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TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT LWBREAK CKLEG SPRAGTIME

REF A. SCWASHINGTON 78208

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACTUATE 2007

- 1. FOLLOWING IS CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO REF B REQUEST
  FOR SUMMARY OF EFFORTS EXPENDED AGAINST CRYPTOGRAPHIC TARGETS. THIS
  MESSAGE DEALS WITH THE SOVIET TARGET.
- AT HEADQUARTERS REQUEST, IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING ITS ENTIRE SOVIET/EAST EUROPEAN OPERATIONAL PROGRAM WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING BETTER FOCUS AND DIRECTION OF LIMITED RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR APPLICATION TO THE APPROXIMATELY 650 SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN OFFICIALS IN THE BONN/COLOGNE AREA. THE REVIEW IS CONCENTRATING ON THE SELECTION OF ONE OR MORE PRIMARY TARGETS FROM THIS MASSIVE GROUP. CODE CLERKS, BECAUSE OF THEIR UNIQUE ACCESS, ARE RECEIVING CLOSE SCRUTINY IN THIS SELCTION PROCESS. THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE COMMENTS ARE OFFERED REGARDING OUR POSSIBILITIES FOR WORKING SUCCESSFULLY AGAINST SOVIET CODE CLERKS HERE.
  - A. SOVIET EMBASSY: IN EARLY 1976, SHORTLY BEFORE OUR RECEIPT

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OF REF A, THE SOVIETS MOVED THEIR EMBASSY. ONLY RECENTLY HAVE WE BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THE EMBASSY'S CODE CLERKS ALMOST CER-TAINLY LIVE AT THE CURRENT (NEW) EMBASSY SITE, RATHER THAN IN THE LARGE SOVIET APARTMENT HOUSE, OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, WHERE MOST EMBASSY EMPLOYEES LIVE. (THE BFV, INCIDENTALLY, STILL LISTS THE CODE CLERKS AS LIVING IN THE OUTSIDE APARTMENT HOUSE,) CODE CLERKS WERE IN FACT LIVING IN THE APARTMENT HOUSE, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO MOUNT AN OPERATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST THEM. DEVELOPING ACCESS TO ANYONE REPEAT ANYONE LIVING AT THE EMBASSY. WHICH IS IN A GUARDED, FENCED COMPOUND, SCREENED FROM VIEW BY TREES, IS A TASK OF THE UTMOST DIFFICULTY. IN THE INSTANCE OF CODE CLERKS, WHO SELDOM TRAVEL, RARELY TALK ON THE PHONE, AND WHOSE PERSONAL ACTIVITIES ARE PROBABLY CLOSELY SUPERVISED, THE DIFFICULTY IS COM-POUNDED TO A POINT OF VIRTUAL INSUPERABILITY. NEVERTHELESS, SHOULD WE DETECT ANY WEAKNESSES IN THE DEFENSES AROUND THESE CODE CLERKS, WE SHALL MOVE QUICKLY TO EXPLOIT THEM.

B. TRADE MISSION: AT THIS WRITING WE ARE CONCENTRATING ON THE EMBASSY IN OUR OPERATIONAL REVIEW, SINCE WE HAVE MORE ASSETS DEPLOYABLE AGAINST ITS EMPLOYEES THAN AGAINST THOSE OF THE TRADE MISSION. THE PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF THE TRADE MISSION, HOWEVER,

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DOES APPEAR TO OFFER SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR LEARNING SOMETHING ABOUT THE PERSONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CODE CLERKS STATIONED THERE. WE SHALL BE EXPLORING THIS SITUATION IN DUE COURSE.

- 3. WHILE THE REF A LIST OF SUSPECT SOVIET CODE CLERKS IN THE BONN-COLOGNE AREA IS OUT-DATED. HEADQUARTERS IS AWARE OF DEPARTEES ON THIS LIST THROUGH OUR ROUTINE REPORTING. WE HAVE A PROBLEM IN THAT ALL OF THE REPLACEMENTS OF THESE DEPARTEES HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED, AND WE ARE NOW LESS SURE WHO ALL THE CODE CLERKS ARE.
  - A. KACHAYEV: DEPARTED, REPLACEMENT UNKNOWN.
- B. KUZMIN: DEPARTED. POSSIBLY REPLACED TEMPORARILY BY

  TDY'ER OLEG ALEKSANDROVICH VOLKOV

  AND REPORTED RE
  PLACED PERMANENTLY BY VASILIY MITROFANOVICH USTIMENKO

  WHO WAS TEACHER ON PREVIOUS TOUR. (SEE WASHINGTON Ø 20631 AND

  \$83.39 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION).
- C. LIBAROV: DEPARTED. REPLACED BY VALENTIN VLADIMIROVICH

  MATSKOV

  BASED ON LATTER'S BEING SUSPECT CODE CLERK

  ON PREVIOUS TOURS, AND FROM SLOT SUCCESSION THIS TOUR. NO TRAVEL IN

  FRG. WIFE RECEIVED PHONE CALL APRIL 77 FROM RELATIVE IN MOSCOW WHO

  INFORMED HER UNCLE HAD DIED. SLIGHT SUGGESTION FROM THIS CALL THAT

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WIFE'S FAMILY STILL RUSSIAN ORTHODOX PRACTITIONERS. NO OTHER INFO DEVELOPED TO DATE.

- E. OVCHINNIKOV: STILL HERE, HE AND WIFE HAVE CONDUCTED LONG PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH RELATIVES IN MOSCOW. ONE OTHER PHONE CALL, BETWEEN TWO OTHER SOVIETS, CONCERNED OVCHINNIKOV AND TENDED CONFIRM THAT HE IS CODE CLERK. NO TRAVEL IN FRG.
- F. ROGALEV: STILL HERE, PER BFV LIST, BUT WE FIND THIS
  DIFFICULT TO CREDIT, SINCE HE ARRIVED IN 1970. NO TRAVEL IN FRG.
  NO PHONE CALLS -- NOR ANY SIGN OF LIFE, FOR THAT MATTER, SINCE
  HIS ARRIVAL.

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G. MANUYEV:	DEPARTED.	REPLACEMENT U	NKNOWN.		·
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PR OK OF YE V	J, TECHN	ICIAN. HEADQ	U.ARTERS HAS	NOT SPECI	FI -
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THIS TOUR. NO TR	AVEL IN FRG.	NO PHONE CALL	S.		
I. PAGURSKI	Y: DEPARTED,	REPLACED BY	IVAN VLADIM	IR OV ICH	
NI KO LA YE V	J. SUSPE	CT CODE CLERK	BASED ON S	LO T	
SUCCESSION THIS TO	UR. NO TRAV	EL IN FRG. NO	PHONE CALL	s.	
4. [	Jp	RELIMINARY FO	OT CASING D	F HAMBURG	•
SOVIET CONSULTATE	GENERAL INDI	CATED THAT L'P	WITHIN 100	FEET NOT	
READILY AVAILABLE	. WE ARE AWA	RE THAT BEV H	AS OPERATIO	N WITH SIT	E
WHICH MIGHT MEET 1	SISTANCE REQU	IREMENT. NEW	SOVIET REF	ER EN TURA	
CHIEF AND COMMO TO	CH WERE IDEN	TIFIED IN	30 70 1	AND 30804.	
B. JFOR	ARDED DATA T	HEADQUARTER	S CONCERNIN	G SOVIET	
CONGEN USE OF OTP					
EMBASSY, BONN, AF	TER DUTY HOUR	s. [	31634 AND 3	1606). TH	IS
INFORMATION CONST	ITUTED THE ON	LY INDICATION	WE HAVE HA	D AS TO TY	PE
OF COMMUNICATIONS	AVAILABLE TO	THE HAMBURG	SOVIET CONG	EN,	
5.	WE NOT	E THAT REF A	MAKES NO RE	FERENCE TO	·

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A CRYPTO TARGET AT SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSION (SMLM),

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ASSUME THIS DUE TO NEGATIVE RESULTS OF TECHNICAL OPERATION CON-DUCTED AGAINST THIS TARGET APPROX TWO YEARS AGO. E2 IMPDET.

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