFF~~ with whom they have had contact, one known *GRW* ~~AEGRI~~ officer was PNG'd, and the number of intelligence disseminations increased slightly. Three of our ~~CATOPHAT~~ *soviet* agent assets can be considered as genuine access agents to the ~~CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF~~ *soviet* targets. Because of the successful PNG action, one of the three has since been terminated. The concentrated effort against two specific targets (mentioned in paragraph 4 B, above) has developed a number of leads, who may be turned into true access agents and thereby increase the effectiveness of the Project in the gathering of operational intelligence. As noted above, we are now engaged in a concentrated effort to build up a stable of controlled agents whom we can commit as circumstances require against targets of our choice.

PERSONNEL

soviet
 7. ~~CATOPHAT~~ personnel at present comprise eleven controlled assets selected from ~~WOLADY~~, ~~MHBRUSH~~ and third country nationals. Annex A summarizes the current status and access of all ~~CATOPHAT~~ *soviet* assets.

PROBLEMS

FRG
 8. As in all areas of the world, ~~MHBRUSH~~ being no exception, there are certain general problems related to operating against the ~~FISREAL~~ target, none of them insurmountable. They are mentioned here as a matter of record.

soviet Embassy / Trade Mission
 A. Non-communist contacts by ~~CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF~~ members are either pursued in keeping with the official functions of the individual member's overt position, or if for some other purpose, have the sanction of that member's superior. In search for access agents, this ~~FISREAL~~ tactic generally serves to limit the types of persons from which ~~WOFIRM~~ can pick and chose, but fortunately ~~CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF~~ *the soviet Embassy and Trade Mis.* maintain such a large group of contacts, that lack of numbers as such poses no problem. Those ~~CATOPHAT/~~ *soviet Embassy etc* ~~CAPAYOFF~~ contacts who in general are not eager to assist ~~WOFIRM~~ fall into the following groups: Business men having dealings with the Communist Bloc and persons of an ideological stripe, who if not necessarily pro-communist are certainly not willing to stick their neck out for the West. Fortunately there are many

contacts who do not fall into either one group or the other, and there are exceptions to the rule even within these groups.

B. The second problem area relates to ascertaining which of the many ^{for the most part} CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF contacts are likely to be willing to offer us their services if properly approached. ^{SECRET Emblos and Trade Mission} CASLIK provides the vast majority of leads to all the overt CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF contacts, but it does no more than that. The greatest problem is to acquire the necessary assessment data on each of these contacts in order to determine which of them is likely to be cooperative. For those who are members of the diplomatic community or resident in the local ^{FRG} MIBRUSH or third national communities, this is usually no great problem. For the many outside the aforementioned communities, it is more difficult and time-consuming to gain access to them and the number and types of approaches possible are considerably more limited. One additional problem concerning the acquisition of agents for use against ^{the Soviet Emblos and Trade Mission} CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF is the small geographic and population sphere in which the target and its contacts move. This factor dictates that great care and caution be used in assessing and developing agent candidates for use against the target, lest ^{Soviets} WOFIRM's efforts come to the attention of the ~~FIRSTALERS~~ before the agent candidate is fully recruited and a clandestine relationship has been established.

9. The foregoing problems do present obstacles in the way of achieving the objectives of this Project, but the possibilities for acquiring significant ^{over} intelligence through the successful ^{the Soviet Embassy} recruitment of select ~~FIRSTAL~~ IS officers assigned to CATOPHAT or CAPAYOFF makes the effort to overcome such obstacles more than worthwhile.

LIAISON

10. ^{This Project} CATOPHAT is a unilateral ^{one} project. Liaison with MIBRUSH intelligence and security services involves only the target, not normally our access agents. ~~CAGRAB is a double agent in liaison with CAWHISPER against ALBBAY/1, a member of CATOPHAT who is a known ABRICK officer.~~ CATOPHAT/16 is known to CAWHISPER as a result of coordination of] and CAWHISPER activities directed against
 LFV

the Soviet Trade Mission

AEDRAIN, a known AEKICK officer assigned to CAPAYOFF. CATOPHAT/8 was a double agent run in liaison with CAWHISPER against AEUPEND/2, a member of CATOPHAT and known AEGRIP officer, who was PNG'd. CATOPHAT/8 has been terminated. The [] are aware of CATOPHAT/14's cooperation with WOFIRM against the CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF target insofar as CATOPHAT/14 was introduced to a WOFIRM staffer by []

Dutch Intelligence Service

the Soviet Embassy & Trade Mission

11. Liaison coordination against CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF involves the following:

LFV

A. CAWHISPER maintains counter-intelligence coverage on the FJSTEAL embassy and provides [] with identities, photographs, residence addresses, local travel and license plate numbers of both privately registered and official vehicles and traces as requested. In addition, CAWHISPER provides [] with the results of their physical surveillance of FJSTEALERS involved in CAWHISPER double-agent operations, and with observation post coverage of CATOPHAT. Because CAWHISPER has only three case officers working on the entire FJSTEAL target in MHRUSH, their assistance in conducting FI-oriented operations against CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF is necessarily limited. Their efforts are of course primarily in the field of CI/CE operations. The [] excellent liaison relationship with CAWHISPER is an important aspect of operations against the FJSTEAL general target and is expected to continue (as in the past) and hopefully increase.

LFV

and Trade Mission

BND

B. CATUSK provides notification of FJSTEALERS traveling to MHRUSH. They also service traces as requested.

The mail intercept

C. CALLIKAK is [] most important operational tool for acquiring leads to persons and firms in contact with CATOPHAT and CAPAYOFF. CAWHISPER and CATUSK assumed responsibility for CALLIKAK monitoring of CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF in November 1968. CAWHISPER passes raw take from its monitoring of CATOPHAT []

LFV

The Soviet Trade Mission

Transcription is done [] AESCREEN team and the finished results are passed to CAWHISPER. CATUSK furnishes [] with finished reports of its monitoring effort against CAPAYOFF and certain of the lines going to CATOPHAT. The arrangement with CAWHISPER is expected to continue []

in Project Year 1970. There are already indications that ^{the KGB} CATUSK intends to delete from its reports the names of ~~MIDRUSH~~ firms and individuals dealing with CATOPHAT and CAPAYOFF based on their contention that the passing of such information is contrary to ~~MIDRUSH~~ national interests. Although this has not yet occurred, if and when it does, the operational value of the ^{SECRET SERVICE} CALLIKAK received from CATUSK ~~BND~~ will be greatly diminished.

the Soviet Embassy and Trade Mission

INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

12. There is no inter-agency coordination required for this Project.

PLANS

13. Considering the far greater size of the ~~CATOPHAT/~~ ^{SECRET SERVICE} CAPAYOFF target relative to the operational element ^{Soviet Embassy and Trade Mission} it is necessary to concentrate limited ^{CIA} ~~NOFIRM~~ manpower on select, primary targets, who are known or suspect intelligence officers and who, if recruited, offer the best chances of fulfilling the paragraph 2 objectives of this Project. Concentrated effort will be directed against other members of ~~CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF~~ (including non-IS) only when there are indications of vulnerability, which can be parlayed into recruitment. Although these personnel are not likely to provide significant hard intelligence responsive to the paragraph 2 objective of this Project, they would be valuable assets for operational and counter-intelligence (paragraph 3 objective) on the ^{Soviet Embassy and Trade Mission} ~~CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF~~ target and vulnerability and assessment data on primary target ^{Soviet} ~~FJSTEAL~~ intelligence officers.

Trade Mission

Soviet Embassy and

CIA

Soviet Embassy and Trade Mission

Soviet

14. In order to acquire the vulnerability and assessment data necessary for determining which of the primary target ^{Soviet} ~~FJSTEAL~~ intelligence officers offer the best recruitment or defection prospects, ^{Soviet} is making a major effort to expand its stable of access agents capable of assessing and developing ~~FJSTEAL~~ intelligence officers. In an effort to increase the total number of persons available in this category, greater attention is being given to that group of people already in the diplomatic and local German communities, who although they do not presently have contact with members of ~~CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF~~, could be put into such contact. An increased effort is being made to locate persons

Soviet

Soviet Embassy and Trade Mission

having no present contact with the CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF target or any reason to have contact, but because of intelligence and personal qualifications are good access agent material. It is planned to train them and place them in the local diplomatic and German communities where they will have an opportunity to gain access to members of CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF. (see paragraph 4 C, above). This approach will also allow the placement of fully recruited agents in ~~MIBRUSH~~ companies doing business with ~~FJSTAL~~ and having contact with members of CATOPHAT/CAPAYOFF. This will obviate one of the major obstacles in gaining access to target personnel mentioned in paragraph 8 A, above.

Soviet Embassy and Trade Mission

15. Though members of the East Bloc official and semi-official communities are not first priority recruitment targets, close scrutiny is being given those select few who have continuous and close contact with primary target ~~FJSTAL~~ intelligence officers assigned to CATOPHAT and CAPAYOFF. It is recognized that considerable time and effort is required to effect the recruitment of a Bloc person and only those persons will be considered who not only already have the desired access but have previously shown themselves to have vulnerabilities which would make them good recruitment prospects.

Trade Mission

SECURITY

16. Present operational assets of this Project are handled by [] personnel []. CATOPHAT/1 and CATOPHAT/2, a husband and wife team, and CATOPHAT/3 and CATOPHAT/4, also a husband and wife team, are probably witting of ~~WOFIRM~~'s role because CATOPHAT/1 and CATOPHAT/3 are former ~~CAWHISPER~~ employees. The risk of embarrassment in the event of compromise with any of the aforementioned or any other present CATOPHAT asset is small. As other individual assets are developed, they also will be handled by [] officers under [] cover.

17. [] is planning to *polygraph* SGSWIRL CATOPHAT/16 on an appropriate occasion, specifically to establish that he has not divulged his contact with a ~~WOLADY~~ IS to any unauthorized persons and that he has not wittingly cooperated with ~~FJSTAL~~ IS. (~~HIDRONE~~) will be *polygraphed* SGSWIRLED in the near future to complete establishment of his bona fides. During the past Project year several CATOPHAT assets were dropped without prejudice. There were no resulting adverse security problems. At the present time there are no known security problems concerning the other CATOPHAT agents.

Dennis Polgar, Hungarian press representative in Bonn

Soviet Embassy

COSTS

18. The accumulated field obligations for the CATOPHAT Project from 1 October 1967 through 28 February 1968 amounted to \$8,023.11.

19. The estimated expenditures for this Project for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970 total \$22,475.00. An analysis of all proposed expenditures follows:

A. Agent salaries, operational expenses and special bonuses.

CATOPHAT/1 and /2	\$ 1,825.00
CATOPHAT/3 and /4	400.00
CATOPHAT/9 (proposed)	1,825.00
CATOPHAT/13 (proposed)	1,500.00
CATOPHAT/16	1,400.00
IDENTITY 1 <i>Picks</i>	1,025.00
IDENTITY 2 (proposed) <i>CASCOFF</i>	7,200.00
HIDRONE (proposed)	3,000.00

B. Rental of hotel rooms for operational purposes

[]

C. Miscellaneous supplies

[]

D. Material and equipment

[]

E. Miscellaneous expenses and recruitment of new assets (to include entertainment, ops expenses, spot payments)

[]

TOTAL

[]

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ANNEX A

CURRENT STATUS OF AGENTS

1. CATOPHAT/1. Subject, a 69 year old ^{FRG} ~~MIDRUSH~~ citizen, is a retired staff officer of ~~CASHISPER~~ with a long history of work against the ~~CATOPHAT/CATOPHAT~~ target. His apartment is adjacent to that of Identity 3. Subject and his wife, CATOPHAT/2, act as ^{Nikol PICKA} LP keepers for an audio operation directed against Identity 1's apartment. They had personal contact with the ~~FISREAR~~ who was previously resident in Identity 3's apartment and hopefully in the near future will be able to effect contact with Identity 3. ^{ca} In addition to his duties as informant and LP keeper, Subject functions as a general support asset of the ~~FISREAR~~ ^{ca} and is used to investigate leads derived from ^{ca} ~~GALLIKAK~~ on ~~CATOPHAT~~. Subject is met regularly ^{ca} ~~case officer~~ under ~~cover~~. Subject agreed to cooperate with ~~WOPIRM~~ because it provided him an opportunity to continue working against the ~~FISREAR~~ target, in ~~MIDRUSH~~ and because the salary he receives supplements his ~~CASHISPER~~ retirement income. It is anticipated that Subject will provide loyal service as long as the basic interests of ~~MIDRUSH~~ and ~~WOLADY~~ coincide.

mail intercept

2. CATOPHAT/2. Subject, the wife of CATOPHAT/1, is used as an LP keeper in the audio operation against Identity 1. In addition, she observes and reports arrivals and departures at Identity 1's apartment.

3. CATOPHAT/3. Subject, a 40 year old ^{FRG} ~~MIDRUSH~~ citizen, is the manager of an apartment building owned by his father-in-law and in his own right is a partner in a wholesale plywood firm. Since at least 1956, the apartment building has been continually occupied by various members of ~~CATOPHAT~~, among them several known and suspect intelligence officers. Subject, who was formerly a support agent for ~~CASHISPER~~ was turned over ^{ca} for unilateral handling in 1964. Subject provides useful operational information on the residences of certain ~~CATOPHATERS~~; his wife reports on their comings and goings. Subject is met regularly ^{ca} (in alias) ^{ca} Subject accepts remuneration and appears to cooperate with the Station out of ideological conviction.

4. CATOPHAT/4. Subject is the wife of CATOPHAT/3 and, through her husband, reports on ~~CATOPHAT~~ personnel living in their building. In effect, Subject is the actual source of a great deal of the information on the comings and goings of the ~~CATOPHATERS~~ since she is present at the apartment through the day. She is witting of her husband's contacts with a ~~WOLADY~~ organization interested in ~~CATOPHAT~~ personnel, and cooperates willingly with her husband in gathering whatever information she can. In the past year, Subject has had direct contact with the case officer in

Genadiy Mikhaylovich
LIPILIN

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charge of this operation. She is also attempting to develop a social relationship with the wives of CATOPHATERS living in the building.

5. CATOPHAT/9. Subject is a 47 year old ^{FRG} MIBRUSH citizen who is a professor at the university in Bonn. Operational approval was granted Subject in January 1967 to spot and assess ^{Soviet} FJSTEAL personnel and their contacts in MIBRUSH. To date Subject has been able to provide spotting information and a moderate amount of assessment data on a small group of ^{Soviet} FJSTEAL contacts within the university. Because he has the personal characteristics and intelligence to be a good access agent, it is hoped that by careful case officer direction, he can be maneuvered into contact with members of ^{the Soviet Embassy} CATOPHAT who are interested in having contacts within the university.

6. CATOPHAT/13. Subject is a 39 year old ^{FRG} MIBRUSH citizen who is a car and truck salesman with a large MIBRUSH firm in the Bonn area. He has had occasional social contact with several members of ^{the Soviet Embassy} CATOPHAT during the past project year. Although Subject is not assessed as having the necessary characteristics to be an access agent, he is suitable as an informant on members of ^{the Soviet Embassy} CATOPHAT with whom he has contact. During the current project year he will be directed so as to increase his circle of acquaintances among ^{Soviet Embassy} CATOPHAT personnel.

7. CATOPHAT/14. Subject is a 27 year old non-German European who represents a firm in Bonn selling customs-free luxury goods to the diplomatic missions in the area. Subject will be moving away from the Bonn area at the beginning of the new project year, in order to build up a similar business elsewhere. For that reason we have not included him in the new project year. With CATOPHAT/14's approval, his place in Bonn will be taken by a ^{WOFIRM} contract employee who will be the subject of separate reporting.

8. CATOPHAT/16. Subject is a 30 year old German national employed by several German companies as a chauffeur for two ^{Soviet Embassy} CAPAYOFF officials having extensive business dealing with these and other firms in Germany. He reports on the itinerary of these two ^{Soviet Embassy} CAPAYOFF officials, their activities while visiting these German firms and is instructed to look for and attempt to develop vulnerabilities which we can exploit.

9. Identity ^{FRG}. Subject is a 45 year old Latvian who is a naturalized MIBRUSH citizen. He is a psychologist employed by the city government of Cologne and has had considerable scientific

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and technical training in the electronics field. An Operational Approval was granted Subject in August 1967 to spot and assess *Soviet* FJSTEAL personnel and their contacts in ~~MIBRUSH~~^{FK6}. To date Subject has been unable to provide much useful information. However, in the past month he was able to join a scientific organization in the Bonn area which is known to be frequented by ~~CATOPHAT~~^{Soviet Embassy} personnel. *Soviet Embassy* It is hoped that through this vehicle he can directly assess the ~~CATOPHAT~~^{Soviet Embassy} personnel, and in addition report on their contacts within the local ~~MIBRUSH~~^{FK6} scientific community.

10. ~~Identity 2~~. Subject is a 36 year old former Arab diplomat previously stationed in Germany who is now living in Bonn as a businessman. He has a wide circle of acquaintances within the Bonn diplomatic community, primarily composed of representatives from the underdeveloped part of the world, as well as West German officials in regular contact with these diplomats. In addition, he also knows many Arab students and workers in the Bonn area. Many of these acquaintances have been identified as having some sort of relationship to ~~CATOPHAT/CADAYOFF~~^{Soviet Embassy and Trade Mission} targets or would be of interest to the latter or could possibly develop a legitimate reason to come in contact with them. For this reason we plan using Subject for assessing and developing those of his acquaintances who could eventually be recruited as access agents to ~~CATOPHAT/CADAYOFF~~^{the Soviet Embassy and Trade Mission}. He will at the same time continue his efforts at spotting other candidates among his acquaintances for such a role. We have included a sizeable amount of salary for Subject in the new project necessitated by anticipated high costs of entertaining and cultivating his contacts who for the most part have a high standard of living.

11. ~~(HIDRONE)~~. Subject is a 56 year old ^{Hungarian} ~~HIWAY~~ citizen serving as a journalist in ~~MIBRUSH~~^{FK6}. He was formally recruited on 12 September 1968. As soon as he has passed the ~~SGSWIRL~~^{the great}, which will be done at the earliest opportunity, his operational approval will be requested. Subject already has contact with members of ~~CATOPHAT~~ on whom he has provided assessment and biographic data. Subject himself is assessed as having the qualities of a good access agent. He is expected to be in ~~MIBRUSH~~^{FK6} for two and a half years.