

27 March 1975

SOVIET UNION--COLLECTION (OBJECTIVE A-1)A. GENERAL

Several intel reports of interest at the highest levels (on Brezhnev's health) resulted from information provided [] unilateral assets, followed up by [] with the BND. [] Soviet human target program has demonstrated some modest but solid progress. This is particularly true [] where a breakthrough has been achieved in the operation against a difficult but potentially susceptible Soviet target personality (PDHUM), effected by insertion of a specially matched officer from [] and supported by revitalized access agents. Another [] target, a senior GRU officer with demonstrated susceptibilities (PDOBSTACLE), proved difficult to manipulate via the well-placed but inhibited access agent, so we are planning direct case officer contact. Other direct contacts have been effected, in Berlin and Bonn, and new access agents acquired in [] and [] resulting in interesting assessments of target personalities, but none of these cases has reached the manipulation stage. [] is now making increasingly effective use of well-placed access agents to assess and develop targets outside of the previously overworked Consulate General target area. [] we are still having some trouble with access agent acquisition but [] has broadened its direct contacts and has made clever use of technical coverage, including RIS ops calls from telephone booths, to aid in personality assessments. An attempt to insert a transplant officer against [] target (PDSPICE), proved disappointing and the target is soon to depart, but [] continuing successful efforts in access agent acquisition in the target office should bear fruit in any ops against his successor.

B. []

1. Progress

a. During September and October telephone intercepts alluded to travel of two West German dentists to the Soviet Union, apparently to treat unidentified high-level Soviet officials. On 1 November, it was learned through

a sensitive unilateral source that the Soviet official was Brezhnev. Liaison was then approached. CASCOPE finally met and interviewed one of the dentists, who has been the source of a number of reports on Brezhnev's health.

b. The operational activity against PDHUM continued. [] established personal contact with PDHUM. [] managed to meet with him in Bonn twice. During the second meeting, [] received PDHUM's "promise" to "assist" [] in writing a political study on a facet of Soviet/German relations in connection with [] role as a U.S. Government consultant. Audio intercepts from PDHUM's home before and after contacts with [] have no evidence PDHUM suspects [] motives or status. CATOMIC-41 and his girlfriend (CATOMIC-40) had a six-hour dinner party in Bonn for PDHUM and wife. This resulted in a closer relationship between CATOMIC-40 and PDHUM's wife. [] CATOPHAT-5, who has known PDHUM for years. recontacted SPD journalist the latter twice, on 6 December 1974 and 23 February 1975, and supplied useful corroborative observations on PDHUM.

c. After an attempt to arrange a direct introduction of [] officer to PDDARE via an LNFALL Science Attache aborted, [] called PDDARE directly and has been attempting to arrange a luncheon appointment. Contact has also been made with a German journalist and tennis partner of PDDARE, and a West German businessman known to him. In the meantime, Headquarters has obtained PDRUSH's consent to come to Europe a third time and serve to use as an access agent.

d. INATTIC-1 continued his close professional and business relationship with PDOBSTACLE. They met three times in the USSR and West Germany. At our request INATTIC-1 proposed establishment of an escrow account in a Swiss bank for PDOBSTACLE, but the latter rebuffed this proposal. While clearly venal, PDOBSTACLE has proven to be clever, cautious, and disciplined. INATTIC-1, while observant and cooperative, is obviously going to do nothing to jeopardize the source of his new-found wealth. We have, thus far, been unsuccessful in introducing a staff officer to PDOBSTACLE because the latter is virtually inaccessible to professional, business, or diplomatic contact by Americans.

e. CATOMIC-36 recontacted PDDILL in early February after several attempts. PDDILL is interesting because of his S&T position, and because he is one of only two official Soviet Embassy officers who live on the German economy.

officer in SovEmb S&T Section.
own intel. Only non-journalist,
senior officer living outside
rise residence.

CATOMIC-36 and his wife have established what seems to be a personal and social relationship with PDDILL which, although not intense, is worth nurturing.

arrived WGER Mar 72 was f. [] plans to introduce a staff officer to
 bed by SovOfficPDEASY were suspended pending results of Headquarters
 "BREZHNEV's contact with him in the United States.
 adior-at-large". Employed by German Inst. for Peace Research, Starnberg, WGER. Was Scientific
 Exec.of components in g. We completed recruitment and training of a
 ad.ofSciences. young German female interpreter and language student
 (CATOMIC-82) who was discovered to be in contact with
 r. Sov.AF pilot. Headquarters target PDGRUDGE. She agreed to operational
 s rank of Gen. involvement against PDGRUDGE at the Paris Air Show. Due
 a KGB agent. to a job transfer, CATOMIC-82 was turned over to []
 es for aviation on 15 January and is available for future activity.
 als.Visits West.Speaks English & German. Chief,

h. During spring 1974, the Soviet ~~Economic~~ Cultural Section
 & Counsellor and his wife (PDTHIN-1 and -2) began having
 is receptionist marital problems, which PDTHIN-2 confided to her friends
 on the phone. After the couple took separate home-leave
 vacations during November/December, during which PDTHIN-1
 had an affair, PDTHIN-2 resumed her calls. her voice
 indicative of a highly emotional state. []
 [] who has known her under a cover
 situation relatively well since 1971, succeeded in seeing
 her alone. She was controlled but gossiped vindictively
 about her colleagues. Further attempts to expand his
 contact with PDTHIN-2 have been thus far unsuccessful.

i. During the last reporting period, a 70-year-
 ved in Duessel- old German (native Russian) translator of Tatar extraction
 (CATOMIC-79) was recruited as a potential access agent to
 PDOBSTACLE. CATOMIC-79 reported that on 11 November he
 renewed acquaintance with an ethnic Tatar acceptance
 engineer currently working out of the STM in Cologne.
 He has cultivated and entertained the Tatar at our instruc-
 tion, reporting that he likes life and travel in West
 Germany, will be remaining for two more years, and is
 expecting his wife shortly.

j. Headquarters proposed a three-week electronic
 surveillance of the present STM, and a surveillance of
 shorter duration against the Soviet Embassy residence.
 We recontacted a terminated but still cooperative agent
 Corp.employee (CACHIN-107) from whose common wall apartment two previous
 similar surveillances against the STM were conducted.
 Infiltration and exfiltration of the technical officers
 and large amounts of equipment were accomplished without
 incident, during late December and early January. No
 broad band or other signals of interest were detected.

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k. A senior official of the Indian Embassy, Bonn [] agreed to a proposal by [] to report on and accept requirements on Soviet activities in Germany and Soviet/Chinese and Soviet/Indian relations, and agreed without question to keep the relationship strictly confidential. We view this as a major step in his development towards a fully controlled source.

2. Current Capability

a. There are still fourteen active CATOMIC assets: short descriptions are available in the previous FPR. There are only two changes: (1) CATOMIC-82 was transferred [] and (2) we encrypted a young West German journalist (CATOMIC-77) who is not an agent but who wittingly cooperates in helping us develop contact with Soviets or with potential access agents to Soviet (or Soviet Bloc) officials.

b. There were no new audio installations during the period. Our unilateral teletap of PDHUM's residence remains active, but the audio installation is activated only infrequently, for verification of specific items of information.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (newspaper)
correspondent

c. Four Base political assets enjoy more or less regular contact with Soviets at the latter's initiative. Two, CASTENO and CAGARRET, are part of the CAVERDANT operation. PDCAPTURE is in contact with both, and PDHUM maintains a contact with the latter. PDWARBLER has kept up his contact with CAEXCEL despite the latter's retirement from official government service; he apparently still considers CAEXCEL an important channel to the SPD leadership (and, in fact, CAEXCEL still does keep a very close relationship with CACAB.) After more than a six-month hiatus, a senior Soviet Embassy official (Subject of [] has taken up contact with CASENSE, apparently for the purpose of passing on to Foreign Minister and FDP chairman Hans-Dietrich GENSCHEK Soviet distaste over FDP campaign tactics. The above assets have contributed to ten disseminated reports: two were rated significant, and eight were rated regular contributions to Objective A-1. As in the past, most of these reports have come from assets targeted on the host country. One report on Soviet activities in the FRG is based on a series of phone calls from the PDHUM teletap. The lack of hard substantive reporting on Objective A-1 remains a most serious shortcoming.

WGER Foreign Min official

d. Teletap coverage supplied by Liaison remains constant.

e. We maintain our tracking capability: two private investigators and a pretext interviewer.

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f. Surveillance capability remains the same: four surveillance automobiles and a photo van.

g. We continue to maintain two observation posts/ photo points opposite the Soviet Embassy residence and the new STM and STM residence. We recently acquired a command post/observation post near PDCAPRI's residence, for use in discreet surveillance and stakeout of PDCAPRI over a prolonged period of time.

3. Plans.

a. We will attempt to secure PDHUM's advice and assistance in helping [] write a paper on German/Soviet affairs. If successful, we will try to get PDHUM to accept money for doing so. The objective is the establishment of a quid pro quo relationship--money for information of value--with or without a formalized intelligence relationship.

b. We will attempt to establish a working relationship with PDRUSH, to obtain his cooperation in introducing a staff officer to PDDARE. We will install audio in PDRUSH's apartment against the possibility PDDARE will visit him there, to get an independent insight and verify the accuracy of PDRUSH's reporting. We will continue our efforts to place a case officer in direct contact with PDDARE through common interest in S&T matters.

c. We will attempt to place a staff officer in contact with PDOBSTACLE, under circumstances (probably false flag) designed to appeal to PDOBSTACLE's susceptibilities. A plan is being submitted separately.

d. We will continue to establish access to PDDILL through CATOMIC-36 and his wife. Although none of PDDILL's neighbors currently have contact with him, we have selected one individual for potential recruitment as an observer.

e. We will plan the next steps for development of PDEASY upon receipt of full results of Headquarters contacts with him.

f. We are exploring with CATOMIC-79 means by which additional assessment data may be obtained on the Tatar acceptance engineer with the intent of finally effecting case officer contact.

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