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BONN BASE SB OPS PROGRAM REVIEW - July 1974

General Comments

The Soviet presence Bonn/Cologne increased 23% largely due to 18 additional Soviets being assigned to the STM in Cologne. The increase in the STM appears to reflect Moscow's emphasis on increased economic cooperation between the USSR and the FRG. Satellite presence increased 7%, almost totally due to the opening of the Czech Embassy in Bonn.

The Soviet Branch of [] increased by one official cover officer to a total of 14 officer and clerical personnel. [] funds being expended against the Soviet target decreased from [] to [] Actual expenditures increased from [] to [] (current period covered 8 months, the previous only 6).

The [] support structure was streamlined by pruning the CATOMIC Project from 42 to 20 agents. The agents pruned were either terminated or transferred to other projects more in keeping with their operational access and activity.

In general, the [] Soviet Program during the period can be described as active, well-focused, yet alert and responsive to opportunities, and as having made some rather clear progress. This is reflected in the development more or less from scratch of the AEDRAFT and the AEDARE operations (the latter with an assist from Headquarters), the placing of a staffer in direct contact with AEHUM, continued attempts to manipulate AETOWHEE which probably deepened his personal relationship with [] although it did not result in significant improvement in his willingness to cooperate. and the development of new operational opportunities such as [] initiated CATOMIC/36 contact with STM official AEDILL and follow-up of the lead to the retired Soviet Colonel and WWII ace who visited the Hannover Air Show, Genrikh GOFMAN.

Specific Comments

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1. AEHUM - (a 45-year-old NOVOSTI correspondent, S/RIS) Objectives which [] set for themselves and their record in accomplishing them during the period:

- a. Deepen CATOMIC/50's intimate relationship to further assess and manipulate AEHUM. Essentially accomplished although disrupted due to C/50's transfer to Paris over which [] had no control. In fact, [] helped arrange a few subsequent contacts with C/50 traveling back to the Bonn area.
- b. Continue contact through CATOMIC/14. This was done.
- c. Attempt to insert CATOMIC/41 into a relationship with AEHUM as a "caring doctor". This was done and has proven to be a vehicle to introduce our staffer as well.
- d. Attempt to upgrade CATOMIC/6 and CATOMIC/33 contact with AEHUM. These contacts continued, but at about the same level as before.
- e. Attempt to have AEIONIC/1 and/2 reestablish contact with AEHUM. Not done for the stated reason that further access to AEHUM was not necessary and may actually be counter productive.

To be a []

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f. Contact and debrief DS-242 on AEHUM activity and contacts during the early 60's in the USSR. This was done and provided some interesting data.

g. Attempt to install audio in AEHUM's new apartment. This was done as well as a unilateral teletap when the telephone line was found to pass through the LP apartment conduits. This provided us our first view of AEHUM's family life and with AEHUM's and his wife's reaction to the first meeting with [

h. Attempt to insert a staffer into direct contact. This was one [] The staffer is [] on TDY from Headquarters. [] did a particularly good job of building his cover as a retired psychologist also knowledgeable of Germany history by taking part as guest speaker at a student-arranged evening discussion at Cologne University complete with handpainted signs announcing the event. One of the signs is now kept in the CATOMIC/41 apartment for "chance" discovery by AEHUM.

i. Identify, investigate and assess for recruitment various AEHUM contacts through CAFISSION leads and other sources. Such leads are regularly screened but none has surfaced reflecting sufficient potential to follow up at this time.

As the above shows, [] accomplished the great majority of the tasks they had set for themselves. With CATOMIC/50 now mostly out of the picture, we are getting little additional assessment data and we have no significant involvement with the target. From past reporting we have a fairly good picture of AEHUM which exposes some susceptibilities -- arrogance, elitism, hints of a Messiah Complex, great ambition, jewishness -- but we have little firm evidence that he is even thinking of a break with the System.

For the coming period [] has set for itself two tasks: 1) Deepen the [] involvement, and 2) deepen the CATOMIC/41 relationship. The operational task now is to see if we can get [] involved with AEHUM using the CATOMIC/40 and /41 couple as the channel. If this is not successful we would suggest that [] either actively use other available means of getting controlled assessment/involvement through AEIONIC/1, consider direct contact by DS-242 for reaction and possibly exploitation, develop new contacts if this can be done quickly, or drop AEHUM as a primary target.

2. AETOWHEE - (a 43-year-old TASS correspondent, no known RIS) Plans for the period and [] accomplishments were:

a. Discuss development of a joint operation with the BND to better coordinate our activities. We provided the BND with a relatively full and accurate account of meetings and production. Headquarters argued for less involvement with the BND and coordination was limited to passage of material. We finally learned that the BND had little operational equity in this case since their alleged source, PUSSYCAT, was not a recruited agent and in fact they had little control over her.

b. [] would continue to meet AETOWHEE. Done and at a respectable pace of one meeting every 3-4 weeks.

c. Planned to introduce a staffer in the role of [] We delayed this ploy by asking that [] attempt first to improve on the degree of cooperation through various tactics and then AETOWHEE vetoed the idea of meeting another party.

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e. Exploit CATOMIC/6 relationship for further insights to AETOWHEE. This was done.

f. CATOMIC/75 to attempt to develop a low-key but friendly and professional relationship. C/75 has a casual relationship with AETOWHEE and that situation remains unchanged.

This case showed considerable promise with AETOWHEE regularly meeting alone with an American in the latter's apartment, providing information which AETOWHEE felt was not sensitive (we got only four disseminations from the information), accepting requirements and he attempted to fulfill them, taking notes at Party meetings which he brought to the meetings, and he accepted money in the form of regular monthly cash payments and cash bonuses for "particularly good" information. Yet we were not able to induce AETOWHEE to provide more sensitive information let alone to accept recruitment. The introduction of [redacted] was designed to help bring this about and several ploys were used by [redacted] which got limited and begrudging additional cooperation but no recruitment. AETOWHEE said many times that he would not be a spy or do such "dirty work" and our estimate was that if pushed to the wall on this point he would have rejected it and probably would have broken contact. Our attempts to obtain sensitive information without calling it espionage were not successful. The case is now suspended with the final meeting on 15 July 1974 just a few days before AETOWHEE was scheduled to return to Moscow PCS to work at his organization's Headquarters. He agreed to write [redacted] (at our A/A), to inform [redacted] when he was to come abroad again, and agreed to pick up the contact when assigned again abroad.

3. AECAPRI - (a 27-year-old Radio Moscow correspondent, S/KGB) intends to drop AECAPRI as a target and we agree. (This has changed due to AECAPRI's reported involvement in a worldwide commo net and our need to learn more about this.)

4. AEDARE - (a 34-year-old assistant to the science attache in the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, K/KGB S&T officer), This operation really got off the ground during the period with the visit to Bonn of AERUSH accompanied by Headquarters case officer [redacted] AERUSH was able to meet AEDARE and found that his attitudes had not changed which provides us some interesting possibilities. [redacted] moved quickly to follow up with activity undertaken to develop new and additional avenues to AEDARE. This has included:

a. Having a staffer run for exercise each morning in an area AEDARE is known to run in. The purpose is to create an "accidental" contact through which to build an acquaintance.

b. Two West German businessmen who are in contact with AEDARE are under development as possible access agents.

c. Heather GRANT, a eurasian born in India and holding an Indian passport, is being considered as a possible channel of dissident literature to AEDARE. A POA on GRANT has been requested.

d. [redacted] a staffer with an engineering background who is [redacted] will attempt to develop entre to the Soviet S&T group.

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The next major step in the operation will be AERUSH's planned re-visit to Bonn to see AEDARE in mid to late September 1974 after AEDARE has returned from home leave.

5. AEDRAFT - (a 54-year-old Soviet Air Force general and chief of the SMLM at Baden Baden, French Zone, known Military Intelligence). This lead came from Headquarters but [redacted] was able during the period to develop the situation from ground zero to the point of having a staffer in direct contact. This was achieved by gearing up a retired U.S. Air Force officer and former acquaintance of AEDRAFT, to pay a visit to the latter and, although contact was minimal, lay the groundwork to introduce the staffer under alias. The staffer, [redacted] was able to introduce himself to AEDRAFT at a Fourth of July celebration and AEDRAFT promised to call [redacted] in November. AEDRAFT will be away from his post until mid-September. The Base now wants to wait to see whether AEDRAFT will call [redacted]. We would prefer to see further attempts to arrange normal appearing additional contacts between AEDRAFT and [redacted] for the purpose of lightly forcing the issue. If the [redacted] contact does not prove productive we believe that the case not be pursued. There is also some indication that AEDRAFT will soon depart PCS.

6. AEOBSTACLE - (a 52-year-old commercial representative assigned to the STM in Cologne in June 1974, S/RIS). He was only assigned to the STM in Cologne in June 1974 but appears, by his exceptional venality, to be a very attractive target on whom we already have considerable information from a previous tour in Switzerland. Development of this operation will be realized during the coming period but specific plans have not yet been made.

7. AEDILL - (a 39-year-old attache in the S&T Section of the Soviet Embassy, no known RIS). He is a member of the Soviet S&T Section. On [redacted] instructions, CATOMIC/36 met AEDILL and was able to develop a personal relationship over a mutual interest in stamp collecting. The [redacted] considers MOZHOGIN a candidate to become a primary target. We feel that they could first concentrate on getting an initial assessment of AEDILL to determine whether there are sufficient positive factors to warrant making him a primary target.

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