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L. I have been requested to comment upon a projected extension of the functions of TYPHERE. Under Associated No. 3 TYPHERE will be sequired to set up a parentlitary starbusiad not in funtame Garman, designed to become operative with outbreak of bootilities between the USSE and the Markett Allido.

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
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SECURITY INFORMATION

- found a convincing explanation why TPEMBER's resistance potential should be considered as particularly adapted let alone adaptable to the requirements of organizing a paramilitary staybehind not equipped to operate along unconventional warfare lines. Would it not be more correct to say that TPEMBER's co-workers, for the most part jubists, are for the purposes envisaged eminently unqualified? Are they not by temperament and by appringing the very stratum of German society whose conspicuous warmallingness to offer resistance to de facto authority by unconventional methods is a matter of historical record?
- 6. Success or failure of the paramilitary progress will be conditioned by factors of operational security and by standards of operational reporting. This puts it clearly up to Heleon C. Henard, TPENER's unchallenged boss. His success, at least in part, can be etributed to his flair for publicity. A pronounced penchant to project himself upon the national scene, is not matched by an equally fervid attachment to the truth. In the presentation of facts he does not display the judgment and circumportion which he has shown in the valection of his staff. Helson G. Henard's boast that he directs an Intelligence net of about 4000 persome throughout the Seviet Zone of Germany, will strike anybody familiar with conditions in the Saviet Zone as somewhat unrellistic. It may make sense from the point of view of psychological warfare to advance such claims, However, if they pertain to the effectiveness and size of a parenilitary staybehind organization, and especially if they are included estimate, major inaccuracies may one day have to be paid in ti for in blood,
- 7. I do not know whether DIGLAVIER's planning should at this stage take into account contingencies that will devalop as a result of a partial restoration of German covereignty and of German re-militarisation. The question suggests ideals whether it will be possible to maintain untransmitted GEOLGER control over cold war agencies at present working under our amplifies and wisting we will be able to hold on to our paremilitary assets if they are devaloped through one of them.



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- 9. Prior to turning Welson G. Henard over to DYCLAVIER management. he had been tested by the undersigned on a number of DYCLEMATIS-type assignments. He was found not qualified for orthodox intelligence work, mainly because of a conspicuous absence of proper intelligence value standards to guide his efforts, a shortcoming that would make itself felt in the execution of a progress as set forth in Amendment #1. This situation cannot be remedied by the simple device of providing Nelson O. Henerd with a deputy in direct charge of the paramilitary setup. In recognition of the fact that TPEMBER is essentially a one-man show, Amendment #1 makes special provision to accord Nelson G. Henard a dominant-voice in the management of the affairs of Identity 1. This arrangement, although it provides a modisom of assurance that the paychological warfare program of TFEERER will not be relegated into a secondary position, presludes a genuine delegation of responsibilities to the persemilitary deputy and is likely to saddle DYCLAVIER with a very untidy resote control situation.
- 10. From the viewpoint of protecting the control echelon of the paramilitary apparat (Identity 1), Amendment #3 provides the conceivably worst solution. The vigilance of the communist society services is focused upon TPENERS and its activities, which constitute a grave threat to the internal stability of the East German regime. For the purpose of mustering adequate safeguards, we must predicate our security planning on the assumption that the paretration of TPENERS ranks high on the priority schedule of those services. What Amendment #3 in affect proposes is to move the most vulnerable and delicate machanism of the paramilitary system into an area of maximum exposure. Hostile services will have little trouble in applying the assets already developed in combatting TPENERS to its paramilitary annex.
- Il. I also have the impression that we are getting to the point where we seem to be tacking a paramilitary tail onto too many of our major organizational activities in Germany" (quoted from Harold S. Thiting's memorandum, dated 15 April 1952). It is my opinion that the farming out of the implementation of our paramilitary program to semi-sutonomous German organizations, consoling ourselves with a residuum of broad and largely ineffectual supervisory normans, is fraught with langer. By piling wast stay-behind committees to ucon a slim QCCIONE

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SECURITY INFORMATION

staffed control base and by exercising control through proxy, we will be placing ourselves into a most disadvantageous position, should we in the face of a sudden crisis - be called upon to effect a smooth and speedy transfer of our paramilitary assets to DYMAOFIE control. The success of our stay-behind program is not reflected in the publication of imposing and sometimes grossly adsleading statistics, but in a current and reliable estimate of the speed and efficiency with which we shall be able to convert our resistance potential into highly selective, highly controlled and securely organized resistance task forces ready for action on D-day. Assendment 5) fails to provide the preventialists for a case of action of D-day. Assendment 5) fails to provide the preventialists.

It is need not be streezed that, were I convinced that Amendment #1 personents the only fearible approach to the advantages of a purposition of the problem and the problem an

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To attachment t 5892 curfs

12 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, HBBASIS

SUBJECT : Amendment No. 3 to Project TPENERR

As directed by you, I am herewith submitting my comments on above subject.

Attachment: 1

GRAHAH L. PAGE

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