

UNCLASSIFIED

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SECRET

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:	NO. EGDA - 12500
2107K	DATE 10 Mar 54

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FOR'D		
1.	1310K			<i>[Signature]</i>	1 for your retention
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
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8.					
9.					
10.					

MAY 3

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WAR OR WES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

SECRET

AIR

WORA-12500

10 MAR 1954

CHIEF OF MISSION, Frankfurt

10 Mar 1954

CHIEF, Berlin Operations Base INFO thru FRANKFURT: CHIEF, OS

CACOM/OPERATIONAL

CACOM/GEFARFUL/DT-ORIG

**SUMMARY:** On 17 February 1954, Nelson G. Hazard informed the CACOM Case officers that he was expected by the GEFARFUL Executive Committee to make a trip, during March 1954, to a number of Near East countries. This office opposed the contemplated trip and suggested that efforts be made through [ ] to have it called off by [ ]. A decision was made by Washington and Frankfurt that this office inform Hazard that the trip not be taken. This was accomplished, and after several days, Hazard informed the Case Officers that it was too late to postpone the scheduled trip. This office suggested (REF ID: A6697) that Hazard's reply was an indication of bad faith and that if he persisted by this decision, a request for his dismissal was the only solution. CCM authorized the Detroit Case Officers (SPRAN 4704) to clearly state to Hazard the consequences of his refusing to abide by EUBANK instructions. A meeting was held on 19 March 1954 during which these instructions were given Hazard. He requested an answer to several questions before making his decision. It is the purpose of this dispatch to summarize the developments of the above situation to date.

1. On 17 February 1954, Hazard stated that as a result of a decision made by the GEFARFUL Executive Committee during its meeting in October 1953 in the Hague, he was expected to make a trip to Turkey, Lebanon, Iran and other Middle East countries. The primary purpose of this trip, according to Hazard, was to explore the possibilities of holding TPOANMAN during the latter part of August 1954 and to brief the Chief of the GEFARFUL Turkey Office regarding his particular duties. He was further to assess the feasibility of founding GEFARFUL country organizations in the other countries mentioned.

2. This office opposed the idea of Hazard making this particular trip since it could conceivably reduce effective control over him and might precipitate undesirable or untimely commitments regarding TPOANMAN. In BERLIN 2737, the situation was outlined and the suggestion was made that pressure be placed upon [ ] through [ ] to cancel the trip and otherwise restrict Hazard's activities on behalf of GEFARFUL to a strict outline. This suggestion was made in recognition of the fact that any directives from the CACOM Case Officers in this connection might have had an adverse effect upon the rapport that they had with him. Furthermore, there were indications that whereas the Executive Committee may not have ordered Hazard to make the trip, it had done nothing to prevent him from making it, thus implying latent approval and, in Hazard's eyes, encouragement.

3. After Frankfurt had concurred (SPRAN 6104) with the position outlined in the Berlin recommendations, a series of cables (DP 39258, SPART 1603, SLEWD 0050,

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from the "low" position he had had following the Schramm defection and the subsequent investigations, back to his normal "high" position wherein he controls everything. Although efforts had been made, with good reason, to keep Hazard in the background, he had been successfully active to amend that situation. Ladell was informed that should a dismissal of Hazard become necessary, he (Ladell) would be the most probably and logical successor. Ladell was asked regarding his opinion of such development. He answered that he was sure that he would be able to assume the responsibility of the assignment, but questioned whether there were any other possibility of solving the situation other than by dismissal. He suggested that every effort be made to influence the OXFORD Executive Committee, if that could possibly be done, since almost any manner in which Hazard would be dismissed (or allowed to resign, as the case may be) might cause repercussions against CADROIT. To support this, he stated that it was his opinion that CADROIT, as an organization, could assume a great portion of the credit for reducing outside attacks against Hazard personally, and that when this organizational support is gone, it would be entirely conceivable that personal attack would be launched again against Hazard with resulting disclosures (Doctor title, lack of requirements to even practice law, etc) of certain embarrassment to CADROIT and its leading functionaries. Ladell was told that everything would be done to rectify the situation, if such were possible.

12. On 10 March 1954, in accordance with the instructions contained in SFMAN 4704, Hazard was instructed that if he should decide to abide by his decision to go on the proposed trip, his resignation from CADROIT would be requested. This revelation apparently upset Hazard considerably for he made no comment for several minutes. His first question was how he could publicly explain his resignation. He was told that it would merely be necessary for him to make a public statement that his other activities were such that he could not give CADROIT the attention it deserved. Hazard then stated that it appeared that EUBANK had little respect for the work he had done on its behalf to make such a suggestion. It was explained to him that was not the case, but rather that EUBANK considered his work in Berlin so important that it did not wish his energies expended elsewhere, even though the value of OXFORD was recognized and respected by all. Hazard attempted to call the proposal illogical, i.e. his work in Berlin was being considered so essential that if he did not comply, he would be dismissed. Then Hazard brought up two points which might be considered as veiled threats or bluffs. The first of these was a question whether the CADROIT Case Officers felt that Ladell would or could assume the leadership of CADROIT. This was answered in the affirmative with the qualification that it was a matter which was not pertinent to the problem at hand and would be taken care of separately. The second point Hazard raised was in connection with the future of CADROIT. He implied that since he had built CADROIT, it was conceivable that it could not exist without him, i.e. if he resigned, enough of the important CADROIT Staff members might resign to make the organization completely unworkable. Hazard implied that other financial sources might also be obtained.

13. He then stated that too many commitments had been made to postpone the Near East trip and that many preparations had been made by persons awaiting him in Turkey. In answer to this argument, Hazard was informed that many persons, even diplomats in very high standing, often are required to change their plans and make apologies for not being able to attend quite important engagements. Hazard then questioned whether the instruction not to go on the proposed trip was one of temporary nature, i.e. only a restriction until after the Geneva Conference, or whether it was to be considered an indication that he was not to make any trip to the Near East on the behalf of OXFORD. He so identified the trip with the concept of future work with OXFORD, that the two are apparently nearly synonymous in his own mind.

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14. Hazard stated that he considered the matter too important for him to make an immediate decision and requested that it be determined whether the restrictions concerning his QKFEARFUL activities are to be considered of temporary or permanent nature before he would make up his mind. Hazard was cautioned that he had previously agreed to the provision that insofar as QKFEARFUL matters were concerned, he would clear any and all actions which were to be required of him. Hazard made no answer to this statement.

APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_

10 March 1954

Distribution:

3 - COM (ATTN:  w/att (1)  
3 - Chief, EE (ATTN:  w/att (1)  
1 - BOB/KUPIRE w/o att.  
1 -  w/att (1)

Attachment: UNSEPCOV

Attachment A

ADDENDUM:

As cabled on 10 March Hazard is to give his decision to [ ] at 1600, 11 March 54.  
Unless he accepts our instructions he will be dismissed.