

AIR

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Chief, ER

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

Info: COM; GANT/HARVARD
CADRAIN

Operational/GANT

CACARANA - Termination Report

REF: FOIA-9858

SYNOPSIS: This report covers the events in the CACARANA case from 19 November 1953 until 8 January 1954. Upon this latter date CACARANA-2 departed with her child for West Germany for resettlement by HARVARD. Since the possibilities of CACARANA's reappearing on the scene within the foreseeable future are, to say the least, remote, we regard the case as terminated. A brief analysis of several aspects of the case is included in this report. No requests for action are contained in this report.

1. As stated in reference, CACARANA-2 agreed on 19 November 1953 to sever all contact with her SFS case officer, "Hans", and to proceed to West Germany for resettlement early in 1954. In the meantime she was to sit tight and report to undersigned at periodic intervals. CACARANA-2's next meeting with Hans had been laid on for 27 November 1953, at which time she was to report at 1800 at the Invalidenstrasse meeting point. This date came and went, and CACARANA-2 maintained that she had not attended the meeting. There was then complete silence from the SFS until mid-December 1953 (see paragraph 4 below).

2. On 27 November 1953, CACARANA-2 told the undersigned that she had received certain information from the wife of one Heinz WUSTRACK. WUSTRACK was a VP Rat in the East Berlin Polizei Praesidium until approximately May 1952, at which time

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he was made chief of the "Passierachinstelle Berlin-Mitte". WUSINACK and CACARANA were good friends, and their wives (CACARANA-2 and Frau WUSINACK) were particularly close. CACARANA-2 reported on 27 November 1953 that an aunt of CACARANA, who was acquainted with both families, had shortly before visited WUSINACK and obtained the following information from him: a) Immediately after CACARANA's arrest, WUSINACK had been arrested and held for several days. He was eventually released, but dismissed from the Volkspolizei. During his arrest he was interrogated several times; the interrogators were particularly desirous of obtaining an admission from him to the effect that he had been aware of CACARANA's activities on behalf of the West. His interrogators told him that they knew [redacted] was an espionage agent, and that CARBOHYDRATE had been one before he left East Berlin. b) WUSINACK had also learned, from an unidentified source, that CARBOHYDRATE and all his close friends had been under suspicion since August 1952 - months before CARBOHYDRATE came to West Berlin. This was due to the fact that Werner GROSCHING, in charge of security at the East Berlin Police Praesidium, did not like or trust CARBOHYDRATE. Then, following CARBOHYDRATE's removal to West Berlin, intensive coverage - including mail intercept - was exercised on CACARANA and CARBOHYDRATE's other friends.

3. a) On 27 November 1953 CACARANA-2 also stated that she had further information on the person identified in WGBA-9859. (For the purpose of this paragraph only, this person will be referred to as Identity A; his wife will be referred to as Identity B. Their relationship to the CACARANA case derives from the fact that Identity B and CACARANA's mother (CACARANA-2's mother-in-law) are sisters. Identity A, it will be remembered, appeared to be the only relative of CACARANA who could be the OBI source described in WGBA-9858, paragraph 7b.) CACARANA-2 stated that Identity B had visited CACARANA's mother on 25 November 1953, and described to the latter an approach made to Identity A by certain Americans c/a 20 November 1953. Identity A, according to Identity B, had been approached in the Karlshorst area by a man who said that if Identity A were interested in helping his nephew, CACARANA, he should attend a meeting in West Berlin. Identity A agreed to do this, and, upon arriving at the specified time and place, was met by a German civilian and driven to an office where an American officer in uniform tried to recruit him. Identity A at this time

said that he would be more than glad to assist his nephew, and that if he still had his old connections he could probably do so. As for working for the Americans, however, he was not interested; he had declined the recruitment attempt flatly, and had not again been approached. (Note: CACARANA-2 volunteered this information. No interest in Identity A was expressed to her.)

b) This account, presuming that Identity C and the OSI source are the same person, contradicts that offered by OSI. The OSI trace request on CACARANA arrived at HOB on 9 November; to our resultant queries, OSI responded that they had obtained CACARANA's name from their source, with whom they had already achieved solid contact. At any rate, a standing request has been made of OSI that any information gained by them which could shed more light on the CACARANA case be passed along to us.

4. On or about 14 December 1953 CACARANA-2 received a telephone call from a woman who said that Hans was wondering where CACARANA-2 was and what had prevented her from seeing him. CACARANA-2 replied that she had been ill. The caller extended best wishes for a speedy recovery, and agreed, in view of CACARANA-2's illness and the coming holidays, that contact would be renewed after the first of the year; CACARANA-2 would receive further instructions at an appropriate time.

5. a) CACARANA-2 passed the holidays without incident, and began making arrangements for going to West Germany. HARVARD Disposal Form had been forwarded under EGBA-10415 and EGBA-10414. On 5 January 1954 CACARANA-2 related a curious story about her mother-in-law; briefly, the story is as follows: On 4 January 1954 CACARANA-2's mother-in-law visited her police revier to obtain a certificate in connection with her pension. While she was there, a man wearing the yellow-and-black armbands which indicate that the wearer is blind was led into the station by a patrolman. The blind man inquired about a matter pertaining to his refugee status, but was told by the police officer on duty that he should apply to the refugee authorities for authoritative information on this subject. At this point CACARANA-2's mother-in-law injected herself into the conversation and informed the blind man that she, having been through the same problems with which he was now confronted, could set

him straight. This she proceeded to do. She then, having transacted her own business, left the police station with him and agreed at his request to help him down the steps curbside and across the street. With this accomplished, the blind man demonstrated his gratitude by buying her a cup of coffee. This led to a long and ample interchange of discourse between the two, during which CACABANA-2's mother-in-law unburdened herself of: her real name; her daughter-in-law's reason for being in West Berlin; and the latter's situation, including the fact that she was receiving financial support "through her connections" and was scheduled to be flown to West Germany in the near future. The blind man listened with interest. As for himself, he gave no name, but did relate his refugee story -- he was once a factory owner in the L.R. and had fled for fear he would be imprisoned because of his management of the factory. The discussion was at length ended, and CACABANA-2's mother-in-law wended her way home. After a few hours, she began to suffer misgivings, whereupon she got in touch with CACABANA-2 and related the incident.

b) Later in the day on 5 January 1954, CACABANA-2 called undersigned in a state of high excitement and said that she had received a call from the same woman (she believed) who had called her on 14 December 1953. On 6 January 1954, undersigned met CACABANA-2, who described the conversation in detail. This time the woman had said that Hans was aware that CACABANA-2 was planning to leave town, and that it was absolutely necessary that Hans speak with her once more before she left. She had then been directed to report to Invalidenstrasse at 1800 on 6 January -- if she ever wanted to see her husband again, and if she wanted to spare him certain unspecified unpleasanties. CACABANA-2 was naturally most upset by this message, but after some soul-searching agreed with the undersigned's direction that she must now leave Berlin as soon as possible. It was pointed out to her that this was the most natural threat the SIS could make; and that in actuality it was almost a certainty that any resumption of contact with Hans would lead to her immediate arrest, and that the final result would be further to worsen CACABANA's position as well as to obtain a long term of imprisonment for herself. CACABANA-2 agreed to be ready for departure on the morning of 8 January 1954. She attributed the SIS's knowledge of her impending departure to the incident described in paragraph 5a above. This appears

rather unlively, but it is no doubt probable that CACARANA-2's mother-in-law did do a great deal of loose talking in general, and that the information thus came into the wrong hands.

c) CACARANA-2 called again at approximately 1830 on this same date (6 January) to say that several men had been waiting near her apartment house when she returned home from meeting undersigned, and that one of them had attempted to seize her. She had broken away and bolted up the stairs to her apartment. It was immediately decided that she should be guarded against any possible kidnap attempts before her departure; SCIS was called in, and from 1 hour after her telephone call until 0645 on 8 January, when she was escorted to the vicinity of Tempelhof Airport and turned over to undersigned, CACARANA-2 was under constant protective guard. CACARANA-2 and child left according to schedule: 0800 on 8 January.

6. The following sub-paragraphs describe the remaining "loose ends" of the CACARANA operation in Berlin:

a) CACARANA-2's household effects, or at least that portion of them which was removed to West Berlin, are now in the residence of CACARANA-2's mother-in-law. If and when CACARANA-2 gets herself established in a place of her own in West Germany, NSR will be glad to make arrangements with the mother-in-law (through CAR-BOUYERER) to have these effects picked up and sent to West Germany. We shall await further word, of course, before taking any steps in that direction.

b) CACARANA-2's half-brother is presently in a youth home in Berlin-Pahlem. CACARANA-2 might eventually desire that he join her in West Germany; this however, is entirely her problem, and she was clearly told that we had no interest or responsibility in the matter. We would, however, be willing to waybill him to Frankfurt should it ever appear desirable.

c) CACARANA-2's mother-in-law intends to remain permanently in West Berlin. We have never had direct contact with her; she is, however, aware of the entire circumstances of the case. If she should bring herself to our notice, we expect that CARBOUYERER can handle the matter.

d) CACARNA-2's sister is still employed as a barmaid in Leukoselin. CACARNA-2 stated that her sister is not aware of any of the facts of the case beyond those commonly known to friends and acquaintances -- i.e., that CACARNA was arrested and accused of agent activity, and that CACARNA-2 was arrested, released, and subsequently came to West Berlin as a political refugee. This, of course, may be completely untrue, but we anticipate no contact with this person.

e) Finally, CACARNA himself. As reported before, there has been absolutely no mention of him up to the present time in either East or West newspapers. It is not definite whether a trial has been held, although it is reasonable to assume not, since reports of DDR trials of Western agents usually filter through to public notice. The only clue to CACARNA's existence since his arrest are the letters passed to CACARNA-2 by Hans. These were certified by a graphologist to be genuine, i.e., undoubtedly written by CACARNA. In the absence of any other word as to his fate, we can only hope the best for him.

7. We shall probably never be able satisfactorily to answer the question of CACARNA-2's loyalty. On the one hand, there were occasional contradictions, although not really serious ones, in her story. Her account of Hans' conduct of the case is also highly improbable (KARBOVICHALL agrees on this point). On the other hand, using all the means at our control -- including surveillance, mail and telephone intercepts, interrogation, DEBRIEFING, and rechecking of details she had told us months previously -- we were unable to find any concrete reason to believe that CACARNA-2 was attempting to deceive us. Undersigned's personal estimate remains that CACARNA-2's loyalty -- for good reason -- was divided, and that neither we nor the GDR got a completely straight story. CACARNA-2, in undersigned's estimate, was convinced that she was doing the best thing for all concerned; this conviction she then managed, by some uncertain process of reasoning, to equate into a conviction that she was being completely honest in her dealings with us. Those who have known and worked with this woman personally -- undersigned, Albano, and CAR-BOWYTHANE -- do not believe that she was consciously working against us.

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8. The attached will show telephone intercepts on the subject, which also contain a photostat copy of a letter from the subject to West Germany to his wife in East Berlin and received at West on 12 January 1954. In this letter, OGDEN-2 promised to write to West Germany regularly, describing her progress in detail. We expect thus to have at least a temporary window into OGDEN-2's activities in East Germany. Any information of interest will be forwarded. Incidentally, OGDEN-2 states in her first letter that she had to wait one-half hour at the main-air airport before a West German representative picked her up, and thus this West German representative apologized for the delay, explaining that notice of her impending arrival had not been forwarded well enough in advance. We would like to apologize to West for this if such is the case. As explained above, OGDEN-2's departure was of necessity, somewhat precipitate; we had expected that she would leave several days later, and would thus have had an opportunity to provide West with reasonable notification.

9. A brief analysis of several aspects of this case from the case officer's point of view would appear to be in order here. The OGDEN case was obviously an unfruitful and disappointing one; yet there are some operational considerations involved which, if outlined, might possibly be of interest to others confronted with similar or potentially similar situations. What follows is, naturally enough, hindsight; it is offered merely for whatever it is worth, and if COE and we have any comments, we should be most interested to receive them.

a) The OGDEN operation was initiated by OGDEN-1's recruiting OGDEN-2. The principle of an agent who has left the CIA recruiting a known personal friend to succeed him is not ideal. Yet it is surely one of the most efficient and successful means of continuing (or achieving) a desired penetration. In this instance there can be no reproach made against the beginning of the operation, since OGDEN-1 had been unemployed in East Berlin for some time prior to his departure; and there was apparently no reason to assume that the East Berlin police or the St. held him under particular suspicion, or would devote any interest to his activities or his friends still in the East. An entirely different picture results, however, with the entry of

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CARBONHYDRATE into GABRIEL. He must assume the East Berlin police and the NFB to be quite aware of the fact that GABRIEL is interested in such information as a penetration of the SACASANA type could procure. (We must also assume that the NFB, at least at the time concerned, was accurately informed as to the true identities of GABRIEL employees.) Under these circumstances, CARBONHYDRATE's entry into GABRIEL may well have focused a spotlight on SACASANA: an ex-member of the East Berlin police praesidium goes to West Berlin and goes to work for well-known organization which is interested in, among other things, information on the East Berlin police praesidium. From there it is one easy step for the East Berlin police security officers to reach the conclusion that the ex-officer's friends and acquaintances who are still in the praesidium will bear close and constant scrutiny.

b) The mechanics of CARBONHYDRATE's recruitment of SACASANA led off with the mailing of a letter from the former to the latter through the open mail contrary to the case officer's instructions. This letter contained an invitation for SACASANA to visit CARBONHYDRATE in West Berlin. The mailing of it was an unfortunate operational step, and CARBONHYDRATE simply ought to have known better -- security-conscious individual that he is.

c) The entry of SACASANA-2 into the operation was helpful: she could and did act as courier and assisted in the transportation of bulky material across the sector border. She represented, however, a new element which called for certain additional precautions; these were unfortunately not forthcoming, and undersigned must take full responsibility for the most serious omission -- namely, the failure to prepare and deliver to SACASANA-1 and 2 an "emergency briefing", with particular emphasis upon the coordination of their 2 separate accounts if they should ever (as was later the case) be questioned separately. Their husband and wife are both agents and are each knowledgeable of the other's clandestine activity, the case officer should work out together with them an agreement on one plausible story (with variations if necessary) which they can present when the fateful knock is heard at the door. SACASANA and SACASANA-2 had actually thought of the possibility of their apprehension; but when questioned separately by the NFB, there were certain discrepancies

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in their separate stories which probably gave the SFD interrogators a comparatively easy time. Such an arrangement would not, perhaps, have been to any avail in this present case; but that is obviously no reason for its omission.

d) During the second phase of the operation (that portion subsequent to SACARANA's arrest), we were faced with several problems. Our goal was two-fold: to do everything possible to play the operation along for a reasonable time against the outside chance that SACARANA might be released; and to try to recruit Joachim KONRY. Failing these, SACARANA-2 was to be resettled. This is, of course, what has happened; yet there were factors in this latter portion of the operation which were undesirable. First, there were too many people "cut in on the deal". In addition to undersigned, CARBOHYDRATE, CARBOHYDRATE's wife, and SACARANA-2's mother-in-law were aware of the whole case. It would have been unrealistic to direct SACARANA-2 not to confer with CARBOHYDRATE about the entire matter, since he had introduced her husband into clandestine activity and enjoyed SACARANA-2's full confidence. In addition, it was necessary that he enter the operation to at least a certain extent because he was the principal target from the standpoint of the SFD. There was no reason, however, for CARBOHYDRATE's wife or SACARANA-2's mother-in-law to know the entire case. The presence of these 2 additional "counselors" resulted primarily in SACARANA-2's not always knowing to whom she should listen. This ties in with the other undesirable aspect of this phase of the operation: we were not really in the position to tell SACARANA-2 that she must play the game strictly according to our instructions -- listening only to our advice -- or else be cut off cold. This ultimatum could of course have been delivered to SACARANA-2, but the risk that she would thereafter attempt to play the game alone and be completely broken was too great to permit us to live up to the ultimatum. SACARANA-2 knew too much -- in particular, she was aware that CARBOHYDRATE's superior [] and [] worked in the same office. The planning of this operation should also have included a method by which such an obvious tie-up between CADROIT and KONRYE clandestine activity could have been avoided. It is very difficult, however, to conceive a plan that could have been successful in every respect in the instant case.

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10. In conclusion, it may be said about the first portion of the CACARANA operation (prior to CACARANA's arrest) that the agent was good, the target valuable, and the actual functioning, for a while, excellent. Yet the operation was begun with an error (the mailing of the invitation to West Berlin); the normal security hazard was suddenly compounded (CARBOHYDRATE's entry into CACARANA); and emergency plans were only partial. In the latter portion of the operation, too little control was exercised over both the agent's (CACARANA-2's) knowledge and the agent's tongue.

Date of Origin: 27 January 1954

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