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5. I have not in any of the correspondence made available to me found a convincing explanation why TPEMBER's resistance potential should be considered as particularly adapted let alone adaptable to the requirements of organizing a paramilitary staybehind net equipped to operate along unconventional warfare lines. Would it not be more correct to say that TPEMBER's co-workers, for the most part jurists, are for the purposes envisaged eminently unqualified? Are they not by temperament and by upbringing the very stratum of German society whose conspicuous unwillingness to offer resistance to de facto authority by unconventional methods is a matter of historical record?

6. Success or failure of the paramilitary program will be conditioned by factors of operational security and by standards of operational reporting. This puts it clearly up to Nelson G. Henard, TPEMBER's unchallenged boss. His success, at least in part, can be attributed to his flair for publicity. A pronounced penchant to project himself upon the national scene, is not matched by an equally fervid attachment to the truth. In the presentation of facts he does not display the judgment and circumspection which he has shown in the selection of his staff. Nelson G. Henard's boast that he directs an intelligence net of about 4000 persons throughout the Soviet Zone of Germany, will strike anybody familiar with conditions in the Soviet Zone as somewhat unrealistic. It may make sense from the point of view of psychological warfare to advance such claims. However, if they pertain to the effectiveness and size of a paramilitary staybehind organization, and especially if they are included in the [ ] estimate, major insurances may one day have to be paid for in blood.

7. I do not know whether DYGLAVIER's planning should at this stage take into account contingencies that will develop as a result of a partial restoration of German sovereignty and of German re-militarization. The question suggests itself whether it will be possible to maintain untrammelled OKWIGAR control over cold war agencies at present working under our auspices and whether we will be able to hold on to our paramilitary assets if they are developed through one of them.

8. [ ] has as far as TPEMBER is concerned adopted a position of benevolent neutrality. With predictable certainty [ ] - not BEGACKLER alone - will oppose and possibly try to thwart the activation of staybehind resistance nets in Eastern Germany which they would indist as corollary to the defensive thinking of [ ] and as at variance with the stipulation that only a massive and offensively motivated military investment can enlist German support. I doubt that there has been any material change in this attitude since 1949 when DYGLEMATIS courted an unqualified refusal in its quest for [ ] support in the recruitment

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of W/T operators. We should of course not allow ourselves to be thrown off the course by the anticipation of [ ] opposition. It appears pertinent though to pose the question whether the prospect of an unbridgeable rift between [ ] and TPEMBER and all that entails for the successful discharge of TPEMBER's psychological warfare responsibilities, is not a weighty factor on which the views of the field should be solicited?

9. Prior to turning Nelson G. Henard over to DYGLAVIER management, he had been tested by the undersigned on a number of DYCLEMATIS-type assignments. He was found not qualified for orthodox intelligence work, mainly because of a conspicuous absence of proper intelligence value standards to guide his efforts, a shortcoming that would make itself felt in the execution of a program as set forth in Amendment #3. This situation cannot be remedied by the simple device of providing Nelson G. Henard with a deputy in direct charge of the paramilitary setup. In recognition of the fact that TPEMBER is essentially a one-man show, Amendment #3 makes special provision to accord Nelson G. Henard a dominant voice in the management of the affairs of Identity 1. This arrangement, although it provides a modicum of assurance that the psychological warfare program of TPEMBER will not be relegated into a secondary position, precludes a genuine delegation of responsibilities to the paramilitary deputy and is likely to saddle DYGLAVIER with a very untidy remote control situation.

10. From the viewpoint of protecting the control echelon of the paramilitary apparatus (Identity 1), Amendment #3 provides the conceivably worst solution. The vigilance of the communist security services is focused upon TPEMBER and its activities, which constitute a grave threat to the internal stability of the East German regime. For the purpose of mustering adequate safeguards, we must predicate our security planning on the assumption that the penetration of TPEMBER ranks high on the priority schedule of those services. What Amendment #3 in effect proposes is to move the most vulnerable and delicate mechanism of the paramilitary system into an area of maximum exposure. Hostile services will have little trouble in applying the assets already developed in combatting TPEMBER to its paramilitary annex.

11. "I also have the impression that we are getting to the point where we seem to be tacking a paramilitary tail onto too many of our major organizational activities in Germany" (quoted from Harold S. Whiting's memorandum, dated 15 April 1952). It is my opinion that the farming out of the implementation of our paramilitary program to semi-autonomous German organizations, consoling ourselves with a residuum of broad and largely ineffectual supervisory powers, is fraught with danger. By piling vast stay-behind commitments upon a slim QXCIGAR

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staffed control base and by exercising control through proxy, we will be placing ourselves into a most disadvantageous position, should we - in the face of a sudden crisis - be called upon to effect a smooth and speedy transfer of our paramilitary assets to DYMAGFIE control. The success of our stay-behind program is not reflected in the publication of imposing and sometimes grossly misleading statistics, but in a current and reliable estimate of the speed and efficiency with which we shall be able to convert our resistance potential into highly selective, tightly controlled and securely organized resistance task forces ready for action on D-day. Amendment #3 fails to provide the prerequisites for a staff control situation from which such estimates would normally flow.

12. It need not be stressed that, were I convinced that Amendment #3 represents the only feasible approach to the establishment of a paramilitary stay-behind net, the sacrifice of ~~FRANKE~~ assets which it might entail would not weigh heavily enough to support my recommendation to disapprove it. I am convinced, however, that a more acceptable alternative is clearly within our capabilities. The problems with which we are faced in our paramilitary planning should be viewed primarily not in terms of convertible assets, but of providing an organizational framework which at the outbreak of hostilities can, in short order, be activated to this event, can be fitted into the command structure of an army, ~~land~~ or ~~air~~. For current planning I could visualize as a practicable alternative the activation of a paramilitary staff composed of ~~CRUIER~~ and ~~FRANKE~~ experts in the field of unconventional warfare, operating under DYMAGFIE cover. We should without delay begin to plan the rather important question that the stay-behind activities are completely ~~FRANKE~~ controlled. Some of the advantages of DYMAGFIE cover immediately suggest themselves: The paramilitary control element could easily lose itself in the complex vastness of the DYMAGFIE staff structure, where it would enjoy the protection of the DYMAGFIE ~~FRANKE~~ services. Its ~~FRANKE~~ could be covered by DYMAGFIE ~~FRANKE~~ ~~FRANKE~~, its ~~FRANKE~~ be sanctioned by the provisions of the ~~FRANKE~~ law. Its logistic support problems be facilitated by organizational proximity to a DYMAGFIE staff. Whether such an arrangement would allow for the proper handling of the political ramifications of a stay-behind program, could only be determined on the basis of trial.

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12 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, HBBASIS

SUBJECT : Amendment No. 3 to Project TPEMBER

As directed by you, I am herewith submitting my comments on above subject.

GRAHAM L. PAGE

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