

CARBOHYDRATE/CADROIT CONTACT REPORT

22 July 1955

Date, Time, and Place of Meeting: 22 July 1955, 1900-2215, CARBOHYDRATE's apt.

Present: a. CARBOHYDRATE b.

1. After the usual amenities, the meeting opened with a ~~MEMORANDUM~~ report by CARBOHYDRATE on the present status of the KAISER case:

a. The case came up on 21 July before the Berlin court. Yersin appeared for K. as planned and moved that proceedings be postponed. Court ~~was~~ agreed that K. would not have to appear before the Berlin court. Yersin discussed the possibility of dismissing the whole case for triviality. The ~~main~~ Ass't District Attorney (Mueller) stated at first that this would be impossible, but agreed later that the possibility might be discussed. Mueller felt it would depend upon the ~~same~~ results of the examination of K. This change of opinion on the prosecution's part was due to two things: (1) the CADROIT statement to the effect that K. had always been politically reliable while with CADROIT, but had only acted in immature manner under economic pressures, which Yersin presented to the court, (2) the favorable reaction of the judge to the statement ^{lower level bureaucrats} (remarks by the judge that ~~some of the lower level bureaucrats~~ sometimes get too excited by minor matters such as K&S letter, etc). Yersin et al now think dismissal could be secured. Two things would be required:

a. Discussion between Yersin and K. to coach latter re testimony he should give. As noted earlier, K. will have appear before the Offenbach court, but not the Berlin court. The case file is now in process of being sent to Offenbach and K. will receive a summons to appear.

b. CARBO, as CADROIT representative, should secure from the chief of the ~~Soci~~ a statement similar to that already given by CADROIT playing down the whole affair.

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DATE 2006

Action to be taken re K. cases: HARVARD will be informed ^{per dispatch} of recent events including upcoming summons on K. to appear in Offenbach court and ~~A~~ brief one or two day trip to Berlin and return by Kaiser will be arranged so that ^Versin can coach him thoroughly prior to testimony.

2. After ~~C~~ requested a number of name traces and returned the WANDREY file, the rest of the evening was spent in ~~more~~ general discussion of ~~the~~ overall CAIROIT security problems. Points discussed included:

REGISTRY

a. A review of the manner in which the registry is maintained, as well as the MA true names. The registry is contained in two rooms (Nos. 15 and 16) which are connected. Each room has one main door. Each of these doors has ~~two~~ good quality locks. (In addition, there is a connecting door between rooms 16 and 17; in reality this is a double door. One of the doors has a top to bottom bar lock, and the other has a good quality pin tumbler). Thus two keys are needed to enter the registry. Frau von Rosenberg has one set with her at all times. ~~for~~ Another set is kept in Henard's safe, where he and Frl. Förster have access to them.

All files are kept in the Registry (but not all cards and card files - ^{five} the latter are discussed later). There are ~~three~~ kinds of files:

- (1) Mitarbeiter files. These contain no true MA names, but are carried in covernames. Good leads to the true identity of MA can be learned from the file, however.
- (2) General files. These are subject files ("Prisons", "Hospitals", etc). Low sensitivity, generally.
- (3) Personnel files on all staffers. These are kept in a safe in the registry.

- (4) Correspondence files (Schriftverkehrsakten). Low sensitivity, generally.
- (5) Beurteilungs files--re all cases where CADROIT has given residing in SEZ either now or formerly an opinion on a person, either good or bad.

All files are kept loose in the registry in the sense that a person in the room can have access to the file. The personnel files are an exception to this rule.

The following persons work in the registry, and no others:

Frau von Rosenberg (Chief of Registry)
Frl. Friedrich (Ass't to Chief)
Frau Adler (works half days in registry and half days for one of the Referenten)

Frl. Steinicke (Telefonmittlung, getting files for staffers, other registry work)

Also in the registry are three kinds of card files geared to files kept
kept by CADROIT (do not confuse with card files geared to persons, which are discussed below). The three are:

- (1) A small subject card file (Akten Sache Kartei) for the general and "Sammelakten". You approach this card file with the subject ("prisons", etc) and a card gives you the number of the appropriate ~~file~~ subject file. Card file kept in wood boxes.
- (2) General name file (Allgemeine Akten Kartei). This is a large, ^{true} file which you approach with a name. The file includes all names mentioned in correspondence, all names re whom CADROIT has given an opinion. The card file gives you the number of the files containing the name you are interested in. ^{used} This card file is the chief instrument/for name traces run with CADROIT. Kept in steel cabinet, Frl. Steinicke has key.
- (3) Mitarbeiter card file (MA Akten Kartei). Only covernames are included here. The cards give the number of the MA file.

MA card file is kept in a steel cabinet; Frl. Steinicke has key.

Apart from card files geared to files, there are four card files geared to persons. They are:

- (1) B Kartel (B for "Belastende") which contain the true names of all persons re whom CADROIT has received derog info. This card file is kept in room No. 17 in the registry.
- (2) Beurteilungskartel. Contains names of all persons re whom ~~ESSE~~ CADROIT has given an opinion. Kept in room No. 17 in registry.
- (3) Besucherkartel. Contains names of all visitors to CADROIT, including some MA names (which are buried@nothing distinguishes them as MA). Maintained by Heynen and Schmidt and kept in room No. 14, ~~there~~ in three steel cabinets, each of which has 2 keys. Only Heynen, Schmidt, and Schadow (who works with Heynen part time) can see the Besucherkartel. The location is a security problem; it is now located near a glass wall which could be broken into as part of raid, etc. A metal jalousie would be expensive and impractical due to size of the wall. The only solution seems to be to move the card file to the registry (which will disrupt Heynen's work to some degree, perhaps). LADELL is familiar with the problem.
- (4) Mitarbeiter card file, giving covername and true name and no more. This is the most sensitive file of all, of course. Kept in Room No. 14 in a steel cabinet. Only Frau von Ro. works in this room. The room has only one door (heavy, steel bound, etc). Two keys are required to open the door (one bar lock, one good pin and tumbler). Two sets exist. Frau von Ro. has one set with her at all times. Another set is hidden in LADELL's room as earlier described. Only LADELL, von Ro., and CARBO know

where the second set is hidden. Frau von Ro. can give her set to Frl. Förster on occasion, however. Once inside room 14, a key is needed to open the steel cabinet before access to the cards can be gained. Frau von. Ro has one key with her at all times. Another is hidden in room No. 14. CARBO assures that it is well hidden, could not be found easily by a person even if the latter knew such a key had been hidden in the room. Only Frau von Ro, LADELL, and ~~SAEDEL~~ CARBO know where the key is hidden in room 14.

3. The above review of registry and file/~~maintenanc~~ maintenance had been gone into ~~due to some changes since last review and, primarily,~~ as background to the question, "what could a secretary who was really an SFS Spitzel learn"? Such a penetration could learn the names of a number of Mitarbeiter. This is unavoidable, although the risk taken is minimized by the systems for file and card file maintenance described above. An SFS secretary could learn MA identities in three general ways:

a. She could learn the names of newly won MA. The secretaries, with a few exceptions, work in the same room with the Referenten for whom they work. They hear the conversations between the Referenten and the visitors. When a Referent suggests to a new visitor that he return to CADROIT at some future time, this could be noted. When he does return and agrees to become a MA, this could be duly noted. How does the secretary get the true name? Each visitor receives a slip from Haynen (initial screening of visitors) containing true name, ~~xxxx~~ residence area-but not address, control number (A-19, etc), and occupation. When the visitor comes to the staffers office and the staffer is temporarily out of the office, the slip is merely put on the staffers desk. The secretary can easily note the name, area, and occupation. Most staffers come to trust their secretaries after a period of time. CARBO estimates that a secretary could in the course

of time learn approx. 20 MA identities in this manner. This was the method followed quite a bit by Sohrava (when paper was handled much more loosely, however, and when true names were used on all reports, etc) who ~~xxxxxxxx~~ never had access to the registry, so far as could be determined. CARBO emphasizes that the situation could not be much changed without radically changing the CADROIT modus operandi and without disrupting the staffers's work to a considerable degree.

b. An SFS secretary could get valuable leads to MA identities from the MA files. These are kept in ~~xxxxxxxx~~ coverness, but analysis of their contents will often give a good picture of the occupation, city, factory, building where MA works, etc. Secretaries can get MA files from the registry by asking. Conceivably a secretary could keep a file for a week or more, ~~xxxx~~ and could remove the file to her home or elsewhere for study, reproduction, etc. The danger to her would be that the file would be requested in the meantime by another, and a search for the file would be begun.

c. An SFS secretary would have access to reports made by the MA containing derog info on SED-minded acquaintances known to him. Analysis would give excellent info re the position, location, job, etc. of the MA.

Generally, CARBO concluded that in the course of time, most secretaries become familiar with the true identities of the MA handled by the staffers for whom they work, but that little could be done to change this situation without impairing morale of secretaries (by treating them as "unclean") and generally injecting ~~xxxxxxxx~~ an atmosphere of suspicion MA into the organization which is inconsistent with its good workings.

4. Also discussed was the extent to which the MA have connections to other organizations (party Ostbueros, etc) and the extent to which this has

security implications for CADROIT. CARBO stated that it is really impossible to say how many of the CADROIT MA have such connections; no one really knows. CARBO estimated the percentage as approx. 10% of the MA. (This is the same figure which ICARBO gave as an estimate when this matter was ^{touched upon} ~~discussed~~ earlier). [] noted the requirement that all MA sign a statement to the effect that they have no connection with other orgs. and made the point that ~~none~~ ~~of the~~ ~~arrest~~ ~~reports~~ ~~he~~ ~~had~~ ~~seen~~ ~~had~~ ~~cited~~ ~~such~~ ~~a~~ ~~signed~~ ~~statement~~. After the required notation whether ~~such~~ such a statement had been secured or not had been added to arrest reports, the notation had always been to the effect that the statement had not been secured. CARBO noted that this requirement remains only a paper requirement with CADROIT, since the ~~referents~~ just never get around to discussing the statement with their MA. ~~Referent~~ Hansen, for example, is so busy with the technical aspects of his work (engineering, ~~management~~ economics, etc) that he never gets around to the question of cross-fertilisation vis-a-vis other groups. CARBO made a good suggestion: he would use the secretaries to get the statements. Each time a MA visited and the Sec'y ~~gets~~ gets the MA file for the staffer, she could insert a copy of the required statement which the staffer could then ~~discuss~~ discuss with the MA. Apart from the statement, however, it seemed desirable to get better info on ~~other~~ other connections than was presently available. Could not each staffer over a period of time prepare a brief note for each MA noting either that there were no known connections with other orgs, or what was known of such ^{connections?} ~~suggestions?~~ CARBO noted that this would require much time for 1400 odd MA, and also noted that this requirement was really not his business. [] suggested

that the matter be discussed with RADELL, which CARBO will do.
 8. Also discussed was the extent to which MA are known as such to others. CARBO stated that cases where MA are known as such to other MA are very rare.

There is excellent compartmentation in this sense, generally. In about half

10. CARBO is now on leave. The next meeting with him was therefore set for 4 Aug, 1900, at his apt.